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# **Elite and Everyday Social Contracts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pathways to Forging a National Social Contract?**

*‘Everywhere we turn, all doors are closed for us.’<sup>1</sup>*

## **Abstract**

The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, it also solidified antagonistic political identities leading to the creation of two social contracts: an ‘elite social contract’ involving primarily political elites of the main ethnic groups and an ‘everyday social contract’ involving ordinary citizens trying to manage a complex social and economic environment. The first social contract is hegemonic, however, alternative, non-nationalist views are slowly emerging. Grassroots groups, the surviving remnants of inter-ethnic coexistence, the integrating pull of market forces and the presence of a large diaspora all constitute resources for the creation of a resilient national social contract.

**Keywords:** Social contract, Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnicity, coexistence, grassroots groups, diaspora, political settlements, institutions, social cohesion

## **Introduction**

The 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) which aimed at managing tensions between the three main ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, identified in the Constitution as the country’s Constituent Peoples - by both preserving the territorial integrity of the state and dividing it internally, mainly along ethnic lines. The implementation of the agreement introduced one of the most wide-ranging peacebuilding interventions the world had seen to that day. A wide array of international organisations, led by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), imposed laws, removed democratically elected officials, transformed the legal system and overhauled the economy of the country. However, 22 years into the peace process, BiH has not yet witnessed the creation of a resilient national social contract.

As part of a multi-country study on Forging Resilient Social Contracts,<sup>2</sup> in this case study on BiH and in line with the other country cases and project framing (McCandless 2018), we investigate what drives a *resilient national social contract* – that is, a dynamic agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together, how power is exercised and how resources are distributed. The research examines how resilience or durability of the social contract is forged through three ‘drivers’:

1. Political settlements and social contract-making mechanisms are increasingly inclusive and responsive to ‘core conflict issues’ (CCIs).<sup>3</sup>
2. Institutions (formal, customary, and informal) are increasingly effective and inclusive and have broadly shared outcomes that meet societal expectations and enhance state legitimacy.
3. Social cohesion is broadening and deepening, with formal and informal ties and interactions binding society horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (between citizens/groups and the state).

To examine social-contract making dynamics in and through these three drivers, we focus on two CCIs, namely, competing conceptions of territorial boundaries and loyalties, and ethnically structured governance.

We argue that two competing social contracts have been created in BiH, an ‘elite social contract’ and an ‘everyday social contract’. The elite social contract encompasses political elites from the three main ethnic groups, along with the international community, business elite, judiciary, and some segments of civil society. For this contract, ethnic tensions are instrumental in preserving the power of the political and economic elite. This is an elite whose members, despite the occasional use of inflammatory rhetoric, are able to accommodate each other’s interests across ethnic lines. This contract therefore exploits rather than addresses CCIs and works against the drivers of a resilient social contract. The main goal of this contract is to freeze the status quo in order maintain control over each respective community, i.e. to preserve elites’ power and (mis)manage economic resources to the advantage of a relatively small clique of people.

The everyday social contract involves citizens trying to make sense of and manage a social and economic environment heavily disrupted by the 1992-95 war. The manifest limitations of the elite social contract in delivering jobs, educational and health services, and in general in addressing the demands coming from citizens, has led many Bosnians to assign less weight to group differences (SCORE 2014)<sup>4</sup>, and to rely largely on themselves and/or

informal networks to meet their needs, and to access services and opportunities. In this way, they are pressuring institutions for greater socio-economic inclusivity which influences vertical and horizontal social cohesion within the country. This bottom-up pressure is inherently complicated by the fact that the elite social contract sets the parameters within which the everyday social contract develops and evolves. Accordingly, citizens cultivate their relationships, views, and expectations within a context dominated by the nationalist-driven, status quo-oriented elite social contract. Non-nationalistic forms of agency and citizenship claims exist but are side-lined and their manoeuvring space is very limited.

Needless to say, the relationship between the two social contracts can assume many forms. For example, some citizens may rely only on themselves and avoid contact with political leaders and/or political parties as much as possible, while others may be linked through patronage networks to political elites, suggesting the existence of significant overlaps between the two contracts. Accordingly, the identification of this binary serves to draw attention to a fundamental dynamic of Bosnian politics, but should not imply the presence of two neatly divided, coherent, and isolated contracts. In addition, not all actors belonging to each contract can be analysed within a single article. Due to space limitation we will focus on the two most consequential actors belonging to the elite social contract, that is, local political elites and the so-called international community. As we shall see, the role of the international community has been frequently contradictory, because it ranged from working hard to embed those aspects of the peace agreement which facilitated the rule of ethno-nationalists to openly fighting domestic oligarchs. Overall, we place the international community within the elite social contract because of its role in guaranteeing a political-economic order favourable to domestic elites, while attempting to address the symptoms emerging from structural dysfunctions. In particular, since its most recent failed attempts to reform the Bosnian Constitution in 2006, the international community has become increasingly passive vis-à-vis domestic misrule.

In this context, over the last decade a few grassroots initiatives replaced the international community in challenging the elite social contract through protests, informal citizens' councils (plenums) and various initiatives aimed at addressing the socio-economic needs of the population shared across the ethnic spectrum. Together with the surviving remnants of inter-ethnic co-existence, the integrating pull of market forces, and the presence of a large diaspora, they have the potential to contribute to the creation of a resilient national social contract. This paper examines how these elements could help unravel the elite social

contract and aid the transformation of the everyday social contract into a resilient national social contract.

This research is based on extensive scholarly and desk analysis, including surveys and data from several regional and global indices. Additionally, three focus groups were held in Jajce, Doboj and Tuzla between January and February 2017. The presence of an ethnically mixed population and of a degree of co-existence in Jajce (between Croats and Bosniaks), Doboj (between a Serb majority and significant population of Bosniak returnees) and Tuzla (between a Bosniak majority and significant population of Serbs and Croats), together with various types of socio-economic segregation, have provided some coherence in exploring the identified drivers of social contract, as well as the CCIs. We have also tried to have a balance of perspectives from both administrative entities (Jajce and Tuzla from the Federation of BiH and Doboj from the Republika Srpska). Sampling of focus groups aimed to gather the views of different segments of society. To that effect, participants in our focus groups included pensioners, grassroots activists, members of NGOs, scholars, municipality/city officials, entrepreneurs, members of the diaspora, unemployed and employed persons from both younger and older age groups. We had 12 participants in the focus group in Jajce and 10 participants in Doboj and Tuzla. The discussion revolved around issues addressing the project's research questions, and inform the analysis below. To minimize selection bias, and to triangulate findings, twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials of international organisations, as well representatives of state-level institutions, non-governmental organisations and grassroots actors.

