We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms production is polluting the environment, firms compete in quantities and invest in green R&D, and a regulator endogenously sets environmental taxation. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives decreases in the intensity of pollution.
Efficient horizontal mergers in polluting industries with green R&D and endogenous taxation
LAMBERTINI, LUCA;TAMPIERI, ALESSANDRO
2014
Abstract
We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms production is polluting the environment, firms compete in quantities and invest in green R&D, and a regulator endogenously sets environmental taxation. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives decreases in the intensity of pollution.File in questo prodotto:
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