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By Giulia Cimini

This book explores how Maghrebi political parties work. Specifically, it examines both Islamist (Ennahda and the Party of Justice and Development) and anti-Islamist (Nidaa Tounes and the Party of Authenticity and Modernity) key parties in Tunisia and Morocco in the decade following the 2010–2011 uprisings. It does so by looking at how they (re)construct their identity and legitimate themselves to gain political authority, and how they function in practice. In an innovative manner and to better serve this purpose, the book disentangles parties into two main ways: on the one hand, by breaking them down into three organisational dimensions or "faces" and their sub-dimensions; on the other hand, by pinpointing the types of authority that they apply.

Party scholars have extensively analysed the formation and development of Western political parties following two main trends in the recent literature: the "model" approach and the "dimensional" approach. Whereas the former focuses on individual parties' structures in search of classification models, the latter goes after parties' single organisational characteristics such as membership, candidate and leader selection, party resources, access to the party decision-making processes, party centralisation, intra-party conflicts and their implications for democracy. The model approach flourished first, advan-cing a succession of typologies that remain standards against which parties are measured, from the cadre or mass party (Duverger 1954) to the catch-all (Kirchheimer 1966), electoral – professional (Panebianco 1988) or cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995) among the most renowned. However, more and more studies have increasingly challenged this approach and raised questions about its viability when only a few real parties actually fit the developed models (see, e.g., Webb, Poguntke, and Scarrow 2017).

Whatever one's views, it is evident that party organisation remains a key theme for party politics, and its study has gained new momentum since the late 2010s. Methodologically, it has moved towards large comparative studies and big data projects; theoretically, it has moved away from a purely deter-ministic approach whereby environmental conditions mainly account for organisational changes to incorporate agential deliberation as well to maxi-mise one's goals (Borz and Janda 2020).

At the same time, comparative political studies have largely disregarded political parties in Maghrebi countries, and Arab countries more broadly. That is where this book comes in. It builds on the dimensional approach lit- erature and expands on it by adding "unusual" cases from an underexplored world region. Following Scarrow and Webb's (2017) footsteps, it takes up the invitation to use a common descriptive vocabulary that accounts for party variety while allowing for cross-national comparisons. In parallel, the book unavoidably engages with a lexicon derived from the model approach such as the notions of the mass or cadre party, both because they are so pervasive when addressing party politics and because they continue to tell us something about parties.[1]

Even if I agree that the classic overarching models, in most cases, fail the empirical test not matching with the real world, abandoning them altogether is not the solution. The point is, if anything, to recognise their heuristics and problematise them from time to time to the test of reality. For the sake of clarity, dimensions are for me as much the three "faces" of the party (Katz and Mair 1993) aimed at reminding us of its non-monolithic nature, as the organisational dimensions like membership, resources, representative strat- egies and so on.

To be even more context-specific and without endorsing culturalist and reductionist tropes, I elaborate on Max Weber's seminal types of legitimate authority (traditional, charismatic and rational-legal) to extrapolate only two, namely modern and traditional accepted powers. This choice is made in consideration of a harsh debate locally on the meaning of modernity and tradition, a debate that cannot be exclusive to Maghrebi parties. In so doing, the aim is to explore the different logics of action and legitimation on which parties leverage.

In this regard, I will find that parties oscillate between one and the other. Importantly, not only can inconsistencies between discourses and practices be detected, but also depending on the issue. For example, the book will show that anti-Islamist parties exhibiting liberal ideological traits and thus simplis- tically associated with modernity are often characterised by endemic faction- alism, arbitrariness and personal dominance of party leaders to the detriment of internal pluralism. Moreover, despite their rhetorical commitment to modernity and progress, they are sometimes more socially conservative than Islamists themselves on specific issues.

I hence advance the notion of "hybridisation," defined as the coexistence and the interplay of multiple types of political authority. By approaching parties in the Maghreb from the point of view of their key components and organisational dimensions, this book places them fully within the analysis of comparative politics to foster additional comparisons, test hypotheses and develop new ones. At the same time, reflecting on the theme of mod- ernity and tradition is not a widespread aspect of party studies. Still, it is not potentially less relevant regardless of the geographical area they belong to. Reasoning in terms of logics of action and legitimation can be useful well

beyond the Tunisian and Moroccan contexts, both for their implications on organisational patterns and for questioning what is deemed as modern and traditional.

This chapter first outlines the broader debate on the evolution of parties on their being halfway between the state and society and increasingly considered to be in decline. It then explores how Arab parties have been dealt with in the literature. Going into specifics, it proceeds to illustrate the book's analytical framework combining the breakdown into three organisational "faces" and a reflection on the hybridity in the logic of action underlying the former.

Political Parties: Between State and Society

Everywhere, the development of political parties remains a matter of extensive debate. Signs of apparent "decay" have been detected in the established democracies for more than 40 years now and mostly pertain to the weakness in both parties' organisational standing and public reputation. Dwindling membership, centralised decision-making process and policy formulation, increasing dependency on state funding, poor reputation and a general disenchantment in (formal) political participation are all features that can be observed in new democracies as well as in those of longer duration. All these phenomena, noticeably, stand as counter-trends in contrast to the very context-specific era of the mass party which "seems to be at an end" in most contemporary democracies, whether long-established or not (Diamond and Gunther 2001).

When talking about the alleged decline of political parties, we are actu- ally – and often unintentionally – referring to the case-specific ideal-typeof the mass party, which has long been the party *par excellence*, having its raison d'être in the representation with society. It is not surprising, there- fore, that political parties are primarily defined in terms of societal interests and compared within the framework of competing patterns of representa- tion (workers' parties, religious parties, people's parties and so forth). In a way, political parties are a "curious object of analysis" as Thomas Poguntke said, inasmuch as, by providing what is arguably the most critical linkage between state and society, they "are located somewhere between the orderly realm of the state and the fluid and sometimes chaotic sphere of society" and"extend into both arenas" (Poguntke 1994, 185). However, as Petr Kopeck and Peter Mair (2003) note in a chapter within an edited volume on African politics, political parties are usually thought of in social terms as outgrowths of society and thus most often associated with the society end of the state– society divide. This "perfect match" between parties and society, which had reached its apex in the mass party format, has long informed much of our imagery about political parties. Yet, two major trends have increasingly exposed its languishing solidity, encouraging talks about party decline. First isthat many political parties within Western consolidated democracies increas-ingly began to place more emphasis on governing and on office rather than

on their representative capacities. Second is the exposure to a greater plurality of party types coming with the "third wave" of democratic expansion, which, since the mid-1970s, challenged the primacy of the mass-party model and its conventional assumptions. Several alternative conceptualisations have since been proposed to account for parties' developmental changes and shapes.

No simple and definitive answer exists to how parties develop: namely, whether they all change in the same way, how they do so and what factors influence their transformation. Yet, it is still possible to identify at least three sets of explanations.

