«The four phases of philosophy and its current state» has been generally considered as one of the most original theories of Franz Brentano and, concomitantly, as one of the most deeply rooted in the spirit of the time. It is well-known that in this respect Brentano owes a debt to Auguste Comte’s leading idea of a scientific development that allows a general reassessment of the history of philosophy, although Brentano’s view opts for a scheme of repeated cycles through a movement of ascending and declining phases. By complementing the historiographical approaches that have been largely developed by recent literature (D. Fisette, D. Münch, R. Schmit), we would like to sketch a theoretical reconsideration of the Brentanian «four phases of philosophy». A theoretical reconsideration that interprets Brentano’s theory from a psychological standpoint as an alternative to other dominant interpretations (Mayer-Hillebrand, Mezei and Smith): the declining phases of philosophy should thus, more precisely, be understood as the improper representations of what philosophy, psychologically grounded, properly is.

Per una psicologia della storia. Brentano, lettore di Comte, e la teoria delle quattro fasi della filosofia

Emanuele Mariani
2019

Abstract

«The four phases of philosophy and its current state» has been generally considered as one of the most original theories of Franz Brentano and, concomitantly, as one of the most deeply rooted in the spirit of the time. It is well-known that in this respect Brentano owes a debt to Auguste Comte’s leading idea of a scientific development that allows a general reassessment of the history of philosophy, although Brentano’s view opts for a scheme of repeated cycles through a movement of ascending and declining phases. By complementing the historiographical approaches that have been largely developed by recent literature (D. Fisette, D. Münch, R. Schmit), we would like to sketch a theoretical reconsideration of the Brentanian «four phases of philosophy». A theoretical reconsideration that interprets Brentano’s theory from a psychological standpoint as an alternative to other dominant interpretations (Mayer-Hillebrand, Mezei and Smith): the declining phases of philosophy should thus, more precisely, be understood as the improper representations of what philosophy, psychologically grounded, properly is.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/864259
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