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Volition ascription to the addressee in a diachronic perspective: a unifying hypothesis for some post-volitional developments of Latin *uolo*

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Pragmatic studies have recently shown that volition ascription to the addressee corresponds to specific strategies and deserves more attention. This paper discusses a series of post-volitional developments attested by second-person forms of the Latin verb *uolo* ‘I want’. While these grammaticalization phenomena – some of which are also attested cross-linguistically – have mainly been dealt with separately, this paper shows that they can be treated in a unified manner, as all originally employ volition ascription as conversational strategy. In Latin, *uolo* constructions featuring the verb in the second person allowed the speaker to offer the addressee options of their choice or, in the case of prohibitive sentences, to preclude them from a specific choice. In this way this paper sheds new light on volition ascription strategies as a pragmatic device and their diachronic developments in Latin as well as cross-linguistically.

Keywords: diachrony; free choice; grammaticalization; intersubjectivity; Latin; politeness; volition ascription

1 Introduction

The description of volition as a modal category is a much-debated issue along with the notion of modality itself. As pointed out by Nuyts (2016: 37), volition has been considered as a dynamic, a deontic or even a non-modal category. In his tentative synthesis of agreed-upon modal notions (Nuyts 2016), he describes it together with intention as a deontic notion, while characterising boulomaic¹ modality as conveying a disposition of the individual. In other frameworks volition is a notion crossing other, better established, modal categories. For example, Portner (2009: 135) unifies abilities, opportunities and dispositions as dynamic modal notions related to a *volitional* individual. Adopting another perspective, Narrog (2012) has developed an original view according to which modal categories are divided into volitive (deontic and boulomaic) and non-volitive categories (dynamic and epistemic). Against this unclear, yet stimulating background, this paper aims to investigate a specific set of

¹ The adjectives ‘boulomaic’ and ‘bouletic’ come from Ancient Greek *bouilomai* ‘I will, I wish, I am willing’. ‘Boulomaic’, ‘bouletic’ and ‘volitional’ are sometimes used as synonyms, but they can also correspond to different concepts according to specific theoretical backgrounds.

grammaticalization phenomena attested by the Latin verb *uolo* ‘I want’. They are post-volitional – but not necessarily post-modal (as shown below) – phenomena, i.e., the relevant source constructions share the property of conveying the semantic notion of volition, while the target constructions have lost this semantic feature (or this is largely bleached).² Moreover, all source constructions explicitly ascribe volition to the addressee. After having discussed the post-volitional pathways and having provided, when possible, cross-linguistic parallels, a new hypothesis is formulated hinting at the possibility of dealing with the relevant phenomena in a unified manner.

This paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a working definition of volition and outlines the recent developments in its study with a focus on volition ascription in pragmatic research; section 3 presents the Latin phenomena and offers some cross-linguistic parallels; section 4 outlines a unifying hypothesis and suggest a possible explanation for the different results of the grammaticalization processes; section 5 wraps up the main results and some further lines of research are outlined.

2 The study of volition (with a focus on pragmatics)

This section highlights some aspects of the recent investigation of volition ascription to the addressee that are important in view of the hypothesis formulated in section 4. There is, however, no claim to be exhaustive. The focus is on pragmatic research, because, as the perspective on philological and cross-linguistic data adopted in section 3 will show, a pragmatic approach enables a unifying view on phenomena that seem disparate at first sight. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to provide a working definition of volition. Modelling its definition on that of the core modal notions of necessity and possibility (cf., e.g., van der Auwera and Plungian 1998), volition is defined here as the expression of wishes, desires, and intentions of a participant with regard to a state of affairs. The state of affairs is modalized – or introduced, if one does not want to use modal categories, – by an explicit volitional marker, such as English *want* or Latin *uolo* ‘I want’. This paper specifically deals with volitional markers used in the second person, hinting at a real or fictive partner in dialogic and/or discursive contexts. With regard to the distinction between volition and intention, it must be specified that it is beyond the scope of this work to investigate in what respects these two notions overlap and differ (cf., e.g., Matthews 1991: 157). Moreover, in the studies cited below, there is not always a clear separation, so that it would be improper, at least for the moment, to suggest one *a posteriori*.

With respect to the investigation of the expression of volition (cf. below for references), research has mainly focused on the *ego*, the speaker-agent of discourse as a volitional and control-endowed entity and, only to a lesser extent, on the ascription of volition to the addressee or on a third party that can be present or absent during the dialogic event. With reference to the relevant focus here – i.e., the addressee –, it must be stressed that (negative) politeness strategies require the speaker not to assume or presume the hearer’s wants, desires, beliefs and abilities, as stated by Brown and Levinson (1987: 144–145) in their seminal work on politeness. Assumptions about them must be put in the form of questions or must be hedged (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987: 130–172 for the strategies). It is important to specify that explicit and direct references to the hearer’s volition can be used as both negative

² The term ‘post-volitional’ is used here with reference to the diachronic process by which an item conveying volition or related meanings begins to convey non-volitional meanings. In the framework of this study ‘post-volitional’ is a better term than ‘post-modal’, as it is not always clear whether the post-volitional meanings developed by Latin *uolo* should be traced back to the pre-modal or to the modal meaning, as shown below. To my knowledge, the terms ‘post-modal’ and ‘pre-modal’ have been introduced by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), when outlining their modality semantic map. They are also diachronic concepts. A pre-modal meaning or function precedes the development of the modal meaning, while a post-modal meaning or function derives from a modal meaning. Cf. below.

politeness strategies (e.g., to avoid face-threatening acts) or positive politeness strategies (e.g., to show concern about the addressee), as shown below.³ However, it is also important to point out that, the choice of explicitly (not) referring to volitionality goes beyond politeness strategies, as shown, for example, by Caffi and Janney (1994) in a foundational paper presenting the historical development of emotion research. They present volitionality as self-assertiveness specifying the agent/object status of the participant in the event (Caffi and Janney 1994: 355, 357–358). To illustrate, it is possible to attribute several degrees of emotive markedness to the following sentences (ordered here from ‘more’ to ‘less’ emotive marked). In the imagined context the speaker wants to suggest that it is time to leave.