The first focuses on endogenous factors to political parties in determining their process of maturation. With the external environment relegated to a trivial impact, parties are seen as developing along similar lines depending on what stage of their life-cycle they are in (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Robert Michels's iron law of oligarchy offers an example of such perspective as it contends that political parties will inevitably succumb to elite domination, including those committed to democratic practices and ideals, because of the imperatives of modern organisation. As Ingrid van Biezen (2005, 150) recalls, it ensues from this scenario that parties follow similar trajectories "from, say, cadre and mass parties to catch-all and cartel parties" in new as well as in older democracies, and "regardless of the period in which they were created or the context in which they first emerged."

A second school of thought can be traced back to Angelo Panebianco (1988) who emphasises the relevance of the party's genetics in its further evolution, pointing to a sort of "generational" effect. To be more precise, whereas in the party's formation phase environmental circumstances have the most significant impact, internal dynamics are the decisive element in the development phase. In other words, origins matter the most by giving the party "genetic imprint" that will influence all future changes, as the dominant faction will tend to freeze the organisation that initially favoured it. According to this perspective, it is the modalities of party-building to inform the degree of institutionalisation – that is, the relative stabilisation of the party organisation or "solidification" (Panebianco 1988, 49) – which in turn makes parties differ from each other.[2] Founding moments thereby create enduring legacies. Comparatively speaking, if a generational effect plays out, commonalities are more likely to be found within the same periods. In other words, parties within the same democratisation wave share many features and differ from parties created in different eras. From this perspective, the transformation of Western European parties from mass to catch-all and cartel party is a very unique historical experience.

The third theoretical approach owes much to the writings of Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) and postulates a "period effect" on party formation and development. In this view, the influence of the immediate environment outweighs the relevance of internal dynamics and genetic origins. Put differently, the organisation is a product of the environment. As in Darwinian theory, parties evolve to remain competitive in the electoral market. They

will either disappear or become politically irrelevant compared to their competitors. Global developments in communication technologies, and shifts in the global ideological climate are all independent variables affecting parties. If the period effect shapes the parties' organisational choices, a homogenising effect will likely lead to parties' convergence towards similarstructures. From this standpoint, similarities would be found between parties in similar environments in any given period regardless of their entry into the electoral arena or the stage of the democratisation process they are in.

In sum, these approaches account for the relevance of the external environment on party-building, and for whether the former or rather endogenous factors condition further party development. In doing so, they offer a wide range of explanations, yet all are pivoting around structuralist views (see, on this point, Hellmann 2011). Agential factors, by contrast, remain vastly underestimated. At the same time, exogenous factors (to the parties) may relate to very different aspects. On the one hand, for example, a sociological approach would consider cultural and socio-economic configurations, domestically but also as universal trends, as most accounts do when considering post-industrial and post-modern societies (Ignazi 2020). On the other hand, an institutionalist approach considers how institutions shape the party's development.

Also, it has to be noted that, despite the factors they emphasise, all these perspectives are Western-centric. This has certain consequences. For example, most political and social scientists more broadly are accustomed to "work within a well-defined subset of relatively comparable cases" (Wolinetz 2002, 138), making little or no effort to go beyond a well-known set of classifications or dimensions.

Lastly, these approaches look at whether parties are converging or diverging, leaving little room for mixed or, say, less clear-cut situations.

Comparative literature on political parties in young democracies has shown, nonetheless, a more nuanced picture. For example, in her study on political parties in newly democratised Southern and East-Central European countries, van Biezen (2003, 2005) argues that the conceptual confusion between party formation and party adaptation – which have to be understood as two distinct processes – undermines our understanding of party development. Whereas, she contends, the external context of party formation makes parties in the new democracies of the late twentieth century become more and more alike their counterparts in the older democracies of the early twentieth century in terms of organisational styles, their path of party development is a *sui generis* process. Namely, instead of being formed as strong societal movements, they are born as agents of the state and only in a second moment do they "reach out, albeit only minimally, towards society" (van Biezen 2003, 9). Others, by contrast, bring the role of agential deliberation in the explanation (Hellmann 2011). In this case, it is the deliberate will of the individuals operating within the party that determines its organisational structure as a result of changes in the leadership or dominant faction, or as a response

to external shocks. The latter, unlike in the period effect, do not automatically trigger change, but it all depends on what the actor perceives as a shock according to its goals.

Compared to these approaches, this book considers the influence that socio-political environments (structural factors) have on parties but also asserts that there is always scope for varied strategic choices at the level of the individual party, which makes for a diversity of outcome. After all, it will find that Morocco and Tunisia's Islamist parties are more similar to each other regardless of very different institutional contexts, just as anti-Islamist parties are to each other. The book wishes to complement the comparative and area study literature in terms of case studies but also by adding another layer of analysis. Indeed, it looks at parties' logics of action and legitimation as drivers of different organisational choices against the backdrop of an unprecedented combination of institutional, contextual and period-related variables accompanying Tunisia's democratisation process and Morocco's expanded liberalisation. Before turning to the abovementioned logics, a key theme that unites the parties in these two countries with their counterparts elsewhere is that of their alleged decline. This issue takes on even more significance given the topical moment of the post-authoritarian turn.

Political Parties: Decline for Whom?

Regardless of the theoretical strand one wishes to follow as for the drivers of party development, it is undeniable that a trend towards "decline" continues to be a recurrent topic when discussing political parties. As anticipated, this is mainly with respect to their representative functions of broader societal interests, which does not necessarily imply a decline of parties as such. Indeed, parties are still there, however criticised and mistrusted, acting as political intermediaries. Alternative configurations will probably substitute them, but at the moment no other collective structure seems to be there to replace them. So, they continue to evolve to keep up with the challenges of the times. As Barnea and Rahat put it, parties "are adaptive creatures. They change, renew and, at times, reinvent themselves in light of the ever-changing social, political and electoral realities" (2011, 305). Let alone that parties are not static entities, the reality that they have a unified agency is equally deceiving.This has repercussions on the idea of decay itself.

In the 1990s, instead of suggesting a sense of party decline *tout court,* Katz and Mair proposed to move away from a monolithic conception of political parties as unitary actors in order to fully capture their developments.[3] And if there is a crisis, it does not relate to the party as a whole, but to one or more of its specific dimensions and roles. In their re-conceptualisation, in fact, political parties feature three "faces" or aspects each of which potentially interacts with the others: the *party in central office*, the *party in public office* and the *party on the ground*. Put simply, the party in central office entails the national leadership and the party bureaucratic apparatus; the party in public office

consists of the elected representatives; lastly, the party on the ground includes primarily party members, but more loosely also activists, financial supporters and voters, or constituencies representing the "bundle of electoral loyalties" (White 2006, 8).

