Multiplicity of equilibria under supply function competition is a two-layer problem. To prove it, we investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. When best replies are increasing, the mixed strategy solution cannot be circumvented. This makes the design of procurement more challenging than we were used to think.
Choosing roles under supply function competition / Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca*. - In: ENERGY ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0140-9883. - STAMPA. - 71:(2018), pp. 83-88. [10.1016/j.eneco.2018.02.005]
Choosing roles under supply function competition
Delbono, Flavio;Lambertini, Luca
2018
Abstract
Multiplicity of equilibria under supply function competition is a two-layer problem. To prove it, we investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. When best replies are increasing, the mixed strategy solution cannot be circumvented. This makes the design of procurement more challenging than we were used to think.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