(1) *I want to leave now.*

(2) *Should we leave now?*

(3) *Do you think it's time to leave?*

Though these examples do not rely on real linguistic data, (2) and (3) show a preference for including the addressee and their volitional disposition by using the interrogative form (along with the relevant personal pronouns). In keeping with this view, interpersonal volitionality has often continued to be understood in terms of self-assertiveness (*I want to leave*) vs unassertiveness (*Do you want to leave?*). Cf. more recently Leech (2014: in particular, 149–150 and 153–154), who, however, also deals with the ‘you might want...’ construction, associating possibility and volition and showing proximity to the hearer (Leech 2014: 138). Along the traditional speaker-centred lines, it is worth mentioning the use of the label ‘wilful’ for certain directives – such as orders, commands, demands, requests, pleas, entreaties – as, to quote Huddleston (2017: 930), “it is, with varying strength, *my will* that you comply” (emphasis mine). It is important to specify, however, that statements about the addressee’s volition are not avoided in discourse and can correspond to specific strategies, as shown by recent research on volition ascription.

In fact, a research development particularly important in the context of the present investigation concerns explicit action ascription (Deppermann and Haugh 2022), including volition self-ascription (Childs 2012a, 2012b, Deppermann 2014) and volition ascription to the addressee (cf., in particular, the pioneering work by Curl 2006 on the use of the construction *do you want me to...* to offer help for latent, not explicitly mentioned problems; Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014, Kendrick and Drew 2016) or to a third party (Broth et al. 2019, Harjunpää 2021). It is worth specifying that the studies mentioned above mainly focus on the mobilisation of explicit intention ascription as an interpretational resource at the interpersonal level. Harjunpää (2021: 137–139) offers a synthetic and useful state-of-the-art about the study of the most common strategies based on volition self-ascription along with ascription to the addressee (I also refer to this publication for aspects of the study of volition ascription that are not relevant for the specific goals of this investigation.)

As shown by Deppermann and Kaiser (2022), explicit intention ascription to the addressee can be used, for example, to clarify the meaning of a prior action, to obtain information about the addressee’s action orientations, or to index a problem with the prior turn. Among the properties they describe as associated with intention ascription strategies, two properties seem particularly important from the viewpoint of the interpretation of the phenomena in focus here. In fact, intention ascription can be associated with conscious control of the agent and their action can be described as chosen by free will. Interestingly, Deppermann and Kaiser

³ I would like to express my gratitude to one of the anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this particular point.

(2022) also point out that volition ascription can be performed through questions along with statements, the second conveying – as expected – a higher degree of certainty and commitment on the part of the speaker.

As will be evident from the diachronic phenomena presented below, at the time when Latin *uolo* in the source constructions still conveyed volition, the speaker was using devices that explicitly employed volition ascription to the addressee. As I will show, this strategy was employed to provide the addressee with the possibility of (*free*) choice in response to a prior turn or action of the conversational partner, or, in the case of the prohibitive marker, to prevent them from *choosing* a specific option.

3 Five cases of grammaticalization based on volition ascription to the addressee

I have been able to count at least five cases of grammaticalization of second-person forms of the Latin verb *uolo*.⁴ Some of them are also attested cross-linguistically. They are as follows, ordered by forms:

- 1) the free-choice indefinite series featuring the marker *-uis* (3.1.1),
- 2) the polyfunctional adverb and concessive subordinative conjunction *quamuis* ‘even though’ (3.1.2),
- 3) the focus-marking particle *sis* (3.1.3),
- 4) the polyfunctional marker *uel*, which also works as the disjunctive conjunction ‘or’ (3.2),
- 5) the prohibitive marker *nolī* (3.3).

In the relevant literature, there is agreement on the description of these forms as cases of grammaticalization. Cf., e.g., Fruyt (2004: 318 for 1 and 4; 305–308 for 2) and Fruyt (2011: 678 and 828 for 4; 717 for 5; 828 for 3; 828–830 for 2), both contributions discussing grammaticalization in Latin. However, a unifying overview – based on the fact that the source form is consistently a second-person singular form – has not yet been suggested. Some remarks on the use of the term ‘grammaticalization’ are in order here. I will also briefly show that it is unclear whether the changes should be defined as post-modal (cf. also fn. 2).

‘Grammaticalization’ has been early described as consisting “in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status” (Kuryłowicz 1975). This classical definition is still referenced, e.g., by Ramat (2015). Diewald (2011: 366) has stressed that “[g]rammaticalization is a complex multifactorial type of language change which does not consist of a single process but of a set of interacting processes.” Any description of such processes relies on a specific view of what a *grammar* is. In line with Diewald (2011: 371), I have adopted “a broad view on grammar comparable to the one expressed in Traugott (2003: 626), who sees grammar ‘as structuring communicative as well as cognitive aspects of language’, and therefore includes a much wider range of phenomena, e.g., ‘focusing, topicalization, deixis, and discourse coherence, into the realm of grammar.” It is within this approach that phenomena of pragmaticalization, such as the above-mentioned development in Latin of the focus-marking particle *sis*, can be viewed as phenomena of grammaticalization. It must also be mentioned that, though there are different sets of formal criteria to identify the degree of grammaticalization of a linguistic item – the most widely known and discussed are the ones suggested by Lehmann ([1982] 1995), but cf. also Hopper (1991), Traugott (2003: 644) and Heine (2003: 579) –, they share some common points (e.g., gradualness), so that they should be seen in a complementary way. In this investigation I will use the relevant criteria within Lehmann’s set as a diagnostic tool. This

⁴ Post-modal or post-volitional developments of Latin *uolo* are not limited to the ones investigated here (cf. Dell’Oro, forthcoming). However, the other developments are not specifically associated with second person constructions.

will allow me to show the degree of grammaticalization of each use of each form (along with some desiderata). For reasons of comparability the focus will be on the volitional markers – i.e., (-)uis, uel, nolī – and not on the related constructions (*quiuuis, quamuis* etc.).⁵ At the onset of the grammaticalization process it is possible to find both lexical or grammatical forms (cf. above). Though the issue is not relevant for the interpretation of 1–5 as grammaticalized constructions, it is worth specifying that it is not always clear whether the onset forms are the pre-modal (i.e., more lexical) or the modal (i.e., more grammatical) ones. This is the main reason why the phenomena are not called ‘post-modal’, but ‘post-volitional’ (cf. fn. 2). The distinction between pre-modal and modal can be illustrated in formal terms: when *uolo* governs a nominal phrase, the construction is pre-modal, when *uolo* embeds an infinitive (or a subjunctive), the construction is modal. To illustrate with English examples, cf.