By disaggregating the party into at least three dimensions, Katz and Mair appreciate the emergence of intra-party tensions, with elected politicians in Western arenas progressively sealing off from their solid, uncontested constituencies and increasing their relative power, as reflected in the growing ability of office-holders to build up their own independent resources and bureaucracy. This trend is what they call the ascendancy of the party in public office, particularly at the detriment of the party on the ground, which seems more and more relegated and subordinated (Katz and Mair 2002). To be sure, such a process comes from Katz and Mair's argument of cartel parties, namely parties increasingly moving away from society and towards the state (1995, 2009).

As Ignazi (2020) recalls, parties' delinking from society and their encroachment into the state is quite unanimously acknowledged today as the defining trend in advanced democratic societies. In the case of new parties, and in particular new parties in new democracies, mainstream literature seems to suggest that a number of factors make them almost inevitably biased towards the privileging of the elected representatives rather than of the party on the ground. While this is the outcome of a long process of transformation in established democracies, it occurs from the very beginning in new democratising polities[4] (Mair 1997, chap. 8). Faced with different societal contingencies, new parties find themselves in a context where mass communication grants politicians with instant access to a more volatile electorate lessening the significance of intermediate party structures. Partisan affiliations tend to be weaker and most of the parties originate as top-down entities at the elite level. In a way, parties' interest in developing and strengthening a solid structure on the ground, as the mass party used to do, would be diverted to the maintenance of office within state institutions in more competitive and diversified environments. Similarly, others argue that in newly democratising polities, parties are likely to develop with loose electoral constituencies by opting for a wider "clientele" of voters rather than for well-defined segments of society, unimportant mem-bership and the dominant role of leaders (Kopeck 1995). In so doing, they thus deviate from the Western European mass party model of organisation from the very beginning of their inception (van Biezen 1998).

Besides specific typologies such as mass or cartel parties, the trend that has been most empirically confirmed is the decline of the party on the ground while it is less clear whether the rise of the party in public office has been happening at the expense of the party in central office (Bardi, Calossi, and Pizzimenti 2017; Scarrow and Webb 2017). All this reasoning, however, implies that, if a crisis exists, it does not concern the party as a whole. Rather, this latter may experience a shifting balance within its components and some – the party on the ground above all – may appear to be increasingly marginalised and

disempowered while others gain in relevance. Nonetheless, despite the party in public office strengthening its positioning and resources and the party in central office gaining greater autonomy, at least in principle, membership proves quite resilient. If anything, political parties have been reinventing traditional membership by offering "cheaper" affiliation options, not only in terms of fees but also in terms of commitments and engagement. This is what some refer to as "light" adhesion, "liquid loyalties" (Ignazi 2017) or "lite member-ship" (Scarrow 2015; 2017) that can be acquired (and dropped) more spontan-eously and carry fewer obligations. Also, certain variations do exist in what seems the mainstream path of organisational development, namely between newly established and old parties, in that the latter are more likely to retain the membership organisation they have somehow inherited (Bardi, Calossi, and Pizzimenti 2017).

These considerations, however, pertain to Western (and mostly European) settings, as the authors themselves highlight. No similar studies have been sys-tematically done outside of them.

So, whereas political parties in Western contexts are farther away from their base and society and possibly more and more "into the State," what about Maghrebi political parties in environments marked by more or less intense political change? How and to what extent have political parties genu-inely changed in the wake of the 2010–2011 Arab uprisings? Moreover, what implications do these developments – or lack thereof – have on the relation-ship between them and the citizenry?

Political Parties in the Maghreb

The many categorisation efforts and debates on organisational development in Western academic scholarship hardly find an equivalent when it comes to Arab political parties. A double challenge, either on the empirical or analyt-ical level, has long constrained research on them (Catusse and Karam 2010).

Empirically, scholars have been confronted with challenging access to proper data because of the scarcity and manipulation of information affecting the research, particularly in non-democratic regimes. Analytically, academic works have questioned the relevance of political parties as such because of two coincidental factors: the absence of substantive democracies, whether authoritarian or limited pluralism contexts, and the existence of other strong ties of primary social loyalties such as tribes, clans or confessional identities (among others, Baduel 1996; Tozy 1999; Catusse 2006; Braun 2006; Picard 2006). Some have disregarded the partisan paradigm as inappropriately "imported" (Badie 1992), thus implying that features shaped in the European or Western environment and at a specific time would not be transferable to other historical or geographical settings.

This problem is what the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1970) has referred to as "conceptual stretching or straining" (Sartori 1970) that may arise whenever one deals with concepts, categorisations or definitions born in,

and mainly applied to, a certain context and later transposed to other realities. In Lise Storm's words, conceptual stretching can be defined as "applying an established concept to fringe cases, thereby potentially altering its meaning" (Storm 2014, 27). It is therefore a risk that does not only concern political parties. The underlying assumption is that by applying certain concepts under very different circumstances, one might stretch them so far as to distort their original meaning or, by contrast, distort the subject under scrutiny.

A possible constructive way out of the problem that would otherwise lead – and sterilely – to analytical paralysis is engaging with the already existing categories as heuristic tools, leaving room for incorporating context-specific variables. This is what van Biezen suggests, for example, in her study on political parties' organisation in the new Southern and Eastern European democracies (van Biezen 2003, 6–8). Such an approach appears to be not only reasonable but also very useful, and that is precisely what this book aimsto do. By referring to informative models or, say, conceptualisations – though developed somewhere else – not only might we reach a deeper understanding of the context where we translate such concepts but also enrich the knowledge about the original frame. Whether a certain theory is validated or otherwise problematised and nuanced, it is still a way of taking a step forward in knowledge production. Additionally, seeking to evade at any cost the paradigms which have emerged from earlier experiences, mostly Western European in our case, might be a distortion itself. Specifically, when discussing political parties, the models and categories developed within the traditional Western literature may represent a marker against which to compare party developments in other regions. This does not necessarily mean their endorsement or reproduction.

Having said that, it should be remembered that the object "political party" is certainly not a new one in the Arab world. Before 2011, however, few studies focused on this topic and with reference to the Maghreb in particular. Typically, political parties have all too often been dismissed as instruments in the hands of Islamic movements or as tools of authoritarian regimes to socialise the masses with a given regime's project and to co-opt segments of society while providing a semblance of democracy. Most accounts vary from a merely historical and descriptive perspective to a normative one, particularly in connection with a missed democratisation wave. Several themes run through the literature: from the crisis of representation (Catusse 2005), particularly concerning the "secular" parties (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2007), to their organisational weakness and personalism; from the dysfunctionality of the partisan system (Santucci 2006) to the dysfunctionality of parties themselves since they stopped to act independently, an argument made about some golden age often de-historicised (Salamé 1991; 1994).

