This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.
Titolo: | Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas | |
Autore/i: | Ghidoni R.; Cleave B. L.; Suetens S. | |
Autore/i Unibo: | ||
Anno: | 2019 | |
Rivista: | ||
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002 | |
Abstract: | This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. | |
Data stato definitivo: | 2021-09-11T15:36:03Z | |
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