(4) pre-modal construction: *I want (i.e., I desire) that car.*

(5) modal construction: *I want (i.e., I desire / I have the intention) to buy that car.*

However, from a semantic point of view, it is more difficult to trace a distinction based on the absence (pre-modal) or presence (modal) of a state of affairs, as a nominal phrase can notionally refer to a state of affairs.⁶ Cf.

(6) (pre-modal construction from the syntactic point of view, but possibly modal from a notional point of view) *I want that change (i.e., I desire that a certain change takes place).*

With respect to van der Auwera and Plungian (1998)’s modality map and the post-modal developments from the volitional domain (e.g., future), it must be pointed out that none of the phenomena outlined here is mentioned. Indeed, with the exception of the prohibitive *nolī* which scopes over a verb and is post-modal, all the other post-volitional constructions can scope over a nominal phrase, hinting at the role played by the related pre-modal constructions, at least at the syntactic level. However, it may be impossible to draw a clear dividing line when both uses, the pre-modal and the modal ones, are active, as is the case in the historical stages of the Latin language. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this issue in more detail.

3.1 The marker (-)uis

With respect to the paradigm of *uolo* it must be noticed that the (indicative) second-person form *uis* – dealt with under sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 – goes back to the Proto-Indo-European root **uejh₁-* ‘strive for’ (LIV: s.v.). The other forms of *uolo* come from PIE **uelh₁-* ‘choose’ (LIV: s.v.). This clearly shows the instability of the (indicative) second-person singular form ‘you want’ that was soon replaced by that of another verb. This could be due to some difficulties in pronouncing the form (which is not attested) or in keeping it distinct from other forms of the verb (cf. under 3.2). Perhaps the use of *uis* could also hint at a preference for addressing the hearer’s wishes and intentions with a specific verb. Unfortunately, these hypotheses cannot be tested. Moreover, it is worth stressing that in the historically-attested stages of the Latin language, from a synchronic point of view, the non-grammaticalized second-person *uis* ‘you want’ has the same semantics as the other forms of *uolo*.

⁵ The constructional framework (Traugott and Trousdale 2013) could also provide useful insights on the forms under investigations. It could be interesting, for example, to discuss whether they should be interpreted as cases of constructional change or of constructionalization. To discuss this approach is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁶ In the relevant literature it remains most often implicit that modal items modalize a state of affairs.

‘Young man, what is it?

What do you want? Why are you knocking?’

Plautus, *The Braggart Soldier* 1296–1297 (late 3rd c. BCE)⁸

In the next passage the hanger-on Artotrogus flatters the lying, braggart soldier Pyrgopolinices by assuring him that he (Artotrogus) already knows everything about Pyrgopolinices’ exploits. Therefore, Artotrogus already knows what Pyrgopolinices is going to say next.

(8) [...] *ehem, scio iam quid uis dicere.*
INT know.1SG already what.ACC.SG want.2SG say.INF

factum hercle est, memini fieri. [...]
happen.PTCP.PST INT be.3SG remember.1SG happen.INF
‘Yes, I already know what you want to say. It did happen, I remember it happening.’
Plautus, *The Braggart Soldier* 37–38 (late 3rd c. BCE)

In the following passage Pyrgopolinices requests the attention of the slave Palaestrio. Palaestrio declares his willingness to comply with Pergopolinices’ orders.

(9) (Pyr.) *aliquam mihi partem hodie*
some.ACC.SG I.DAT.SG part.ACC.SG today

operae des denique,
care.GEN.SG give.SBJV.2SG finally

iam tandem ades: uolo te.
now at_last attend.SBJV.2SG want.1SG you.ACC.SG

(Pal.) *assum, impera si quid uis.*
attend.1SG command.IMP.2SG if anything.ACC.SG want.2SG

‘Give me some part of your attention in the end today, now attend to me at last: I want you.’

‘I am attending to you, command me if you want anything.’

Plautus, *The Braggart Soldier* 1030–1031 (late 3rd c. BCE)

When used in specific contexts, for example, with verbs of saying or commanding, *quid uis* ‘what (do) you want(?)’ / ‘[if] you want anything’ could have been reinterpreted as *quiduis* with *-uis* extending the hearer’s options, from ‘something/anything’ to ‘anything you want’. Compare (10), where *quid* is an argument of both *loquere* ‘say! (imperative)’ and *uis*, and (11), where *quiduis* is an argument of *imperat* ‘(someone) orders’:

(10) [...] (fished Gripus) *Quin loquere quid uis.*
in_fact say.IMP.2SG what.ACC.SG want.2SG

‘Say what you want.’

Plautus, *The Rope* 946 (late 3rd c. BCE)

⁸ If not otherwise specified, the Latin texts and the English translations come from the Loeb Classical Library Database. The Loeb translators are John Barsby (Terence), Wolfgang de Melo (Plautus), Sander M. Goldberg and Gesine Manuwald (Ennius), L. H. G. Greenwood (Cicero) and E. H. Warmington (*Twelve Tables, Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*).

The context of (10) is compatible with ‘anything you want’, as the character saying (10) is refusing to hear his partner in the dialogue. Cf. the exchange reported in English here:

(slave Trachalio) ‘Listen.’

(Gri.) ‘I won’t.’

(Trachalio) ‘But you will later.’

(Gri.) ‘Say what you want. / Say anything you want’⁹

(Tra.) ‘Hey, just wait. What I want to tell you is worth your while.’

In the next passage, *-uis* is a bound element. It does not convey a volitional meaning and it does not refer to the conversational partner (# ‘Need commands what/anything *you* want’). It strengthens *quid*, which can function as an interrogative-relative or as an indefinite pronoun, by enlarging its notional scope to every possible choice.

(11) (Argyrippus)	<i>quiduis</i>	<i>egestas</i>	<i>imperat:</i>
	anything.ACC.SG	poverty.NOM.SG	command.3SG

<i>fricentur.</i>	<i>da=n</i>	<i>quod</i>	<i>oro?</i>
rub.SBJV.PASS.3PL	give.2SG=PTCL	what.ACC.SG	ask.1SG

‘Beggars can’t be choosers; a rub they shall get.’ (lit. ‘Need commands anything: that they (your knees) be rubbed’) ‘Will you give me what I ask for?’

