This paper examines the working of the ‘Lamfalussy committees’ in the banking and the securities sectors, asking whether these are ‘technical’ committees or ‘parapolitical’ ones. These committees are composed of experts (national civil servants) discussing regulatory and supervisory issues in a technical policy area — financial services. However, the issues discussed have political salience. It is argued that these committees of experts tend to be argument-based (level 2) and evidence-based (level 3), even though politics, as opposed to expertise, enter the policy process under specific circumstances. This combination of politics and expertise originates a distinctive type of informal governance.
Committee Governance in the Financial Sector in the European Union
QUAGLIA, LUCIA
2008
Abstract
This paper examines the working of the ‘Lamfalussy committees’ in the banking and the securities sectors, asking whether these are ‘technical’ committees or ‘parapolitical’ ones. These committees are composed of experts (national civil servants) discussing regulatory and supervisory issues in a technical policy area — financial services. However, the issues discussed have political salience. It is argued that these committees of experts tend to be argument-based (level 2) and evidence-based (level 3), even though politics, as opposed to expertise, enter the policy process under specific circumstances. This combination of politics and expertise originates a distinctive type of informal governance.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