## **Context**

Since the beginning of the Ottoman domination (1463), Bosnians of all nationalities have been accustomed to growing up in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment. The degree of toleration and respect in this environment has been frequently noticed, and perhaps overstated. However, it is noteworthy to stress that the main national groups lived side-by-side with very little animosity ever occurring between them (Donia and Fine 1994). Large-scale violence between Muslim landlords and Christian peasants broke out for the first time in the 1870s due to socio-economic motivations, and not religious or ethnic ones (MacCarthy 1996). Only during World War II did BiH experience a civil war involving mass killings, atrocities, and displacement. However, even this outburst of violence was to a significant extent instigated by Nazi collaborators from neighbouring Croatia and Serbia. When the

process of Yugoslav dissolution began in the early 1990s, nationalist leaders and parties won the first multi-party elections in 1990 by capitalising on painful experiences and traumas from the first half of the 1940s (Obershall 2000).

After three and a half years of war,<sup>5</sup> the DPA aimed to manage tensions between the three main ethnic groups by preserving the territorial integrity of the state while endorsing the internal separation of the three groups into two semi-independent entities: the Federation of BiH (FBiH),<sup>6</sup> predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Srpska (RS), predominantly populated by Serbs.<sup>7</sup> In addition to dividing the country into the FBiH and RS, the DPA left the status of the town of Brčko to be determined through arbitration. In 1999 Brčko District became a separate administrative entity (OHR 1999), thus contributing to further decentralisation in a country of less than four million people. Decentralisation and group identity accommodation resulted in one of the most cumbersome administrative apparatuses per capita in the world. The existence of various levels of governance and of much overlapping in competencies across state, entity, cantonal and municipal levels resulted in numerous opportunities for ethnic outbidding, policy paralysis, the creation of informal networks and corruption (Belloni and Strazzari 2014). Post-war economic recovery has been slow, and has resulted in the highest rate of unemployment in Europe.

In this context, two main conflict issues serve as hindrance to the establishment of a resilient social contract. The most important one revolves around the presence of different conceptions of the territorial boundaries of the political community and the rights of citizenship within that community. The DPA recognised the existence of BiH within its historical boundaries (a concession to the Bosniaks) governed by central institutions with very limited competences. The recognition of the legitimate existence of the RS constituted the main concession to the Serbs. Croats obtained the further decentralisation of the FBiH into ten Cantons – in such a way achieving some degree of self-government at least at the local level. In addition, both Croats and Serbs attained the right to establish a ‘special relationship’ with Croatia and Serbia respectively.

After they ratified this compromise through the endorsement of the DPA, the three groups disagreed over its implementation. Bosniaks, who are the relative majority in the country, favour the creation of an ever more centralised, ‘Weberian’ state, which supposedly would be under their strong influence. Accordingly, they demand that as many competencies as possible are transferred from the two entities to the central government based in Sarajevo. By contrast, both Croats and above all Serbs vociferously reject these demands of further centralisation. Instead, they are in favour of preserving de-centralised governance and, if

possible, of acquiring greater forms of autonomy and independence (Sebastian – Aparicio 2014). In sum, the first conflict driver suggests that Bosnia is plagued by a ‘stateness problem’, where profound discrepancies exist between the boundaries of the political community and the rights of citizenship within that community (Belloni 2008a, 17-18).

The second CCI involves the ethnic based governance system created by the DPA. This system has favoured the persistence and strengthening of a political “zero-sum game” between the three main communities through a combination of two main aspects (Bieber 2006). First, ethnic difference is inscribed in the law and mapped onto territory. The DPA has established a consociational structure which accommodates nationalist demands, reifies ethnic belonging, and provides no incentives for politicians to cross ethnic divisions. Consequently, in order to gain votes from their respective communities, political parties have moved to the extremes in a process of ‘ethnic outbidding’ frequently recognised in the literature on ethnic politics.<sup>8</sup> Second, and most importantly from a long-term perspective, in a consociational system each nationalist leadership manages its own cultural politics, emphasising the one-sided memorialisation of their own group’s suffering during the war, and promoting exclusive (and occasionally inflammatory) national symbols, celebrations, and the like. Given these problems with the ethnically based governance system created at Dayton, it is unsurprising that policy analysts argue that for the foreseeable future ‘[t]he most likely eventuality is continuing institutional paralysis, ever-rising tensions and further crises’ (Bennet 2016, 238).

While experiencing the influence of these CCIs, BiH also possesses certain resilience capacities that can be tapped into in the service of peace, the most important of which are found in the existence of grassroots groups, the integrating pull of market forces, and the presence of a large diaspora potentially available to participate constructively to improve the post-war order. All of these capacities play an ambivalent role for peace in BiH and should not be romanticised, but they can exert a positive influence on the building of a resilient social contract, in particular by contributing to transform two social contracts – the elites and the everyday ones – into one, as further argued below.

## **Core Conflict Issues and the DPA**

In this section we examine the influence of the elite social contract in various ‘social contract-making mechanisms’, as defined in the overarching research framing, across peace-making, transitional institutions, formal governance, and ‘everyday’ spheres (McCandless 2018). Peace-making negotiations focused on core conflict issues but led to the establishment of a political system amenable to nationalist manipulation, with the international community both attempting to guarantee (nationalist) stability and trying to support the building of a functional state by strengthening central institutions. Legal challenges have been levelled at the DPA, but were either not implemented or resulted in changes that failed to modify the ethnic nature of governance. In this context, citizens are increasingly cynical about the formal political process. Those who continue to vote are usually embedded in the nationalist clientelistic network, guaranteeing themselves jobs, pensions, and services.

### ***Peacemaking***

The signing of the DPA was achieved after 20 days of proximity talks held in Dayton, Ohio. Neither the process that preceded the talks, nor the talks themselves were fully inclusive. Additionally, neither were clear implementation mechanisms and related commitments envisioned. Both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were only marginally represented, with their delegations in Dayton led by the President of Serbia and President of Croatia respectively. Completely excluded were any representatives of other communities (such as Roma and Jewish), as well as civil society groups and, more broadly, Bosnian citizens (Belloni 2008b), especially women (McLeod 2018). The OHR, which was mandated with the task of overseeing the civilian implementation of the agreement, constituted the main transitional mechanism established at Dayton to implement commitments. The Peace Implementation Council, composed of 55 countries and agencies, is tasked with clarifying the goals of peace implementation and the responsibilities of OHR until BiH is deemed politically stable and self-sustainable.