Plautus, *The Comedy of Asses* 671 (late 3rd c. BCE)

It is important to notice that source constructions and target constructions already coexist in the most ancient attestations. The element *-uis* in *quiuuis* (and in the related series) shows a high degree of grammaticalization. It shows phonetic, but not semantic integrity, at least at the end of the cline, as shown by (11). It also has no structural scope anymore. It shows a certain degree of paradigmatic cohesion, as *uis* is still the second person of *uolo*. It is a bound (frozen) element (cf. also below). There is a certain degree of paradigmatic variability (*-uis* vs *-libet*)¹⁰.

Before introducing the second case of grammaticalization from a source construction featuring the second person singular of *uolo*, it is worth pointing out that the association of the relative-indefinite pronouns and *uolo* is also attested in other constructions. To illustrate, in (12) the third person singular of the future is found.

(12) [...]	<i>quis</i> (or <i>quisquis</i> , parenthesis mine)	<i>uolet</i>
	anyone.NOM.SG	want.FUT.3SG

<i>uindex</i>	<i>esto.</i>
protector.NOM.SG	be.IMP.FUT.2SG

‘[...] let any one who shall be willing be protector.’
Twelve Tables, 1, 4 (early Latin)

It is important to stress that in Latin, the grammaticalization process clearly developed from the constructions featuring the second person singular, hinting at dialogue as the source context of the Latin free-choice indefinite pronouns. As shown in the next section, Latin has generalized the second-person strategy far beyond free-choice indefinites.

⁹ The second translation is mine.

¹⁰ Syntagmatic variability is not a pertinent criterion with respect to *-uis*, as the position of *-uis* depends on that of *quiuuis*. Cf. section 3.

3.1.2 *Quamuis*

Uis combined with the relative and interrogative adverb *quam* ‘to what degree’ means ‘to any degree you like’ and was originally used with adjective and adverbs expressing scalar concepts. Compare (13), where *uis* is a lexical (pre-modal) verb, and (14), where *uis* is a bound element. In both cases, the speaker wants to leave the hearer the choice of the quality degree, including – and sometimes implicitly hinting at – the maximum possible degree (cf. already Spevak 2005: 75–76).

(13) *solet* *iocari* *saepe*
 have_the_habit.3SG joke.INF often

me=cum *illoc* *modo*.
 me.ABL.SG=with that.ABL.SG way.ABL.SG

quam *uis* *ridiculus* *est*,
 to.what.degree want.2SG funny.NOM.SG be.3SG

ubi *uxor* *non* *adest*.
 when wife.NOM.SG NEG be.present.3SG

‘He often jokes with me in that way. He’s as funny as you wish for when his wife isn’t around.’

Plautus, *The Two Menaechmuses* 317–318 (probably about 200 BCE, translation adapted)

(14) *noui*, *Neptunus* *ita* *solet*,
 know.1SG Neptune.NOM.SG so have_the_habit.3SG

quamuis *fastidiosus* *aedilis* *est*: *si*
 however_much exacting.NOM.SG inspector.NOM.SG be.3SG if

quae *improbae* *sunt* *merces*, *iactat* *omnis*.
 any.NOM.PL bad.NOM.PL be.3PL merchandise. NOM.PL throw.3SG all.ACC.PL

‘I know, that’s what Neptune is like, he’s an ever-so-particular market inspector: if there’s any bad merchandise, he throws the lot overboard.’ / ‘... he’s an extremely demanding market inspector ...’

Plautus, *The Rope* 372–373 (end of 3rd c. BCE, second translation added)

The form *quamuis* developed into the concessive conjunction *quamuis* ‘even though’, while other functions also evolved (cf. ex. [15] and below). For the diachronic process, cf. also Fruyt (2004: 305–308). With regard to the bridging construction from which the concessive conjunction arose, there are several suggestions. Leumann et al. (1979: 603) propose that in certain contexts *quamuis* could be read as referring to both the adverb and the verb, as in

(15) *locus* *hic* *apud* *nos*, *quamuis* *subito*
 place.NOM.SG this.NOM.SG at I.ACC.PL however/though suddenly

uenias, *semper* *liber* *est*.
 come.SBJV.2SG always free.NOM.SG be.3SG

‘However suddenly you might come [referring to the adverb] / Though you may come suddenly [referring to the verb], here at our place there’s always a free space.’

such as *quiuus* and *quamuis*, it is up to the addressee to establish what, to what degree, how etc. I will come back to this point later (4).

As in the case of the indefinite series, Latin also attests a competitor featuring the third person: *quamlibet* ‘in whatever degree it pleases you/one’, which is attested in a seemingly concessive use, from Lucretius (3, 987) onward (Leumann et al. 2016: 604).

In Latin *quamuis* can also develop rectifying meanings such as ‘nevertheless, still’. As outlined by Leumann et al. (2016: 604), the earliest examples can be observed in Propertius for poetry and Celsus for prose, respectively.¹² Interestingly, similar to *sis* (3.1.3) and *uel* (3.4), *quamuis* can also work as a focus-marking particle. To illustrate, cf. (17), if *insipiens* is understood as conveying a non-gradable concept (‘a foolish person’), and (18).¹³

(17) *quamuis insipiens poterat persentiscere*
 even idiot.NOM.SG can.PST.3SG realize.INF

‘Even an idiot could realize...’

Plautus, *The Merchant* 687 (probably late 3rd c. BCE, translation adapted)

(18) *quicumque senator uoluerit fieri,*
 whoever.NOM.SG senator.NOM.SG want.SBJV.PST.PFV become.INF

quamuis puer, quamuis indignus, quamuis
 even child.NOM.SG even unworthy.NOM.SG even

ex eo loco ex quo non liceret,
 from that.ABL.SG place.ABL.SG from which.ABL.SG NEG be.lawful.SBJV.PST.IPFV.3SG

si is pretio apud istum idoneos
 if he bribe.ABL.SG at this.ACC.SG suitable.ACC.PL

vinceret, factum esse semper [...].
 oust.SBJV.PST.IPFV.3SG become.PTCP.PST.ACC.SG be.INF always

‘‘If anyone who wished to become a senator – even a child, even someone incapable, even someone from a legally disqualified standing – had ousted (more) suitable people through a bribe paid to this man (Verres), he invariably became a senator [...].’’