Furthermore, several typologies of party types in the Muslim world have been produced,[5] not least in connection with the classical divides first elaborated by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). These two scholars articulate political interests and conflict around four main societal

lines (urban versus rural, church versus state, owners versus workers, and centre versus periphery), the applicability of which remain controversial.[6] By contrast, Willis (2002b, 2002a) proposes a much more context-specific classification and clusters political parties in the Maghreb based on the position they adopt towards incumbent power-holders, their viewpoints about the role of religion in the state and that of minority identities. However, his way of approaching parties hardly allows for comparison in other environments.

Beyond these classificatory attempts, much less attention has been paid to the development of political parties as organisations, except in their "ideological" evolution. This is especially true of Islamist parties and the scholarly "obsession" with their moderation, commonly interpreted as the abandoning of more radical goals and tactics to include liberal views for gaining political advantages and appealing to broader constituencies (e.g., Wickham 2004, 2013; Schwedler 2006, 2011).

It is a well-established point in the area studies literature that Islamists are more organisationally effective than non-Islamist parties in the Arab world. However, this is not the case in the broader generalist literature, where Islamist parties remain largely unknown. Works such as Wegner's (2011) on the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco or Wickham's (2013) on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt give us all the complexity of the intra-organisational dynamics of Islamist movements, whether they choose to participate in the political game officially or not. These works show how these movements are far from being monolithic blocs and rather harbour individuals and groupings that often pursue conflicting agendas. Also, they explain how this heterogeneity translates into internal tensions and different power balances as well as into specific strategic or value-based choices towards the regime and society. Above all, they critically account for how these developments are not linear and given once and for all. Similarly, from previous studies, it is very clear that Islamist opposition parties are well-organised and rooted in society, much more so than other counterparts, not least because of the parallel proselytising and educational and charitable activities carried out by related religious organisations (Clark 2004).

With a focus on Tunisia and Morocco, this book expands on these accounts of political parties in three main ways: firstly, by looking at the organisation and development of Islamist parties once in power after the watershed elections of 2011; secondly, through a systematic cross-national comparison, and moreover bringing in their counterparts, based on the same dimensions and sub-dimensions; thirdly, by reflecting upon the ambivalent and highly instrumentalised dichotomy of modernity and tradition as logics of action and legitimation and drivers of organisational changes. In the end, while confirming a greater organisational strength of Islamist parties and richer links with society as evidenced by previous works, this study innovatively treats this aspect as the manifestation of a modern logic. Likewise, the anti-Islamist parties' less organisational development can be attributed to traditional logics.

In sum, this book aims at filling a gap in two distinct strands of litera- ture: on the one hand, political science comparative literature that has long ignored Maghrebi (and Arab) political parties; and on the other hand, area studies literature, which has rarely compared them systematically from a political science perspective. It attempts to move beyond usual, mutual "suspects" by integrating these two perspectives, which, taken individually and abstractly, do not capture the complexity of the parties on the ground. While providing valuable data for our understanding of an under-researched topic (parties in North Africa), it also aims to contribute to the broader litera- ture on the evolution of contemporary parties. Concretely, it does so in two ways: by breaking down four key Tunisian and Moroccan parties along the lines of Katz and Mair, and by looking at the underlying logics of action and legitimation informing their organisational choices.

Breaking Parties Down

The literature on party organisational change continues to elaborate from the three "faces" of the party as proposed and also reworked several times by Katz and Mair: the party in central office (PCO), the party in public office (PPO) and the party on the ground (POG). And so does this book in studying political parties in Tunisia and Morocco. It thus departs from and shares the assumption that they are not monolithic entities, albeit it will be evident that some parties are more structured than others to act cohesively. There are sev- eral ways to look at parties as non-unitary actors. By advocating a dimen- sional approach, the most recent trends in the literature look at a variety of issues that characterise a party: for example, its autonomy or dependence on state funding, the diversification of its resources, its degree of centralisa- tion and coordination, the extent of its territorial organisation as well as the autonomy enjoyed by the leadership (Scarrow and Webb 2017). Most of these studies, on closer reflection, all analyse the party leadership, party bureau- cracy, party membership and elected office-holders, which are nothing more than Katz and Mair's organisational dimensions from different angles.

In this book, the choice to refer to their classic framework is motivated by a number of reasons. Firstly, instead of generally talking about a party's "decline," inability or inefficiency *tout court*, breaking it down into several sub-dimensions meritoriously allows for a deeper analysis so as to detect whether the party as a whole or rather specific components are weakening or strengthening and to whose advantage or expense. Secondly, as this break- down takes into account both ends of the state–society divide, one can simul- taneously explore to what extent parties fulfil their traditional representative functions and observe whether and how they cement their position within the state through new institutional engineering (Tunisia) or in a less-reformed, and mostly top-down reformed context (Morocco). Thirdly, this approach lends itself to an explorative analysis and sufficiently enables cross-national comparison precisely because it does not provide a rigid classificatory scheme

and by virtue of its stated objective of coming up with the establishment of commonalities while considering national peculiarities (Katz and Mair 2002).

One of this book's main challenges is, in fact, how to adopt a theoretical lens that is not limited but rather enriched by localised experiences. Although Katz and Mair did not have non-Western political parties in mind and Arab ones even less so, their conceptualisation is quite flexible and can be easily operationalised. This means that despite the evident specificity of contexts in which parties operate – institutions, histories, and so forth – some generalisation can nevertheless be drawn. Moreover, regardless of how contemporary party organisations may be typified, it is possible to observe in which conditions potential shifts occur in the balance among intra-party dimensions. Indeed, the privileging of one face over another, as well as their substantial equilibrium, "is not in itself dependent on the validity or otherwise of a particular classification of party organisation" (Katz and Mair 2002, 122). In this way, we can observe how parties organise and develop irrespective of their typical classification as cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral professional, cartel party or others.

By moving the three "faces" from the theoretical to the operational level, the book introduces and relies on six criteria corresponding to key sub-dimensions of each realm: *operating procedures* and *financial resources,* the basic aspects of party functioning; *public image* and *legitimacy*, features that overtly represent the party to the outside world; *inclusiveness* and *representativeness* that more specifically account for their openness and relationship with the base and society at large (see Table 1.1). To be sure, the three "faces" of the party organisation based on Katz and Mair's works are not watertight compartments but instead very permeable. The same subject can, in fact, belong to more than one face simultaneously. Member of parliaments (MPs) are a clear example of this, as they can be party members but also hold elected office or other positions within party bodies. Moreover, these organisational "faces" continuously inform each other through mutual interaction. By zooming in on these dimensions, it is possible to systematically distil out common elements and differences between parties and possibly identify some patterns according to the party family or between parties within the same country.