The discussion at Dayton focused on the CCI involving the nature and status of the state but the agreement reached by the parties was backward, rather than forward-looking, that is, it was driven by the imperative of ending the war rather than building a viable state (Zahar 2005). International mediators attempted to address CCIs, in particular each group’s favoured institutional preference, by involving political elites responsible for the war. Unsurprisingly, the DPA had two main characteristics. First, it reflected the political priorities of the ethno-nationalists who negotiated it. It was an elite settlement that guaranteed



the immediate interests of each group and their leadership and which soon evolved into an elite social contract involving a set of unspoken rules on how political leaders would maintain their grip on power, exercise control over their constituencies, and (mis)manage economic resources often in close collaboration with criminal actors who emerged as a new group of politically connected entrepreneurs in the post-war period (Pugh 2017).<sup>9</sup> The institutionalisation of ethnicity at all levels of governance guaranteed the post-war prominence of the same political parties and individuals who conducted the war. This was frequently recognised by the focus group participants, who identified the existence of multiple layers of governance as conducive to exploitation by nationalists and observed how entity and state level governance are ‘all just a show for the masses’, the real power resting in the local control of the few resources available.

Second, no attention whatsoever was given to either the functionality of the soon-to-be-established institutions or more generally the implementation of the accord. To begin with, the complex institutional structure went hand in hand with the creation of an unwieldy administrative apparatus. Not only has this system created an inefficient and corrupt economy, but also it has handed over the control of jobs in the blotted public sector to nationalist political parties, and established a large bureaucracy loyal to them, thus reinforcing the second CCI identified above. Such a control has supported the development of a degree of acquiescence and apathy among the general population, whose wellbeing frequently depends upon political parties’ handing out of jobs, perks and benefits (Moore 2013, ch. 7; Jansen 2015, ch. 6). One of the focus group participants in Jajce adroitly described the Byzantine and wasteful nature of Bosnian institutions when he explained that ‘not even China would be able to cope with this big administration’. Another participant in Tuzla, a male in his late 40s, employed as a telecoms operator, used the old Bosnian proverb ‘gdje je puno baba, kilava su djeca’ (too many cooks spoil the broth) to describe the political system which emerged from the war.

Moreover, not only did the DPA create a heavily fragmented system but, in the attempt to address the first CCI involving the nature of the state, it also recognised two potentially conflicting realities: the territorial integrity of BiH – demanded by the Bosniaks – and the existence of the RS – required by the Serbs. The post-war implementation period has been primarily characterised, on the one hand, by the Bosniaks’ attempt to centralise as many competencies at the state level as possible and, on the other hand, the Serbs’ insistence on preserving the quasi-sovereign prerogatives of their entity, even by threatening to hold a referendum to achieve full independence (Sarajevo Times 2017). For their part, Croats have

solidified control over the municipalities where they are a majority, while demanding greater autonomy and even the establishment of a third, Croat entity (Haltzel 2017). The contested nature of political institutions has alimanted a widespread feeling among the population that the Dayton order is ‘temporary’.<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, this perception has contributed little to citizen commitment to the new post-war institutions.

In this context, the main nationalist political parties interpreted the DPA, and the commitments required to implement it, according to their political priorities. In general, political parties have little or no interest in implementing any measure that could address either the first CCI involving alternative conceptions of the state or the second CCI concerning the ethnic nature of governance. On the first point, despite heated debate within each ethnonational camp, no political party has ever questioned the respective groups’ preferred institutional views (Basta 2016, 953). The elite social contract rather, has meant stubborn attachment to each maximalist political stance. On the second point, nationalist rhetoric ensures the perpetuation of zero-sum political dynamics which favours nationalists’ control of the economic resources – including state jobs. Not only do these dynamics reinforce the second CCI, they also benefit ethno-nationalists and hinder the growth of civic alternatives (Mujkić and John Hulse 2010). Elites gain from the existing institutional framework in at least two ways. First, never-ending controversy concerning constitutional reform functions to maintain communal fears, allowing elites to present themselves as guarantors of the safety of their respective constituency, while legitimizing extractive activities. Second, the complex institutional framework is conducive to the development of informal networks, corruption and similar practices (Belloni and Strazzari 2014). In particular, clientelism further contributes to demobilise political and social opposition.

### ***Transitional Sphere***

In a context still dominated by the two CCIs, implementation of the DPA has depended primarily on the engagement of the international community. International actors have guaranteed the ethnic (dis)order which emerged from the war, and thus implicitly allied themselves with local elites benefiting with the peace process, but at the same time they pushed through policy decisions when local actors refused to cooperate in the implementation of the agreement (although, as discussed below with reference to the second driver, with contradictory results). In addition to the role of the OHR, BiH’s Constitutional Court played an important role with regard to constitutional issues. This Court is the main hybrid

institution in the country, composed by six local judges (two Bosniaks, two Croats, and two Serbs) and three international judges selected by the European Court of Human Rights. In its 2002 ‘constituent peoples case’ the Court ruled against institutional segregation and national discrimination within State institutions and thus opened the way for the representation of all three constituent peoples in both entities, as well as for the introduction of the language and script of other constituent peoples (McCrudden and O’Leary 2014, 86-87). This decision was important in providing greater representation of the three constituent peoples throughout the territory of BiH, but it has also further entrenched ethnicity as the foundation of the state and the institutions at all levels.

Another legal challenge was brought to the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 with the *Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina* case. The Court found that national minorities could not enjoy the citizenship right of competing for office and thus urged Bosnia to amend its constitution with regard to the election of the members of the House of Peoples and the Presidency. The endless negotiations among Bosnian political parties concerning the question of how to implement the Court’s ruling testifies to the nationalists’ resistance to any changes which could weaken their complete dominance of the political system. In practice, the elite social contract worked effectively to perpetuate the status quo. While in the constituent peoples case the High Representative enforced constitutional and legislative changes, in the *Sejdić & Finci* case international reliance on the principle of domestic ownership of the peace process ensured a deadlock in the negotiation.