Cicero, *Against Verres* II, 2, 121 (1st c. BCE, translation mine)

The bound element *-uis* in *quamuis* shows a high degree of grammaticalization as in the case of *quiuus* and the related series (cf. 3.1.1). It is interesting to notice that unverbated *quamuis* also underwent a process of grammaticalization.

context of this investigation, it is only possible to make a couple of remarks. First, Relevance Theory does not work on the basis of an explicit marking of relevance (or irrelevance), as relevance is a property, e.g., of an utterance resulting from a positive balance between contextual effects and cognitive efforts. Second, part of the problem is certainly terminological (‘indiscriminacy marker’ is perhaps a better choice).

¹² For *quantumuis* ‘to as great a degree as you want’ and *quantumlibet* ‘to as great a degree as it pleases (one)’ showing at least partially similar developments with respect to *quamuis* and *quamlibet* respectively, cf. Leumann et al. (2016 [1965]: 604).

¹³ It is worth specifying that other interpretations are possible, as shown by the Loeb translations: ‘Any idiot could realize’ (‘to any degree you like’, emphasis mine) and ‘that anyone who wished to become a senator, however young or incapable or disqualified by his legal standing, had only to pay Verres a larger bribe than more suitable people offered, and a senator he invariably became’ (‘to any degree you like’, emphasis mine), respectively.

3.1.3 *Sis*

The third case of grammaticalization featuring (-)*uis* is the parenthetical conditional clause *si uis* ‘if you wish’, appearing under the contracted form *sis*¹⁴. It is traditionally interpreted as a polite ‘please’ (among others, Risselada 1993: 154, Rosén 2009: 331–332, Pinkster 2015: 349, 351)¹⁵ or as urging (Adams 1984: 67, Barrios-Lech 2016: 134, 139). Recently, Dickey (2019) suggested that the use of *sis* as a politeness marker weakened early and that *sis* is already working as a focus-marking clitic particle in the most ancient passages. With respect to verb forms, it mostly appears associated with an imperative (98% of the occurrences in the early Latin corpus used by Dickey 2019). This is particularly interesting from the perspective adopted here, as it confirms the relevance of the dialogic context in which the use of *sis* originated and developed. To illustrate, (19) shows *sis* still having its lexical meaning (it introduces *erum sospitari* ‘that your master be saved’),¹⁶ (20) and (21) outline its use as focus-marking particle, with imperatives and with other words, respectively:

(19) [...] *sis erum sospitari,*
if=want.2SG master.ACC.SG save.INF.PASS

da mi istas uiginti minas. [...]
give.IMP.2SG I.DAT.SG this.ACC.SG twenty mina.ACC.PL
‘[...] if you want your master to be saved through your deeds, give me those twenty minas.’
Plautus, *The Comedy of Asses* 683–684 (late 3rd c. BCE)

(20) *occlude sis*
lock.IMP.2SG PTCL

fores ambobus pessulis. iam ego hic ero.
door.ACC.PL both.ABL.PL bolt.ABL.PL now I.NOM.SG here be.FUT.1SG
‘Lock the door with both bolts. I’ll be here in a moment.’
Plautus, *The Pot of Gold* 103–104 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation adapted)

(21) *illuc sis uide: non “paedagogum” iam me,*
there PTCL look.IMP.2SG NEG instructor.ACC.SG now I.ACC.SG

sed “Lydum” uocat.
but Lydus.ACC.SG call.3SG
‘Look at that! He isn’t calling me “tutor” any longer, but “Lydus.”’
Plautus, *The Two Bacchises* 137–138 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation adapted)

The later use of parenthetical *si uis* with imperatives shows that volition ascription as a politeness strategy is still at work in the Latin language. Examples such as (22) – and cf. also (24) below – also shows the long-lasting co-occurrence of volition ascription to the addressee in parenthetical structures and imperatives.

(22) *dic, si uis, de quo*
say.IMP.2SG if want.2SG about what.ABL.SG

¹⁴ This form must not be confused with the subjunctive form *sis* ‘that you be’, from the verb *sum* ‘I am’.

¹⁵ Cf. Ancient Greek *ei théleis* ‘if you want’ (Ruiz Yamuza 2022), French *s’il vous plaît* ‘if it pleases you (plural)’ and other similar constructions.

¹⁶ It is worth specifying that (19) is not an isolated example. Cf., e.g., Plautus, *The comedy of Asses* 309: *sis amanti subuenire* ‘if you want to help the lover’ (translation mine). Cf. also below.

disputari *uelis*
 discuss.INF.PASS want.SBJV.2SG
 ‘tell me, if you wish, what subject you wish to discuss’
 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 2.13 (1st c. BCE, translation mine)

Adopting a diachronic point of view, it is possible to suggest that at the beginning of the grammaticalization process, the speaker employed the parenthetical *si uis* to politely introduce an imperative (cf. already Dickey 2019). Conditional volition ascription was used as a pragmatic device, conveying to the hearer the idea that they could choose whether to perform or not the action expressed by the imperative. A similar pragmatic use is also attested for *uel* (3.2).

To my knowledge, in this case, there is not a (-)libet variant, showing a parallel development.¹⁷ It is worth mentioning the existence of the plural pendant *sultis* ‘if you (pl.) want’. Cf. (23) where *sultis* appears as *sulti*:

(23) *pandite* *sulti* *genas* *et* *corde* *relinquite*
 open.IMP.2PL PTCL eyelid.ACC.PL and heart.ABL.SG remove.IMP.2PL

somnum
 sleep.ACC.SG
 ‘open your eyelids, if you please, and remove sleep from your heart’
 Ennius, fragment 86 (3rd or 2nd c. BCE)

According to Hofmann (1951: 132), *sultis*, an analogical form based on *sis*, shows that the Latin speakers still perceived the volitional meaning of *sis*.

With regard to the cline of grammaticalization, there are some differences with respect to the two previous forms featuring (-)uis. At the end of the cline, *uis* (in *sis*¹⁸) has lost semantic and phonetic integrity along with its own structural scope and paradigmatic cohesion. It does not show paradigmatic variability. This different development can be partially due to the different syntactic construction at the basis of *sis* (conditional structure evolving into a parenthetical structure) with respect to *quiuus* and *quamuis* (relative-interrogative structure).