After outlining the formal legal framework constraining political parties as dictated by national constitutions and laws in Tunisia and Morocco, the book establishes a detailed account of the PCO, looking at the *operating procedures* of the national leadership and key national structures, as well as at the party *financial resources*. To do so, it primarily draws on the parties' statutes and internal rules. It also combines this data with other information from personal interviews and indirect evidence to see to what extent rules on paper are implemented in practice. These two aspects are fundamental building blocks to run the party machine as a whole, though they can be easily clustered within the party in central office as the basic formal and legal institutional aspects of parties' internal working (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Table 1.1 The analytical framework (part 1): Party faces and operational criteria

Party Face	Criterion	Operational Definition
Party in central office (PCO)	Operating procedures	What are the key party bodies and how do they work? To what extent do explicit rules exist and are formalised? How are powers and responsibilities attributed and distributed?
	Financial resources	What are the main sources of income? What is the relative importance of each source of funding in total party revenues? How are resources allocated?
Party in public office (PPO)	Public image	What are the party's platforms and discourses? How have they changed? Which role and image are MPs called to fulfil? How do they work into parliament and relate with the citizenry?
	Legitimacy	What is the party's electoral strength? To what extent are MPs/parties accountable and trusted by society? What is their reputation?
Party on the ground (POG)	Representativeness	What is the party's main social base? How is its electorate geographically distributed? Are there any discernible patterns?
	Inclusiveness	How easy is to join the party? To what extent are members given some voice? What are the members' duties and rights? What kind of mobilisation strategies does the party opt for? What kind of linkages does it promote?

The *public image* of a party lies primarily in the quality of its representatives, and its *legitimacy* is also closely linked to them. This is why these two other criteria have been associated to the PPO, with a specific focus on public office-holders at the national level. Public image will be mainly addressed in terms of evolving platforms and discourse in search for legitimacy (Chapter 2), but also through the message that MPs in particular convey through their habits and activities (Chapters 4 and 5). Electoral clouts and overall turnout rates (Chapter 3) combined with trust as measured by existing opinion surveys will instead be indicators of legitimacy (Chapters 4 and 5). In this sense, legitimacy is understood primarily as legitimacy by elections. However, a cross-cutting theme throughout the book is precisely the process of each party's legitimation, which emphasises multiple types of legitimacy: gained through the revolution, by exploiting neo-patrimonial relationships, by endorsing

professionalism, by resorting to the modernist card or that of authenticity, to name but a few.

Two last criteria are taken into account and more specifically relate to the POG, primarily defined as party members and more loosely including activists, supporters and even loyal voters (Katz and Mair 1993, 597): *representativeness* and *inclusiveness*. The former relates to the different constituencies that parties tend to represent, geographically and sociologically. In other words, it is mainly signalled by voter identification, that is voter behaviour, and electoral outcomes. It illustrates the spectrum of social forces that each party incorporates, and the interests it is called to represent (Chapter 3). The latter refers to the ease of access into the party and the members' participation in the decision-making process as evidenced by the extent of their duties and privileges (Scarrow 1996). Implicitly, I am assuming that inclusiveness is indicative of openness to the outside world (outward inclusiveness) and internal pluralism (inward inclusiveness), two dimensions that do not necessarily run in tandem (Chapters 4 and 5). Namely, a party may be inclusive in one dimension but not necessarily in the other. In other words, greater ease of access does not necessarily mean that members have a greater "say" within party affairs. This is definitely interlinked with the strategy of mobilisation parties opt for, whether partisan or electoral. In short, the partisan approach is undoubtedly more time-consuming and labour-intensive but has the advantage of creating a much more permanent anchoring of the party within society (van Biezen 2003). Instead, the electoral approach is mainly driven by short-term electoral calculations and aimed at attracting as many voters as possible. By way of example, a bottom-up party where the grassroots level plays a key role in selecting candidates to office within the party and to parliament or in planning election campaigns and actively participating in partisan activities, is definitely more (inward) inclusive than top-down parties, in which the leader or a narrow oligarchy deeply centralised the decision-making process. It remains to be seen whether such intra-party inclusiveness also corresponds to easier access, mainly because the partisan approach usually calls for more committed members, and the party is likely to adopt a higher selection at the entry to ensure cohesion.

In sum, the existence of explicit rules and their formalisation, the ways in which powers and responsibilities are attributed to and distributed among parties' bodies, their resources, the image parties aim to promote, their legitimacy and constituencies, as well as the extent to which members are given some voice, are all instructive elements, although not exhaustive, accounting for the party's development, above all from an organisational standpoint.

While observing political parties' organisational standing via their internal working, reputational and representative strategies, we can also grasp what sources of political authority parties rely on, which they tend to reproduce, and which they also use as discursive repertoires to legitimise themselves. Namely, whether they are more oriented towards a modern or a traditional conception of legitimate power. Empirical evidence will suggest that no party

is exclusively one or the other but that all parties oscillate between them. Tunisian and Moroccan political parties, this book finds, are hybrid precisely insofar as they combine these different sources of powers. Further, organisational choices and these logics of legitimate authority are not randomly linked. The book in fact argues that the former are the product of the adoption of the latter. Or, such hybridisation affects party organisational standing.

Hybrid Parties: A New Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Modernity (*hadatha*) and tradition (*taqlid* or *turath*) are widely contested terms and hardly devoid of normative connotations. Depending on the standpoint, they take on slightly different meanings. From a widespread perspective, modernity is positively associated with progress, development and civilisation. In this frame of reference, something "traditional" is disparagingly viewed as a synonym for backwardness. Moreover, and closely related to this, modernity is too often improperly understood "as a linear and teleological process, spreading from the West to the rest of the world" (Kaya and Tecmen 2011). As such, the process leading to modernity (modernisation) is awkwardly equated with westernisation. Unsurprisingly, as Al-Nakib (2020, 58) recalls, much of the discourse about tradition and modernity is framed as a "binary" between the "local" and the "global/Western." This sometimes makes modernity unacceptable insofar as it is perceived as alien, or even worse, imposed from outside and contrary to local, and therefore authentic, values.

Although a substantial body of literature has challenged the Euro-American hegemony in the discourse on modernity (e.g., Eisenstadt 2000; Moore 1967; Wagner 2001), this approach remains pervasive in popular, scholarly and official discourses, both in Western and Arab contexts.

Conversely, and particularly from an Arab pulse and sometimes in reaction to the previous assumption, tradition is proudly equated to heritage, true identity and authenticity as opposed to alien, forcefully injected and intrusive (Western) models. In particular, the element of religion is the one that most easily ends up in the spotlight and lends itself to instrumentalisation. As will be elaborated later in the book, it happens that Islamist parties themselves advocate a return to Islamic tradition as a sign of authenticity (*'asala*) while also affirming their openness to modernity, which does not translate as being modern, but if anything as being reformist (a much more preferred term). At the same time, their detractors capitalise on an idea of modernity defined by opposition to Islamists, namely around the suspicion of their allegedly hidden, obscurantist project. Meanwhile, they also claim religious credentials to present an alternative approach to Islam by defending it from the attack of "extremists."[7] And in their common rhetoric, being modern does not exclude being authentic.

