It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.
Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment / Casari, Marco; Zhang, Jingjing; Jackson, Christine. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - STAMPA. - 19:4(2016), pp. 764-791. [10.1007/s10683-015-9467-7]
Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment
CASARI, MARCO;
2016
Abstract
It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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