3.2 *Uel*

With respect to the development of the disjunctive function ‘or’, Latin *uel* is in keeping with cross-linguistic tendencies about the use of volitional markers in the formation of free-choice indefinites such as *quiuus* (3.1.1). Cross-linguistic evidence – though mainly from European languages – shows that disjunctive coordinative particles can develop from imperatives (cf. Hungarian *akár* ‘or’, imperative of the verb *akar* ‘want’), second-person (cf. Ossetic *fændy* ‘or’ from ‘you want’) and also third-person (cf. Portuguese *quer* ‘or’ from *quer* ‘wants’, Romanian *ori* ‘or’ from late Latin **uolet* ‘wants’) forms of volitional verbs (Haspelmath 1997: 168).¹⁹ Moreover, as it can also be used as a politeness marker associated with an imperative, it also shows strategies and developments similar to those outlined for *sis* (3.1.3). Finally, as it can also function as a scalar focus particle, its behaviour is also similar to that of *quamuis* (3.1.2).

¹⁷ For the partially similar use of *si placet* ‘if it pleases (one / you)’, cf. Fedriani (2021).

¹⁸ The syntagmatic variability of *sis* is low, as the form clearly tends to be used after the imperative (Dickey 2019: 216).

¹⁹ Cf. also Russian *libo* ‘or’ from *ljubo* ‘pleasant’ (‘one wants’).

Uel is a second-person form of *uolo*. However, it is not possible to establish with certainty whether it is an archaic imperative, meaning ‘want!’, or the original second person singular of the indicative, meaning ‘you want’ (cf. Walde and Hofmann 1965: s.v.; Leumann et al. 1979: 526, among others). Cf. also above (3.1). As shown above, cross-linguistic studies confirm that both indicatives and imperatives can be the sources of ‘or’. As in both cases the source construction features a second-person form, the issue of the etymology of *uel* does not affect the present investigation.

Uel is still poorly studied in Latin linguistics (cf. OLD: s.v., Rosén 2009). It can be used to introduce two options (double *uel*). Cf.

(24) *utrumuis* *est, uel leno uel Lycus.*
 whatever.you.like.NOM.SG be.3SG or pimp.NOM.SG or Lycus.NOM.SG
 ‘Whichever you wish, a pimp or a Lycus.’
 Plautus, *The Little Carthaginian* 1382 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation adapted)²⁰

Repetition of volition verbs to introduce a double option is also known in other languages genetically related to Latin. Cf. It. *vuoi ... vuoi ...* ‘or ... or ...’, second person singular of the indicative present of *volere* ‘to want’ (evolution of Latin *uolo*) and Sabellic *heris/heri... heris/heri ...*, second person singular of the indicative present of **heriom* ‘to want’ (Untermann 2000: s.v. *U. heris – heris*). In this case, the speaker is given the hearer the choice between two alternatives.

Uel could also be used as a scalar focus particle. Cf.

(25) *etiam* <*iam*> *intro duce, si uis,*
 also now inside bring.IMP.2SG if want.2SG

uel gregem venalium
 even herd.ACC.SG hired.worker.GEN.PL
 ‘Bring in even a herd of hired workers, if you wish.’
 Plautus, *The Pot of Gold* 452 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation mine)

Similar to what we have seen with *quamuis* ‘even’, the speaker allows the addressee to choose, including the most remote possibility. As already shown by Haspelmath (1997: 162–163), this development is also known in other languages such as Hungarian (*akár* could also mean ‘even’, cf. above) and Russian (cf. *xot’* ‘even’, originally an imperative form of *xotét’* ‘want’).

Uel was also used together with an imperative, showing a similar behaviour as *sis*, including polite (26) and urging (27) functions. In (26) Jupiter is apologising to Alcmena. The passage is given here with the preceding lines translated in English.

(26) [If I said so, that doesn’t make you unchaste, and I don’t think you are, and I’ve come back here to apologize to you. Well, never have I been more upset about anything than after hearing that you’re angry with me. Why did you say it, you’ll ask. I’ll explain it to you. Well, not because I believed you’re unchaste. But I was testing your attitude, what you’d do and how you’d take it.]

equidem ioco illa dixeram

²⁰ It is worth noticing the co-occurrence of *uel* with *utrumuis* ‘which of the two (you want)’.

truly joke.ABL.SG that.ACC.PL say.PST.PFV.1SG

dudum *tibi*,
litte.while.ago you.DAT.SG

ridiculi *causa. uel* *hunc* *rogato* *Sosiam.*
fun.GEN.SG for PTCL this.ACC.SG ask.IMP.FUT.2SG Sosia.ACC.SG
'I said those things as a joke to you a while ago, for fun. Ask Sosia here if you like.'
Plautus, *Amphitryon* 916–917 (early 2nd c. BCE)

In (27) Philolaches is playfully complaining about the price paid to free his sweetheart Philomatium. The translation of *uel* as 'go ahead' underscores the urging, yet playful, character of the following order.

(27) *etiam* *nunc* *decem minae* *apud te* *sunt*;
also now ten mina.NOM.PL at you.ACC.SG be.3PL

uel *rationem* *puta.*
PTCL account.ACC.SG reckon.IMP.2SG
'Even now ten minas are with you; go ahead, balance the account.'
Plautus, *The Ghost* 299 (early 2nd c. BCE)

Sometimes *uel* works as both introducing multiple options and accompanying an imperative, cf. (28):

(28) *uel* *tu* *me* *uende* *uel* *face*
or you.NOM.SG I.ACC.SG sell.IMP.2SG or do.IMP.2SG

quid *tibi* *lubet.*
what.ACC/NOM.SG you.DAT.SG please.3SG
'You can sell me or do whatever you like.'²¹
Plautus, *The Persian* 398 (early 2nd c. BCE)

It is difficult to ascertain the phonetic integrity of *uel*, as the we do not have access to the original form (cf. above). The picture that is possible to draw for *uel* is different from those outlined above, though the form also shows a high degree of grammaticalization. The main difference is that *uel* still has a structural scope, as it alone can introduce the alternative. Moreover, it did not coalesce with another form. It has lost paradigmatic cohesion and does not show paradigmatic variability. Though statistically data are missing, it usually precedes its scope, showing reduced syntagmatic variability.

In all developments outlined until this point (cf. 3.1 and 3.2), the speaker employs *uolo* advancing volition ascription to provide the addressee with options of their choice. The last case to be presented here, that of the prohibitive marker *nolī*, is different, but can be explained applying the same logic.

