While it is true that philosophy did not wait for phenomenology to propose a strong theoretical usage of the concept of «phenomenon» — Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Hegelian thought clearly support this claim —, phenomenology seems to be expressly designed, as its name suggests it, to have phenomena as its privileged, or even unique, theme of inquiry. Some questions consequently arise: what kind of «phenomena» are we talking about? And what sort of «phenomenology» is involved? The long history of the technical term, «phenomenology», which dates back to the 18th century and still continues to be in force nowadays, complicates in two substantial manners the possible reply to the definition of «phenomenon» and, subsequently, of «phenomenology» as a discipline and as a method.
Phenomenon: Cartography of a Fundamental Concept
Emanuele Mariani
2017
Abstract
While it is true that philosophy did not wait for phenomenology to propose a strong theoretical usage of the concept of «phenomenon» — Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Hegelian thought clearly support this claim —, phenomenology seems to be expressly designed, as its name suggests it, to have phenomena as its privileged, or even unique, theme of inquiry. Some questions consequently arise: what kind of «phenomena» are we talking about? And what sort of «phenomenology» is involved? The long history of the technical term, «phenomenology», which dates back to the 18th century and still continues to be in force nowadays, complicates in two substantial manners the possible reply to the definition of «phenomenon» and, subsequently, of «phenomenology» as a discipline and as a method.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