All this highlights an underlying tension between the idea of modernity and tradition, which echoes more or less consciously a centuries-long debate within the community of Arab and Muslim scholars and still has not found

a definitive solution. Especially in the nineteenth century, the need to reconcile with modernity has acquired a fundamental salience. Conventionally, the critical juncture is traced back to the launch of Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in the Ottoman territories of Egypt and Syria in 1798. The *al-asr al-jadid* (the "new era"), also known as *al-mu asara* (the contemporaneity) or *al-hadatha* (the modernity), was "provoked by the intrusion of the West, raised to the level of a world-civilization, into the discursive field of Islam" (Redissi 2005). The new era also came with an "accumulation of dualisms" such as reason/revelation, imitation/innovation, past/present, tradition/modernity, Islam/West, traditional law/rational law and state/religion (ibid. 2005). At that moment, modernity was associated with the West and understood both as the science and technology it produced, arousing fascination, but also as a cultural baggage of potentially threatening values to a traditional authenticity (*'asala*). It is in this context that the idea of modernity, and that of tradition by reflection, take on normative connotations, with modernity ending up representing "the Other/West," and tradition the "Us" (and above all Islam as a unifying factor). This "encounter" with the other challenged the perception of the self. As a result, the foundations of power and the hierarchies within society, that is, their ordering principles, were deeply affected. New categories emerged as opposed to long-standing ones. Examples are the category of the individual, less subordinated to the ethno-religious unity of the clan, the tribe and the *Umma* (the community of believers), and the idea of *watan* (nation) constructed on ethno-linguistic bases in opposition to the sacred bond of the *Umma*. Likewise, the possibility arose that power must obey legal rationality, be based on popular legitimacy and be divided into weights and counterweights, thus pointing to the fact that it could be no longer, and naturally, the product of a pact between God and men (Redissi 2005).

The dilemma of whether to accept or reject (Western) modernity led to multiple forms of reformism. If thinkers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) first, and the Egyptian Rached Rida (1865–1935) later on along with the Moroccan Allal El Fassi (1910–1974) or the Tunisian Abdelaziz Thaalbi (1874–1944) aimed at a return to the past, to the origins, others like the Egyptians Salama Moussa (1887–1958) and Taha Hussein (1889–1973) advocated for breaking with the past and embracing modernity (Redissi2005). A third way between acceptance and rejection has instead become dominant, namely incorporating some aspects and dropping others as a sort of compromise. However, such a compromising approach has come along with another dilemma, that of whether "modernising Islam" or "Islamising modernity" (Redissi 2005). It is interesting to see how, in this debate, the "new" that modernity brought with it was understood as a reinterpretation of its own past: a notorious example is the argument that democracy is nothing more than the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation). Islamist parties, for example, are keen to emphasise this aspect and feature *shura* councils (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for party organisation), serving as consultative

bodies and a sort of internal "parliament." This is to highlight that there is no contradiction between them and modern democracy.

All this backdrop still resonates today, not least through an increasingly heard argument of "modernisation without westernisation" (Lewis 1997) in which political parties found themselves trapped when resorting to categories like modernity and tradition. Talking about modernity and tradition opens Pandora's box. Normative biases and associations with worldviews at times exclusive, contradictory or reconcilable depending on the perspective, not to mention their fluidity and adaptability over time, make the analytic categories of modernity and tradition somewhat problematic. This is not a reason, however, to exclude them *a priori*, especially if it is such a recurring theme in the construction of party identity, and in the repertoires of legitimation and de-legitimation.

And here comes the innovative contribution of this book. Empirically, it finds that Tunisian and Moroccan political parties display elements of both. Conceptually, it frames this as hybridisation. Reconceptualising parties in this way might be theoretically and practically more fruitful not only as a way out to overcome this apparent dualism but precisely by virtue of what parties, in the Maghreb and elsewhere, *are* on the ground.

Hybrid, hybridity and hybridisation can be ephemeral concepts. The main risk is using them as blank boxes to include almost everything. Yet, they grasp a fluidity and ambivalence, which are nonetheless building blocks of extant political entities in a specific moment and even more over time. These features are too often underestimated to compel with more simplistic Manichean views, which fail to embody the nuanced reality on the ground. This book resorts to the notion of hybridity meant as the coexistence of traditional and modern power according to the logics of authority adopted. In other words, variations in the balance between modern and traditional tenets account for how parties differ within and across countries. It is the multiple combinations of those features, this book argues, that distinguish different parties insofar as variations in that balance account for how they organise and develop.

Likewise, the concept of hybridity has already been applied in terms of the overlap of oft-competing features to describe, for example, the evolving regimes in the Middle East and North Africa region and the institutionalisation of their sovereignty. By looking at the nature of the regimes as key to further explain differences in post-2011 trajectories, Raymond Hinnebusch draws on neo-patrimonialism as "a hybrid of personal and bureaucratic authority in which there can be considerable variation in the relative balance between the two sources of authority" (Hinnebusch 2015, 213). Variations in that balance account for how the regimes reacted to the uprisings. Similarly, in order to describe the different institutionalisation of sovereignty in some Arab Middle East states, Bacik (2008) uses the concept of "hybrid" to mean the coexistence of competing modern and traditional practices. In her study on hybrid sovereignty, she argues that the injection of Western models into the Middle East, either through colonial rule or local reformation movements,

clashed and mixed with traditional political forms. This encounter resulted in the combination of Western forms and trends linked to the modern nation-state format (first of all, the idea of a powerful state and homogenous society) with tribal and communitarian networks and ethno-religious loyalties. Itis reasonable to say that alien models affected indigenous ones, which didnot disappear and in turn affected the former as well. This hybridisation has produced "a strain of sovereignty that is neither completely Western nor trad-itional" (Bacik 2008, 7). In a similar vein, hybridity has been discussed in rela-tion to political orders in the "Global South" as the dialectic coexistence of non-state indigenous societal structures and newly introduced state structures (Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009).

Interestingly, the "modern" versus "tradition" paradigm is a recurrent theme within the literature on Arab urbanism and architecture, particularly in the Gulf. It fuses potent, traditional local symbols with state-of-the-art technology and futuristic design. In this regard, some critically observed how this freezing binary logic was also exploited to control and depoliticise the population: urban planning, the construction of infrastructures or targeted demolitions abiding by a modern state-driven development thereby act as forms of "repressive erasure" (Al-Nakib 2020).

The blending of modern and traditional elements, as well as their possible exploitation, is therefore by no means new. However, political parties have never been looked at in this light. By contrast, the notion of "hybrid" parties seems particularly fitting to the purpose of this book, as it perfectly expresses the idea of diverse logics of order and claims to power, inspired to traditional and modern models of governance, which co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine. This implies that depending on the vantage point (e.g., structures, values, practices and discourse), a party can be modern in one respect and more traditional in another. Political parties may tend in one direction in their structures or communication strategies, and in the opposite direction in terms of promoted values and programs. Or can resort to different meanings of modernity and tradition in the same domain. Different souls, therefore, coexist pointing to a multifaceted identity or, by paraphrasing Eisenstadt's (2000) notion of "multiple modernities," to "multiple identities."