3.3 Prohibitive marker

Latin has also a prohibitive marker that originates from the verb *uolo*. The prohibition marker *nolī* (with the plural *nolīte*) comes from the negation *ne* and the second person singular

²¹ For other developments of *uel*, cf. OLD: s.v.

optative (Proto-Italic) form **uel-ī-*. Literally, *nolī* meant ‘may you not want (to do something)’. Cf.

(29) *quaeso hercle nolī, Saurea, mea causa*
 ask.1SG INT NEG Saurea.VOC.SG my.ABL.SG cause.ABL.SG

hunc uerberare
 this.ACC.SG flog.INF

‘by Jove, please, Saurea, don’t flog him, for my sake / may you not want to flog him because of me’

Plautus, *The Comedy of Asses* 417 (late 3rd c. BCE, second translation added)

In this passage, the Merchant asks the slave Leonida (who is pretending to be the steward Saurea) not to flog the slave Libanus for being late. In fact, Leonida has repeatedly expressed his wish to flog Libanus. Cf. 415: *malam rem effugies numquam* ‘you will never escape a thrashing’, 417: *utinam nunc stimulus in manu mihi sit* ‘I wish I had a cattle-prod in my hand now’. This example shows that *nolī* has the function of preventing the hearer from doing something they wish. It could also show a higher degree of intersubjectivity with respect to the use of other directive devices not based on an explicit marker of volition (for example, a negated subjunctive). As made explicit in the second translation, *nolī* seems to directly oppose the wishes previously expressed by the addressee.

It was originally a polite way of issuing a prohibition (cf. Risselada 1993, Devos & Van Olmen 2013, among others) which progressively ousted negative imperatives from classical prose.

As shown by Aikhenvald (2010: in particular 353–354), volitional markers can contribute to the formation of imperatives and prohibitive constructions. Cf. also, e.g., the ‘want not’ strategy in (30):

(30) (Middle) Dutch

Wilt niet schrikken
 want.IMP NEG be_afraid.INF

‘Don’t be afraid!’

(Van der Horst 2008: 1161, 1163, quoted from Devos and Van Olmen 2013: 4).

With regard to Latin, it is important to stress that the Latin construction is not the imperative of *uolo* (as often said), but an optative construction, soliciting the volition of the addressee. In a certain way, *nolī* combines two strategies for forming prohibitives: the use of volition – cf. (31) – and the negation of a wish – cf. (32). It is worth noticing that example (31) features the first person singular of *nolo*, conveying the wish of the speaker for something not to happen.

(31 – indicative) *meis consanguineis nolo te*
 my.DAT.PL kinsman.DAT.PL NEG=want.1SG you.ACC.SG

iniuste loqui
 unjustly speak.INF

‘I don’t want you to abuse men of my own blood’

Plautus, *The Little Carthaginian* 1037 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation adapted)

(32 – subjunctive) *molestus ne sis nunciam,*
 annoying.NOM.SG NEG be.SBJV.2SG here_and_now

i rus, te amove
 go.IMP.2SG country.ACC.SG you.ACC.SG retire.IMP.2SG
 ‘stop annoying me this instant! (lit. ‘don’t be a nuisance!’) go back to the farm! Vanish!’
 Plautus, *The Ghost* 74 (early 2nd c. BCE, translation adapted)

It is worthwhile to notice that the *uolo*-type prohibition can be embedded by using verbs such as *interdico* ‘to forbid’, etc. To illustrate,

(33) *interdico ne extulisse extra aedis puerum*
 forbid.1SG NEG carry.INF.PST out_of house.ACC.PL child.ACC.SG

usquam uelis
 to_any_place want.SBJV.2SG
 ‘I forbid you to carry the child anywhere out of this house.’ / lit. ‘I forbid that you may want to carry the child anywhere out of this house.’
 Terence, *The Mother-in-Law* 563 (2nd c. BCE, second translation mine)

Though this can be due to a gap in the Latin documentation, Cormany (2012) points out that the use of *uolo*-type prohibitions – in which *uolo* appears in the subjunctive form – is typical of ancient legal documents. In these texts the *uolo*-prohibition always refers to a third party. In fact, there is no defined addressee (i.e. a specific individual) to which legal documents are addressed, nor is the group of addressees thought to be present at the moment of issuing the legal text because of place and time constraints. In these attestations, the function of *uolo* is that of evoking a possible choice of a third party that the ones issuing the law want to avoid. To illustrate,

(34) *Magister neque uir neque mulier quisquam*
 master.NOM.SG NEG man.NOM.SG NEG woman.NOM.SG any.NOM.SG

eset. Neue pecuniam quisquam eorum
 be.SBJV.IPFV.3SG NEG treasury.ACC.SG any.NOM.SG they.GEN.PL

comoine<m h>abuisse uelet.
 common.ACC.SG have.INF.PST want.SBJV.IPFV.3SG
 ‘Let not any man or woman be a master or any likewise be minded to institute a common fund. / lit. ‘[...] that no one of them shall wish to have charge of a common treasury.’
Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus 10–11 (early 2nd c. BCE, second translation mine)

Examples such as (34) show that the development of *nolī* as a prohibitive marker is part of a more general strategy of the Latin language.

With respect to the grammaticalization criteria, the original form **uel-ī-* has partially lost phonetic integrity in *nolī* as in the case of *uolo* vis-à-vis *nolo* ‘I do not want’. As in the cases outlined above, semantic integrity is only definitely lost at the end of the grammaticalization cline (cf. ex. 29). The structural scope is reduced to infinitives (with their arguments and satellites). The original optative and the prohibitive marker are not integrated into the historical paradigm of *uolo/nolo*. They cannot appear in isolation. The prohibitive marker *fuge* ‘shy away from (doing something)’ can be used instead of *nolī*, allowing for a certain degree

of paradigmatic variability²². Though statistical data are missing, it can be observed that *nolī* usually precedes its scope.