### *Everyday*

At the everyday level, the distance between citizens and the formal peace implementation process is reflected in the widely held lack of interest at the popular level for constitutional issues, the technicalities related to the implementation of the DPA, and more broadly for the political sphere. This is reflected in a noticeable decline in voter turnout over the years, signalling low vertical social cohesion in the country.<sup>11</sup> A retired woman of Croat background, in the focus group in Jajce, stated ‘it pains me to hear people saying, “this is our fault, we choose them in elections”; this can’t be true because around 50 per cent of the population doesn’t vote in the elections, people are simply disillusioned with the system’. A significant portion of those still voting are embedded in political parties’ patronage networks, and thus exercise their right to vote in order to maintain or gain employment opportunities and other benefits. For example, the former nationalist mayor of Jajce was widely perceived

as having a penchant for favouring his kin in distributing resources, jobs and perks (Kurtović 2011, 243). Thus, the backing of governing parties is largely dependent upon the handing out of resources. All other citizens, roughly half of the population, consider the political sphere as an arena to avoid. They struggle daily to make ends meet through their societal network, which may even extend across ethnic lines.

Overall, more than two decades of experience of the implementation of the DPA suggests the existence of little political interest in adopting any compromise that could undermine the logic of ‘zero-sum’ intergroup dynamics. Accordingly, peace implementation has been slow and mostly driven by international actors, while domestic political actors, in particular Serb and Croat nationalist parties, have regularly resisted external interference aimed at supporting the building of viable state institutions. In addition to being disinterested in constitutional issues, people at the everyday level either vote strategically to access economic and other resources, or reject the political sphere and rely on their informal connections and networks. In sum, institutional dynamics and ‘social contract-making mechanisms’ succeeded in managing CCIs peacefully, but at the cost of entrenching nationalists’ control and of demobilising citizens.

## **Institutions: Promoting Nationalist Forms of Legitimacy and Inclusivity**

### ***Inclusion and (In)Efficiency***

Inclusion viewed through institutional representation of the three ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) is relatively high as they are all represented at the level of central institutions and to some extent at the entity level. Local institutions on the other hand tend to be dominated by Bosniaks and/or Croats (in the FBiH) and Serbs (in the RS). However, this ethnic inclusivity fails to adequately translate into state legitimacy because of the poor performance of institutions at all levels. The perception of the performance of public institutions and services is below the regional average on all indicators, including transparency, treatment of citizens, time required for acquiring information and obtaining services, and price of public services (Regional Cooperation Council 2016, 105-112). As a result, institutions are widely perceived as inefficient, unfair, and unpredictable – in sharp contrast to the perception of the pre-war, Yugoslav institutions whose main task was to care for society as a whole, above all by providing social security and universal medical assistance

(Cohen and Marković 1975). Post-Dayton BiH has drastically reformed the old system: although citizens yearn for ‘normal lives’, entailing a developmentalist state able to ensure stability and predictability in social protection, they face ambiguity and flexibility (Jansen 2015). The provision of services is decentralised, making welfare support dependent on where citizens reside. Consequently, in addition to being inefficient, because of administrative divisions based around identity belonging, services are provided on the basis of ethnic criteria, thus perpetuating societal divisions (see the discussion on driver 3 below) and hindering the development of a resilient national social contract.

Notably, education is one of the many prerogatives decentralised to the sub-state level, the entity government in the case of the RS and the cantonal authorities in the case of the Federation. As a result, the educational system is de facto divided into three separate curricula, while pupils are separated on the basis of their declared nationality. In practice each curriculum, and in particular history textbooks, serves to spread negative stereotypes about other national groups, while celebrating the qualities and virtues of their own group. In such a way, both divided teaching and textbooks have strengthened Bosnia’s divisions and, by so doing, they suited ‘the purposes of political elites and helped them to maintain the status quo’ (Torsti 2013, 220). The nationalist narrative perpetuates the influence of the first CCI, and works against the establishment of a resilient national social contract.

On the aggregate, data from the 2018 Fragile State Index suggests an improvement in delivery of public services between 2006 and 2018 from a score of 5.8 to a score of 3.3, suggesting that ‘public services are adequate in rural areas and more than adequate in all urban areas’ (Fund for Peace 2018). However, perhaps confirming the imperfect and politicised nature of statistical production in the ‘fragile states’ settings (Rocha de Siqueira, 2017), both our focus groups and ethnographic literature reveal the presence of a diffuse sense of dissatisfaction with the universality of coverage, which largely depends on wealth, the place of residence or the work of non-state actors (Jansen 2015). Indeed, the increasing NGO role in the provision of social services (USAID, 2018) has further fragmented the accessibility and the quality of healthcare, and has contributed to obscure the responsibilities and duties involved in the vertical social contract between citizens and the state. A participant in the focus group in Jajce, who lives in Sweden but often visits his hometown, was particularly annoyed with this. When he learned that two NGO members collected money to buy a new delivery bed for the maternity ward and to build access for the disabled, he confronted them, arguing that they should not engage in these types of activity, which are a responsibility of the state.

In addition, the highly intrusive work of international agencies has further contributed to undermine the legitimacy of local institutions in two apparently contradictory ways. First, through the so-called ‘Bonn powers’, international officials have frequently imposed legislation on local institutions, and even removed democratically elected officials, thus emasculating the domestic policy-making process, and the development of process legitimacy (Knaus and Martin 2003). Second, while working to manage the dysfunctional aspects of the political system, the international community has nonetheless guaranteed the ethnic (dis)order that emerged from the DPA, and thus has become complicit with the mismanagement of domestic resources. In this sense, the international community can be enlisted as a member of the elite social contract whose main political objective is to maintain stability and the status quo. In sum, by ruling by decree the international community has treated the symptoms of the Bosnian malaise while paradoxically perpetuating the conditions within which poor domestic governance operated (Bennet 2016).

