This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
Why lawyers are nice (or nasty): a game-theoretical argumentation exercise
SARTOR, GIOVANNI;ROTOLO, ANTONINO;RIVERET, REGIS;
2009
Abstract
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.File in questo prodotto:
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