And it is precisely this tension that the book seeks to highlight. In other words, it notes how the powerbrokers themselves play on the ambivalent meanings of modernity and tradition in search of legitimation and to delegit-imise their rivals. In doing so, they alternately attribute negative and posi- tive meanings to these notions depending on the circumstances. Also, the book makes it clear that different aspects of modernity and tradition applyat different levels of party organisational standing, identity and rhetoric, and they are but one part of the picture. No one claims to be entirely modernor traditional. Sometimes parties emphasise one aspect, andsometimes claim both. They are trapped in this constant oscillation between demarcation and reconciliation. Reflecting on this false dichotomy is somewhat inevitable, as these concepts still permeate much academic research on the Arab world and,

even more remarkably, remain pervasive in the partisan discourses and official and popular ones.

To be clear, the goal here is not to definitely assert what modernity or tradition are or are not, not least because they are anything but static notions. Nor does the book endorse a linear transition over time from "then" to "now" or from one given model to another. Nor does it suggest a value judgement on any belief system or worldview. Instead, it brings forward some possible interpretations of modern and traditional elements and how these relate to common perception.

What Modernity? What Tradition?

In talking about modern and traditional tenets, this book gives them a precise meaning. Modern authority is vested in a particular rationale, system or ideology; traditional one is customary and personalised. This conceptualisation takes a cue from the seminal interpretation on legitimate sources of authority by the German sociologist Max Weber, but derives only two, reworking them in part, to reflect the debated dualism mentioned earlier. This approach makes sense even more given the significance of the issue of legitimation after the 2010–11 uprisings that expressed the societal desire of change vis-à-vis the *ancien régime* and the practices it embodied. By extension, protesters demanding the downfall of the regime in Tunisia, or more simply its transformation in Morocco, called all political and social actors, thus parties, to change their logic of action, demanding greater accountability and an end to cronyism. The modernity–tradition pairing, however contestable and analytically problematic, is an inevitable knot to be confronted with given the pervasiveness of the need to reconcile the two, especially when it comes to Islamists, as if the religious element were the only one to contradict modernity. And it is precisely prominent Islamists who insist on showing how it is possible to be a very religious Muslim and at the same time highly educated, cosmopolitan, urban and modern in outlook.[8]

As a note of caution, these categories here, as throughout Weber's work, simply serve as heuristic devices. Weber's (1919) classic triad of legitimate authority notoriously features charismatic, traditional and rational-legal sources. In short, the foundation of charismatic authority rests on the character of political leaders. It is emotional, not rational, and derives from personal qualities that make the leader exceptional. Secondly, traditional legitimacy relies on tradition and established customs, thereby exploiting prevailing practices. Thirdly, rational-legal authority is grounded in institutional procedures and clearly defined rules which restrain arbitrary behaviour. In this case, a bureaucratic, impersonal and rational logic governed by law is the defining characteristic of legitimate authority. In the Weberian conceptualisation, this is what typifies modern societies.

Inspired by such a conceptualisation, this book extrapolates two aspects for broad analytical categories: modern and traditional power. The former

(and modernity equally) is exactly meant in Weberian terms as the rationality of laws and bureaucracy. This type of authority primarily resides in the office, in standards set forth in agreed rules and not necessarily in the person implementing that "doctrine." Modernity thus conceived can be operationalised through via standard operating procedures and functional working structures (as the "bureaucratic" apparatus).[9] Traditional power and tradition relate instead to customary styles of governance. In this context, patron–client relations and personalism are the perfect proxies.[10] For example, in discussing traditionalist features of Maghrebi politics, Michael Willis (2002a) recalls the phenomenon of the *za'im* (Arabic for leader), namely the prevalence of single dominant leaders both at the head of state and of political parties.[11] This aspect is also linked, if not exclusively or necessarily, to a charismatic legitimation. At the same time, being a long-standing feature along with the importance of patron–client networks to societies in North Africa, it can be approached as a traditional practice. In this sense, clientelism and personalism are more reflective of traditional types of authority as opposed to impersonal, rational-legal, and hence modern, legitimation. Specifically, party bylaws and, more importantly, their implementation, mirror a "procedural" legitimation based on institutionalised patterns of organisation and decision-making. Modern tenets are here intended as a reformist trend inspired by rationalisation, the routinisation of procedures, specialisation, professionalisation, complexity and continuity within the party structure and activities. In that regard, the book will show that Morocco's Party of Authenticity and Modernity and Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes do devote some efforts in this direction and praise modernity and progress. Nonetheless, despite their rhetorical commitment, they are pretty traditional in their practices and overwhelmingly concerned with counter-balancing the Islamists and the promotion of long-standing powerbrokers' interests, be they old regime cronies in Tunisia or the monarchical entourage in Morocco. In doing so, these anti-Islamist parties are more entrenched with the dominant role of personalities and clientelism than the Islamists are.

At the risk of oversimplifying, the occurrence of each proxy for both modern and traditional power can be denoted as either "low" or "high." This is admittedly arbitrary because additional cut-off points could be equally pointed out and because the operationalisation of qualitative features always has its shortcomings in terms of "measurement" efforts. However, this simplification actually allows key characteristics to be identified in any party. This latter will be a primary concern, especially since it is not the intention of the book to provide ideal types or rigid classifications but rather to reflect on the possibilities and limitations of such definitions and tools. For the sake of clarity, therefore, rating here refers to broad-level performance just as the corresponding operationalisations are to be understood more as rough indicators than clear-cut ones.

As illustrated in Table 1.2, political parties will be considered low in standard operating procedures if they poorly define their statutory rules

Table 1.2 The analytical framework (part 2): Proxies and measurement of modern and traditional power

	Proxies	Low	High
Modernity	Standard Operating Procedures (SoP)	Poorly defined rules Volatility Arbitrariness	Detailed rules Systematicity Predictability and reliability
	Bureaucratic apparatus	Skeletal or fuzzy organisation Presence of party bodies at the national level Intermittent activities	Complex and coherent organisation Operates at several different levels (national office, regional and local branches) Regular activities
Tradition	Clientelism	Extent of recipients: population at large Nature of linkage: institutionalised and framed by the party Brokers: Yes	Extent of recipients: well-identifiable bunch of voters Nature of linkage: personalised transaction transcending the party Brokers: No
	Personalism	Counterweights to the leadership	Leader-centred

concerning working mechanisms, duties and responsibilities at different levels or if these latter turn out to be merely cosmetic and largely inconsistent with practice. Whenever rules are clearly defined, detailed and formalised in procedure manuals and down the organisational ladder leaving less room for interference, parties can be rightly considered high on this dimension. It is evident how this also implies greater or less levels of arbitrariness and predictability. At the same time, parties can be rated as low or high as to their bureaucratic apparatus depending on how articulated and coherent their structure is, how extended over the territory is and how regular their activities are. In this line of reasoning, a party with a skeleton organisation, not necessarily rooted throughout the territory or intermittently active results as low in that dimension. On the contrary, the more coherently articulated and rooted the party is in the territory beyond the national office or localised strongholds, and the more continuous its activity, the higher the ranking of the bureaucratic apparatus it is considered to be.