### *System inefficiencies and everyday dynamics*

In sum, the complex rearticulation of social protection from a pre-war system focused on the provision of social security and universal medical assistance to a system perceived as erratic and dependant on residency or other criteria after the war has shifted responsibility for welfare from the state to local level actors, including fourteen local governments and a countless number of NGOs. This shift, along with neoliberal shrinking of the state contributed to a pervasive ambiguity with regard to the responsibilities for welfare and pushed citizens to rely increasingly on *■tela* (Brković 2015), a cultural embedded practice of having strong links in society, a network of connections used in many aspects of public life, and involving a broad spectrum of behaviours from small favours to more blatant forms of corruption. Despite the fact that a person can use *■tela* to acquire possessions he/she is not entitled to, Bosnian citizens have relied on these connections mainly to fill the void that was created by the failure of public institutions’ transition to democracy, especially in terms of service provision and employment opportunities. According to a UNDP report, an astounding 95% of over 1,600 respondents believed that *■tela* is required to access healthcare, education, employment, and documents (UNDP 2009, 75).

Practicing ‘relations’ and ‘connections’ constitute the citizens’ way of adapting to the changed circumstances by using social relations to get better access to social protection. Focus group participants confirmed their reliance on *■tela*. For example, a woman in her

early 50s, an academic-turned-entrepreneur from the Tuzla focus group, said she was not proud of using her connections to obtain services, but thought that she had no other choice: ‘everybody does this, and I would unnecessarily have to wait for services had I not used *■tela*’. As suggested by this kind of statement, practicing *■tela* constitutes the citizens’ response to the new neoliberal demands placed on them as a result of radical state restructuring. *■tela* is almost universally practiced, if necessary even across ethnic and religious lines, to find employment (Ramović 2017; Regional Cooperation Council 2016, 65). Indeed, the most important factor shaping the likelihood of employment is personal connections (United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015, 17). In brief, *■tela* constitutes the core component of the ‘everyday social contract’ which developed after the war. Because of Bosnia’s demographic situation, *■tela* is mostly practiced within the boundaries of each ethnic group but, when needed, its influence extends also beyond these boundaries. Overall, *■tela* has an ambivalent role in terms of social cohesion and inter-ethnic relations. It mostly disrupts the vertical social contract as people have to rely on it to access services, but at the same time it plays a cohesive role strengthening the horizontal social contract and in some cases even facilitates inter-ethnic relations.

Most of the focus group participants had a negative opinion about *■tela* (and, more broadly, about clientelism) because its practice reinforces inequalities and limits the possibility of improving the delivery of public services. They confirmed the pervasiveness of *■tela* in looking for employment and in accessing educational services or health care, and blamed it for its influence in limiting social and economic progress in the country. Emsad Dizdarević from Transparency International confirmed the negative impact of the phenomenon, in particular with regard to employment in the civil service, which is largely under the control of nationalist parties and is used as a source of patronage.<sup>12</sup> Unsurprisingly, political and social actors who benefit most from the system (including politicians, administrators and service providers) work to maintain social protection and welfare provision based on personal relationships.

This system, together with the difficult post-war economic recovery, undermines citizens’ views of their institutions. Many focus groups participants complained about the state of economy, in particular the lack of employment opportunities for the younger generation. In the Jajce focus group participants lamented the destruction of the tourist industry, which used to be one of the core economic assets of the town. Similar disquieting views were expressed by informants in both Dobož and Tuzla, who regretted the state of local industries and the resulting high rates of unemployment. This situation has consequences for

the citizens' perception of the political elite and its role in preserving economic insecurity. In Jajce, a woman in her 50s, who is a housewife and activist in a feminist organisation, speculated that 'it is suitable for the ruling elite not to have high employment as it is much easier to manipulate those who are hungry'. Even some trade unions are seen as complicit in this state of affairs. In the Doboj focus group one participant, a retired woman in her 60s who returned from abroad after the war, argued that the role of trade unions is not what it is supposed to be as 'workers are now treated like slaves, they work 60 hours per week, they have miserable wages and some are not even registered at all'.

Along similar lines, several participants remarked how inequalities are increasingly visible and class divisions are being reintroduced. At the same time, they also noted how class divisions can have a reconciliatory dimension since both workers and the wider society can find common grounds in the fight for labour rights, thus bridging ethnic cleavages. An example brought up by the focus group in Doboj is illustrative of this possibility. In this town, the two main supermarkets are run by owners of different ethnic backgrounds. Until recently, citizens shopped in accordance with the ethnic belonging of the owner. However, when poor labour practices in one supermarket came to be known, citizens of all backgrounds changed their shopping habits.

In this difficult socio-economic context, forms of political and social protest are possible, but difficult. In 2014 major demonstrations were initiated by laid-off workers from Tuzla and quickly spread to other urban centres. The brief rule of the non-nationalist Social Democratic Party between 2010 and 2014 contributed to create the conditions for the uprising since this party, like nationalist ones, used patronage as a source of political consensus and implemented those neo-liberal policies favoured by the international community. Plenums (informal citizens' councils) were established to collect and send citizens' requests for socio-economic reforms to political authorities (Belloni et al. 2016). As a result of these initiatives, five cantonal governments resigned and cantonal authorities were revoked of some of their privileges. The movement's limited impact, combined with attempts of an opposition party to hijack the protests and plenums and with pressure from the ruling elite, led to its demise. However, the movement has alimented the possibility of a long-term shift in civic consciousness, which could include the use of violence to achieve political change (Murtagh 2016).

Focus group participants, who were mostly positive towards both the 2014 protests and other previous instances of citizens' dissent, explained how fear constitutes the main obstacle in the mobilisation of citizens. For example, a participant in the focus group in



Doboj, an NGO activist in his mid-twenties, mentioned difficulties with collecting signatures for one of the citizens' initiatives, as people were afraid to give the required details. The participants in the focus group in Jajce revealed how citizens feared they would lose their jobs in case they got actively involved in activities against authorities at different levels. Indeed, this was the case with protests in 2014, when some protesters were exposed to considerable pressure from the authorities, either directly, or indirectly through frequent in-depth inspections of their businesses and the related threat to issue financial penalties or even to close their operations.<sup>13</sup>

Despite these difficulties, most participants were of the opinion that grassroots activists should have been more persistent in their protest efforts. One of the participants in the focus group from Jajce, a teacher from a vocational high school argued: 'we simply gave up half way through. We became satisfied with small concessions that authorities gave us. We were not persistent'. Svjetlana Nedimović, one of the key individuals behind the Sarajevo plenum, explained the 'lessons' of the 2014 protests in this way: 'we learned that a change – a radical one because nothing less than that can help us – will not come from the mere presence of masses in the streets. We should organise ourselves, and work in the field, where singular battles are fought, and work on joining forces as much as on winning concrete battles' (Nedimović 2017). Despite the fact that grassroots groups were not successful in maintaining the momentum of 2014, challenges to the current system may arise again. If the economy continues to stagnate and the resources at the disposal of the political leadership diminish, social peace through patronage may be increasingly difficult to secure. While those citizens embedded in the nationalists' patronage network will likely remain 'loyal' to institutions, the others will have to choose between 'exit' and 'voice' (Hirschman 1970). Continuing migration expresses the citizens' exit from a political and economic system which is unable to address their needs. At the same time, new voices among those remaining are being heard. For example, as further discussed below, throughout 2016 and 2017 students in Jajce protested repeatedly against school divisions along ethnic lines (BBC 2016).