4. A new look at grammaticalized second-person forms of *uolo*

In the previous section an analysis of the grammaticalization pathways of the five second-person constructions *qui uis*, *quam uis*, *si uis*, *uel* (+ option / + imperative) and *nolī* (+ infinitive) was carried out, showing strategies of ascription volition that enrich the picture outlined in section 2. It was suggested that when ascribing volition to the addressee the Latin speaker was leaving them the possibility to choose, extending the interpretation of *qui uis* and *quam uis* as markers of (free-)choice to the other constructions. While some of the grammaticalization phenomena are also attested cross-linguistically, sometimes in correlation (e.g., free-choice determiner and disjunctive conjunction based on the same volitional source), it is worth stressing that – to my knowledge – Latin seems to be a unique case, offering multiple developments. Instead of the formal point of view adopted above (cf. 3), I provide here an overview of the main results of the previous analysis by taking into account the possible presence or absence of the addressee. In this way I will show that, while the results of the grammaticalization processes may appear disparate, there are connections between the diachronic developments.

The presence of an interlocutor to whom the speaker can ascribe volition was verified for all the source constructions. For some target constructions, this point is still pertinent. In fact, the prohibition marker *nolī* can be used exclusively when addressing the hearer. This is also true for *si uis* at the end of its grammaticalization pathway, as *sis* typically combines with imperatives. *Uel* is more flexible, but one of its uses is that of accompanying an imperative. If we look at forms that can be used in non-dialogic contexts as they are no more related to an addressee, we find *quiuvis*, *quamuis* and *uel* (used as a focus-marking particle or a disjunctive conjunction). This configuration is perhaps not random or can hint at a pragmatic property of (free-)choice devices.

When using *qui uis*, *quam uis* and *uel* ‘choose!/you choose’, the speaker is giving the addressee the possibility of choosing a referent, a degree or an option, respectively. In all cases, the final choice of the addressee does not matter from the point of view of the speaker. One possible interpretation is that the presence of indiscriminacy between multiple possibilities amounts to cancel the addressee’s volition – passing from a volitional ‘it’s up to you (to choose)’ strategy to a non-volitional ‘it does not matter (what you choose)’ strategy. If the choice of the addressee is not relevant, volition is not anymore a semantic component of the *uolo*-construction and this is likely the reason why *quiuvis*, *quamuis* and *uel* (used as a focus-marking particle or a disjunctive conjunction) could be used without an interlocutor being present.

5. Conclusions

The investigation outlined in this paper has shed new light on already recognized phenomena of grammaticalization in Latin which were seen as non-related in the relevant literature. The new unifying hypothesis is based on pragmatic grounds connected to the presence of the second person singular of the volitional verb *uolo* in the source construction. In all five cases studied in this paper the grammaticalization process started from a construction in which the speaker is giving (or taking away from) the speaker the possibility of choosing between two

²² The use of *fuge* is mostly poetic (or archaic, cf. Leumman et al. 2016: 340). It must be specified that in Latin – along with the negated subjunctive – there are other means to express prohibition without using a negated imperative. A case in point is the construction *cave* + subjunctive. They are not considered as showing paradigmatic variability with respect to *nolī* + infinitive as they are used with the subjunctive and not with an infinitive.

opposite or multiple (sometimes gradable) choices. With respect to the cross-linguistic situation, where some languages only show some of the outlined phenomena, Latin *uolo* stands out for displaying multiple results. The reasons for the situation outlined in Latin must be investigated in more detail in further studies.

To sum up, this study has outlined multiple phenomena of grammaticalization featuring five second-person forms of Latin *uolo* and the ways in which the speaker employs them to attribute volition to the addressee. In fact, though corresponding to several moods – indicative, imperative and optative – and clause types – conditional, directive, optative –, all source constructions appeal to the addressee and their volition in an explicit way. It has been shown that for four source constructions – *qui uis*, *quam uis*, *si uis* and *uel* – the speaker is giving the hearer the possibility of choosing, sometimes in terms of free choice (*qui uis*, *quam uis*, *uel* ‘even’), sometimes by suggesting one (*si uis* + imperative, *uel* + imperative) or more option (*uel... uel...* ‘or... or...’), so anticipating the possible wishes and choices of the hearer. As shown in 3.5, the prohibitive marker *noī* can also be explained along these lines. When volition ascription is used in a prohibitive sentence, it refers to a specific action or state of affairs that the hearer wants – they have formulated their wishes or intentions – or may want – wishes and intention are anticipated by the speaker – and that the speaker wants to avoid. The strategy is similar to that seen with *uel* as presenting the hearer with a choice. What changes is that with prohibitive sentences, the wish for a certain option is negated.²³ If these explanations are correct, the phenomena outlined in this paper can be explained in a unified way, as all are based on providing the addressee with at least one choice. They correspond therefore to a specific strategy of volition ascription whose investigation enriches the picture developed by pragmatic studies briefly outlined in section 2.

It has also been shown that some target constructions – *quiuis*, *quamuis* and *uel* (used as a focus-marking particle or as a disjunctive conjunction) – have lost their original connection with a dialogic context, while other target constructions continue to be used in dialogic contexts, typically with imperatives (*sis*, *uel*, *noī*). As suggested in section 4, a possible explanation could be that, for the first group, the final choice of the hearer is absolutely irrelevant from the point of view of the speaker, so that the volitional semantics of *uolo* got lost. This is not the case for the second group, as the speaker is interesting in guiding the addressee’s volition towards a specific choice.

Table 1 outlines the complex relationships between the forms investigated in this study.

	originally a politeness marker	obligatory presence of a real or fictive addressee	employed to convey one or more options	scalar focus marker (‘even’)	employed in association with an imperative
<i>quiuis</i> (for the <i>-uis</i> indefinite series)	possible	no	yes (free-choice options; double option for <i>uteruis</i> ‘whichever of the two’)	no	no
<i>quamuis</i>	possible	no	yes (scalar free-choice options)	yes	no
<i>sis</i>	yes	yes	yes	no	yes

²³ As remarked by one of the reviewers, negating the addressee’s volition (in favor of the speaker’s point of view) can result in a more intersubjective value. Cf. also 2 about volition ascription.

<i>uel</i>	possible	yes (when used with an imperative)	yes	yes	yes
<i>nolī</i>	yes	yes	yes	no	yes

Table 1. Outline of the relationships between the five grammaticalized forms *quiuīs, quamuis, sis, uel* and *nolī*.

As has been pointed out, most of the phenomena outlined in this paper have parallels in other Indo-European languages and sometimes even beyond. Therefore, it is desirable that the investigation of volition ascription be extended to those languages by combining the diachronic and the pragmatic point of view.

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