Moving to tradition-based features, the extensiveness of clientelism will be assessed as "low" when somehow privileged access to resources or the

provision of different forms of administrative and social assistance address the populace in a more widespread way. Also, it is often mediated by brokers,and the relationship between the citizenry and the electoral candidate or member of parliament mostly remains institutionalised and framed by the party. In sum, a clientelistic exchange relationship with voters is not clearly identifiable. By contrast, clientelism is more markedly high insofar as it targets well-identifiable constituencies around specific notables and unfolds through a personalised transaction that directly responds to local notables. In such a context, the individual prevails over the party as a collective body. Lastly, personalism is low or high based on the existence of counterweighs to the leader's authority or his centrality and essentiality in party life.

Conclusion

Maghrebi political parties have been typically and often erroneously dismissed as non-autonomous or irrelevant entities, especially abouttheir representative functions and the prospects for democratisation. Much more rarely have they been studied in their own right, and in a systematic and comparative manner. Relegated to a perspective of "exceptionalism" that often traps studies on North Africa and the Middle East, they have rarely been analysed with specific reference to their organisational development. Even less so with an eye to universal trends and the peculiarities that characterise Tunisia and Morocco, like any other context. The political science literature has long disregarded Maghrebi parties, while area studies have rarely attempted systematic comparisons on organisational and operational aspects. This book attempts to compensate on both grounds, adding "unusual" cases to the first and a structured comparison to the other.

Classic explanations for how parties develop centre on endogenous factors, environmental circumstances, and the genetic imprint at their birth, alternately accounting for divergent or convergent paths. Parties are much more complex than the above. Conceptually, this book approaches Maghrebi political parties in their multidimensionality, looking at three interwoven "faces" of party organisation with reference to central bodies at the national level (party in central office), elected office-holders (party in public office) and party membership (party on the ground). From this viewpoint, it focuses on the internal articulation of powers and working mechanisms of parties, their finances, public image, political legitimacy, representativeness and inclusiveness.

Hence, the following chapters draw on original evidence from Tunisia and Morocco to disentangle political parties in both their organisational dynamics and legitimation rhetoric. Regarding this latter point, the book innovatively suggests hybridisation as an additional lens for looking at parties in order to grasp the plurality of souls and logics of action. More precisely, to frame the oscillation of parties between modern (rational-legal) and traditional (customary) features. The cumbersome discourse on modernity weighs on parties that, to varying degrees, resort to more traditional practices such as clientelism

and personalism while dealing with party rules and working bodies. The book goes further by arguing that it is precisely the hybridisation of these logics of action to shape the party organisational approach.

It will therefore proceed along a double track: discussing the parties' organisational arrangements while comparing them with each other and with an eye to classic comparative party literature, and reflecting on the multiple "modernities" and "traditions" that parties convey. In this sense, disentangling parties in their organisational development and legitimating rhetoric and practices is a new and fresh start for relaunching the debate on Arab political parties.

The upshot is that parties seem to have failed in their role as legitimate actors in the processes of representation even after the 2011 watershed elections, which altered the opportunity structures in both Tunisia and Morocco, with negative consequences in terms of political trust and citizens' dissatisfaction with politics. Although with due differences from party to party, the book will show that the party on the ground appears rather disempowered. If in this respect Maghrebi political parties resemble their counterparts in the West, it is more complex to clearly identify that the elective component increases its relative organisational power and autonomy at the expense of the other party "faces" as some literature has hypothesised for Western parties. Substantial differences also remain among the Maghrebi parties under scrutiny. Overall, the book will find more similarities by party family, hence between Islamist parties on the one hand and anti-Islamist parties on the other and. The former appear as far more oriented towards a Weberian notion of modernity while the latter are rather traditional in their style of governance. These findings confirm those approaches that tie inter-party differences less to institutional contexts.

Notes

1   In his "Afterword" to the edited volume by Scarrow et al. (2017) that advances the genuineness of a dimensional approach over classical modelling, Richard S. Katz (2017) instead observes that dimensions and ideal-types could be complementary analytic frames.
2   According to Panebianco (1988), three factors, in particular, mould the party's physiognomy in the formative phase: the leaders' charisma, the territorial strategy and the presence (or absence) of sponsoring groups.
3   The idea of utilising more nuanced "components" in the analysis of parties was not entirely new at that point, as ~~Vladimir~~ O. Key (~~1964~~) had already distinguished between *party in the electorate*, *party organisation* and *in office*, albeit in a less formalised way.
4   As a side note, the "new" democracies to which the literature on party politics usually refers are those of the third – and to date – last "wave" of democratisation, up to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
5   Bertrand Badie (1989), for instance, distinguishes between "single parties" (like the Algerian National Liberation Front), "pressure parties" (as the Egyptian *Wafd*), parties "outlines of a political ideology" (see the *Baath*) and others that are both expression of a leader or of the regime they represent.

6 Moncef Djaziri (1997), for example, highlighted how Lipset and Rokkan's classic cleavage theory poorly applies in Maghrebi contexts. By contrast, Pierre-Robert Baduel (1996) attempted an adaptation of their system of analysis by retaining the two divides of "center versus periphery," and "owners versus workers" while adapting the other pairings of "religious versus secular," and "state versus civil society." On the other hand, Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser (2003,chap. 6) questioned the application of these criteria. They argue that, although these cleavages are present in Arab societies, parties draw their legitimacy not from the exacerbation of differences but rather from a strategy of equivocation regarding social cleavages.

7 Author's interview with a Nidaa Tounes MP. Tunis, 11 April 2017 (No. 27).

8 See, for example, Ennahda's leader Rached Ghannouchi, or Lahcen Daoudi from the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco who also served as the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research (2012–2016).

9 These two latter aspects are reminiscent in some way of the internal dimension of party institutionalisation as described by Panebianco (1988). The routinisation of rules and organisation provides for parties' complexity and coherence, hence "systemness."

10 When it comes to the personalisation of politics, Kefford and McDonnell (2018) remind that this type of parties have to date been variously termed as "personal" (Calise 2015), "personalistic" (Gunther and Diamond 2003) or "personalist" (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014). Although a slightly different terminology is used, all definitions seem to share the centrality of the leader who is functional to the survival of the party itself. For a detailed discussion of personalism in MENA policy and the Tunisian context more specifically, see Cimini (2021).

11 To be sure, za'im is a more recent term used to translate "leader." Typically, in Arab classical political vocabulary, "leaders" were the caliphs, sultans, kings, princes or other religious authorities.

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