To conclude, the marginal efficiency in the delivery of services and the dire state of the economy have contributed to disillusionment among Bosnians in relation to the seemingly endless post-war transition period, which is experienced as a 'desert' (Horvat and Ćetković 2015); an 'empty' (Hromadžić 2015) political space, or even a 'swamp' full of crocodiles where the threat of sinking is ever-present (Jansen et al. 2017). Unsurprisingly, opinion polls find that 50% of Bosnians would consider living and working abroad – the highest percentage in the region (Regional Cooperation Council 2016, 75). Citizens are so hapless that they either rely

on clientelistic relations or have given up on asking for even basic services from their government. In one reading of the situation, the vertical social contract is described as ‘non-existent’ (Hemon 2014, 64). Citizens are so disillusioned that the majority (57% of them – once again, the highest percentage in the region) no longer even discuss the government’s decisions (Regional Cooperation Council 2016, 116). Significantly, citizens include the so-called ‘international community’, as well as local authorities and politicians, as most accountable for this state of affairs (United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015, 20).

### **Social Cohesion in a Complex BiH Environment**

Both vertical and horizontal cohesion, considered in this study through domains of trust, belonging and identity, and participation, are low in BiH.<sup>14</sup> Vertical cohesion (between the state and society) suffers from the inefficiency of institutions at all levels, which are prey to manipulation by the political parties. Horizontal cohesion (between groups and citizens in society) is undermined by the nature of the elite social contract, which for the most part preserves the separation of citizens into ethnic reservoirs of votes. Yet, despite the predominance of ethnic principles, reflected in the enduring influence of both the first and the second CCIs, the everyday social contract, which brings people together in different ways across ethnic groups, arguably provides opportunities for the development of a resilient national social contract. The tradition of inter-ethnic co-existence, the integrating pull of market forces, and the generally positive role played by the diaspora, support the growth of new forms of sociability.

In the institutional context discussed above which is dominated by patronage, clientelism and the need for personal connections to access services, trust towards institutions – at the heart of vertical cohesion – is at a record low. According to the Global States of Mind, published by Gallup in 2014, Bosnian citizens have a very low confidence in their institutions. With 91%, Bosnia ranks second in the world (in the category of ‘partly free countries’) in the perception of government corruption. Bosnia’s governments are the least popular worldwide, with the lowest approval among the general population, with just 8 per cent.<sup>15</sup> In addition, almost 9 out of 10 citizens with no significant variation between different ethnic groups believe that political elites represent the major problem in the country (United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015, 15). The realm of politics and politicians is commonly opposed to the realm of ‘ordinary people’, thus

confirming the existence of two parallel, at times intersecting, social contracts, one involving the political and economic elites and the other one involving citizens struggling to make ends meet. In this divided context, Bosnians maintain a deep scepticism towards the political process, as revealed by the common catchphrase ‘politics is a whore’ (Helms 2013, ch. 5). In addition, there are a growing number of cases in which voting ballots are made invalid by citizens who refuse to vote for candidates on the list and add their own candidates or write messages expressing contempt for political elites (Rama Prozor Info 2014). The realm of official politics is thought to involve morally corrupted subjects who abandon personal ethics either out of opportunism or nationalist conviction.

Given this assessment, combined with the widespread perception of unfairness and inefficiency in the delivery of services discussed above, it is puzzling that Bosnian citizens have continued to choose at the polls the same ethno-national political parties which are responsible for the country’s mismanagement and failures. Setting aside the half of the population who does not participate into the elections, it is possible to identify three broad categories of voters. First, die-hard nationalists are consistent in their support for their respective political parties. Second, there are those citizens who may recognise the limits of the existing political and economic order, but choose to vote for their nationalist leadership in the expectation that voters of other groups will choose the most extremist option available to them, thus being trapped in what could be described as the ‘dilemma of the ethnopolitical prisoner’ (Mujkić and Hulsey 2010). Finally, members of political parties’ patronage network choose pragmatically to support those leaders who guarantee them access to state jobs and other perks (such as pensions). Through patronage, many Bosnians become invested in the existing system and discouraged from participating in challenges to it (Murtagh 2016, 160). In addition, the dispersion of institutional representation further complicates attempts to coordinate mass discontent (Jansen 2015, 189-219).

Opinion polls have found how the level of social cohesion and trust is low in BiH (UNDP 2009). Moreover, Bosnians display a low attachment level to both their homeland and their (state) citizenship, but with some significant differences. 82% of Bosniaks privilege the fact of being a BiH citizen, followed by 60% of Croats. By contrast, for Serbs, their ethnic identity is most important (United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015, 45). In such a condition, Bosnian nationality does not constitute an identity for all citizens. This attitude reflects the influence of both CCIs discussed above, that is, the strong connection a significant part of the population feels for neighbouring Croatia

and Serbia, as well as the governance system which privileges ethnic identities while marginalising civic ones.

This emotional and political attachment for one's own national group is reinforced by political elites who exaggerate the fear of the 'other', thrive on it, and use it to maintain the elite social contract. This is also translated into a number of policy spheres. In addition to education policy, discussed above, each national group's 'politics of memory' is instrumental in the pursuit of the nationalist parties' political priorities. For example, in the RS politicians actively engage in the instrumental use of memorial sites, state symbols, monuments and so on in order to support the Serb nationalist cause, in particular by highlighting Serb victimization, the legitimacy of the RS as a separate political community, and the desire to disintegrate Bosnia as a common political space for all of its national groups (Correia 2013). In the implementation of their political agenda they are supported by Russia, who acts as a geopolitical competitor vis-à-vis the EU's attempt to move BiH closer to Europe (Bechev 2017). More generally, three official memory narratives exist and compete with each other. Potential alternative non-nationalist narratives, such as the antifascist narrative (celebrated during World War II anniversaries and other events from the socialist period) or the one based on a Bosnian identity, are either too weak or formulated as part of other dominant ethnonational approaches (Moll 2013).

### ***Horizontal Social Cohesion***

Horizontal social cohesion refers to formal and informal ties that hold society together. Forms of horizontal social cohesion are primarily present in three ways. First, BiH has a rich history of coexistence and tolerance which is in part still visible. Common Slavic ancestry is reflected in the language spoken, as well as in some customs still shared across all three groups (Duranović 2011, 44); (Velikonja 2003, 22). Post-World War II industrialisation favoured population movements from the countryside to the cities, and led to the creation of melting pots in urban areas, also supported by Yugoslavia's policy of brotherhood and unity (Đukanović 1995, 39). The sharing of both workplaces and new neighbourhoods led to an increase in the number of inter-ethnic marriages (Velikonja 2003, 224). Inter-ethnic ties were never completely cut off even during the 1992-95 war, when many risked their lives to protect their friends and neighbours of different ethnic background (Broz et al. 2005). Even in Dayton Bosnia, with its pervasive focus on ethnic divisions, there are many examples of people crossing ethnic boundaries and demonstrating their willingness to continue the

tradition of tolerance. Surveys indicate that ethnic distance does not play an important role in people's lives, while it continues to be important in political relations and decisions (Regional Cooperation Council 2016, 75).

A student protest in Jajce in September 2016 demonstrated students' rejection of ethnic divisions (BBC 2016). Their protests, which continued into 2017, resulted in the decision of the Ministry of Education of Central Bosnia Canton to suspend the establishment of a new, exclusively Bosniak school. Some international organisations supported students' demands and, unsurprisingly, were blamed by local political leaders for their presumed manipulation of students. However, demands for inter-ethnic contact and exchange in Jajce are genuinely local. As confirmed by a Bosniak unemployed woman in her 40s who participated in the Jajce focus group, while teachers favour separation, pupils give little weight to ethnic differences. According to her, the religious education teacher tried to separate her son from his Croat friends, but her son affirmed his desire to play with all of his friends - embodying the long historical tradition of coexistence in BiH, and even in the wider region.

The second form of horizontal social cohesion is manifested in the economic and social cooperation from the ground up which involves all former Yugoslav states, and which Tim Juddah (2009) calls Yugosphere. Processes of economic development facilitate forms of constructive interaction and even sharing, despite difficult economic conditions. Most participants in the focus groups claimed that the economy can have an integrative function despite the current state of underdevelopment. This was confirmed by an international official who explained how 'there is a parallel world in Bosnia, one that doesn't follow politics on TV... [it focuses] on doing business, on building something despite the difficult political situation'.<sup>16</sup> In addition, as mentioned above, the return of forms of class politics can also have a reconciliatory dimension, as workers across national groups can develop forms of solidarity in the fight for their rights. High unemployment rates and lack of welfare support has led to the rise in inequality, which in turn introduced embryonic forms of class politics and mobilisation. The case of the independent BiH Commerce and Services Trade Union is a good example as it draws members from both administrative entities.<sup>17</sup>

Third, diaspora can play a useful role both in contributing to ameliorate the economic condition and in supporting the development of inter-group relations. Needless to say, diaspora played a very negative role in the break-up of Yugoslavia, since it offered significant support to ethno-nationalist parties,<sup>18</sup> and frequently in the post-war period its political agenda has clashed with the interests and views of local actors (Kurtović 2011, 247).

Yet the influence of diaspora extends well beyond this type of initiative. In general, the diaspora's ability to play a constructive role depends on a favourable local political opportunity structure, on the existence of formal and/or informal channels of communication between diaspora and local groups, and on diaspora 'positionality', which involves diaspora perceptions about the relative strengths of their social positions derived from linkages to both the host-land and home-land (Hasic 2016). In practice, the diaspora financed several initiatives, including the construction of hospitals in Nevesinje, (Nezavisne Novine 2014), and supported local handball clubs in Jajce.<sup>19</sup> In addition, organisations supported by diaspora groups, such as Bosnian-Herzegovinian American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American-Bosnian Foundation, play a significant role in fostering inter-communal contacts and cooperation.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps most importantly, diaspora can support both economic development and certain forms of social cohesion. Many Bosnians have become successful entrepreneurs abroad, and have come back to invest in their hometowns. Despite limited political interest at the local level, the diaspora frequently manages on its own to get involved in matters that can contribute to economic development and reconciliation. The diaspora both invests in resources and produces employment, and inserts into BiH new ways of conducting business based on professional standards (Sivac-Bryant 2016, 175-188).

Notable examples include the companies Bekto Precisa and Prevent, which were relocated by their owners from Austria and Germany to the Bosniak-majority town of Goražde in Eastern Bosnia. These companies hired Serbs from neighbouring towns, thereby creating opportunities for workers of different ethnic backgrounds, - particularly younger workers who grew up in mono-ethnic communities - to share multi-ethnic workplaces (Padalović 2016). Other notable cases are found in Trnopolje, where a returnee from Norway started a farm and hired Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats, as well as members of the Ukrainian minority (Slobodna Bosna 2015) and in Kozarac, a small town near Prijedor, where employment opportunities offered by returnees are not based on ethnic considerations (Marković 2016). These hiring policies may be driven by the desire of (re)establishing inter-group relations after the war or more pragmatically by the economic need to find an adequate workforce. Be that as it may, this type of initiative plays an increasingly significant, albeit still marginal, role in favouring forms of socio-economic reintegration. International organisations have taken note of the diaspora's importance, and have developed programmes aimed at broadening the diaspora's involvement in the economy of BiH.<sup>21</sup>

In sum, while forms of social cohesion in BiH remain predominantly intra-ethnic, there exist (still marginal) social dynamics and actors favouring the development of cross-

ethnic linkages and cooperation. In particular, focus group participants identified the diaspora as a potentially positive player whose influence, however, is hindered by both the limited interest of local politicians, and by the lack of clear legal avenues to participating fully in Bosnian political, economic and social life.<sup>22</sup>

## **Challenging Road to a Resilient National Contract in BiH**

This paper addressed the state of the social contract in BiH, a country that has experienced one of the widest ranging peacebuilding interventions in the last thirty years. Despite the depth of intervention, BiH is still far from reaching a resilient national social contract and peace in the country is stable but frequently challenged by political leaders. The paper has examined the situation in the country against the three drivers central in the forging of a resilient social contract which can advance prospects for achieving and sustaining peace (i. inclusive political settlements which are responsive to CCIs; ii. effective and inclusive institutions; and iii. social cohesion - both vertical and horizontal – that binds society).

The settlement in Dayton perpetuated the influence of the two CCIs. The DPA resulted from a compromise among the warring parties but did not constitute a suitable framework to address these issues effectively. Rather, it played into the hands of domestic elites who coalesced into an unwritten elite social contract to maintain the status quo through the exploitation of communal fears, while enriching themselves in the process. In addition, elites have maintained control of the electorate mainly through patronage, including the control of employment in the public sector. As a result, institutions and bureaucracies at all levels are staffed not according to merit but to ethnic and political loyalty, and perform poorly in terms of service delivery. This is one of the reasons why institutions in BiH are seen the least favourably in the entire region, and why much of the population relies on *mitela* to access services.

Reliance on their own resources has increasingly led to the population being less interested in group differences and more open to crossing divisions in order to make ends meet, thus developing the form of an everyday social contract. Accordingly, some avenues which might facilitate the unravelling of the elite social contract and the evolution of the everyday social contract into one, resilient national social contract, are identified. To begin with, grassroots initiatives show some potential in challenging the elite social contract, particularly initiatives which focus on issues shared by the three major ethnic groups and can

expose the vicious relationship between political power, business and judiciary. Specifically, initiatives which demand that the voice of ordinary people is given a channel for communication with authorities, e.g. public debates or deliberation in local community councils (*mjesne zajednice*), are important in this regard as they can lead to the increased effectiveness and socio-economic inclusion of institutions. This can support driver 2 (effective and inclusive institutions that meet societal expectations and enhance state legitimacy) in shaping a resilient social contract in the country.

Both the diaspora and independent trade unions can have a positive impact on the economy and contribute to breaking up the vicious circle of corruption and mismanagement. Diaspora groups, and foreign investors more generally, can subscribe to anti-corruption principles and focus on introducing higher standards of working conditions. Furthermore, independent trade unions can play an important role in expansion, attracting workers from different ethnic groups, offering them opportunities for legal assistance and financial support in what are usually long and expansive trials in cases where workers demand their rights.

Finally, in order to develop and sustain the resilient national social contract, the international community can play a significant role by opening itself to the demands made by groups and organisations defending the needs of the unprivileged and marginalised (in particular the unemployed, the elderly, and youth). Only if the international community focuses its assistance on the needs of these groups, which represent the majority of local voices but are silenced by the dynamics of the elite social contract, will it be able to avoid being entangled in the country for another 22 years. Bosnian politicians also carry a great responsibility in this regard, but the international community has shaped the economic framework which limited opportunities for much of the population.

The process of forging a resilient national social contract will be demanding in a country that witnessed more than two decades marked by the ethno-nationalist entrenchment of the elite social contract and the related dispossession of the population. Perhaps what can be read from citizens' attempts at changing the system through protests and other initiatives is that the time has come to forge a social contract inclusive of everyone in the country, regardless of their ethnic and other identity, a contract that would move BiH from a weak, elite based society and fragile peace into a resilient national social contract.

## Notes



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<sup>1</sup> A closing statement of a participant in the focus group in the town of Jajce.

<sup>2</sup> For more information see [www.socialcontractsforpeace.org](http://www.socialcontractsforpeace.org).

<sup>3</sup> As defined in this study, these are overt drivers of conflict and discord, either historical, or contemporary in nature, broadly agreed by the main parties to drive conflict and discord, that are being disputed in the policy arena nationally, over time, and have resonance for most, if not all of the population. Ideally, they are reflected in formal agreements or mechanisms and enable examination of how state and society address conflict (McCandless 2018).

<sup>4</sup> See particularly the section on reconciliation and intergroup contact.

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed account of war in BiH see Sells 1996, Silber and Little, 1995, Malcolm, 1996, Donia and Fine, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> The Federation of BiH was established by the Washington Peace Agreement which ended the violence between Croats and Bosniaks. The agreement was signed on 18 March, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Even though Serbs and Croats in BiH are mainly referred to in the literature as ‘Bosnian Serbs’ and ‘Bosnian Croats’ respectively, we adopt the terms ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’ as they are predominantly used in the local context.

<sup>8</sup> Consociational institutions have worked rather successfully in divided societies like Switzerland and Belgium. However, the case of Bosnia suggests that it is unclear whether consociationalism encourages cooperation, or whether cooperation is a result of a previous implicit agreement among the elites that they must reach a mutual accommodation.

<sup>9</sup> For a detailed account of negotiations in Dayton see Holbrooke 1999. For an overview of the implementation of Dayton Peace Agreement see Bieber, 2006 and Belloni, 2008a.

<sup>10</sup> Stef Jansen (2015) refers to the post-conflict period in BiH as a “meantime”.

<sup>11</sup> “Stalni pad izlaznosti biraca u FBiH: Sarajevo primjer sve veće apstinencije”, *mojportal.ba*, 4 October 2016. Accessed <http://www.mojportal.ba/novost/234618/Stalni-pad-izlaznosti-biraca-u-Federaciji-Sarajevo> For example, in central Sarajevo municipality only 43% of the electorate voted in the 2016 elections.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Emsad Dizdarević, Project Coordinator and Researcher, Transparency International, 17 November, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Anonimised interview with a Sarajevan who was involved in protests and plenums in 2014.

<sup>14</sup> For definitions of key terms, see McCandless, 2018.

<sup>15</sup> Report available at [www.gallup.com](http://www.gallup.com).

<sup>16</sup> Confidential interview with an official from an international organisation involved in peacebuilding in BiH, 7 March, 2017.

<sup>17</sup> A talk by union president Mersiha Bećirović, 4 April, 2017.

<sup>18</sup> This was particularly the case in Croatia, where Gojko Ćosić, the owner of a restaurant chain in Canada, rose to the role of Defence Minister in the first government of Croatia after it gained independence, and played a crucial role in instigating the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats in 1993.

<sup>19</sup> Participants in the Jajce focus group.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Aiša Telalović, Senior expert associate in the Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 28 November, 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Confidential Source Interview, 14 March, 2017.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Aiša Telalović.

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