As the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized control of extensive areas of Syria and Iraq during the spring and summer of 2014, surrounding governments reacted in markedly different ways. The Islamic Republic of Iran responded to the expansion of ISIL by stepping up its direct intervention in both the Syrian civil war and the internal affairs of Iraq. Turkey, by contrast, at first hesitated to engage ISIL directly, but after clashes between ISIL cadres and Kurdish, Christian and Turkmen (or in Iraq, Turkoman) fighters spread into districts adjacent to the country's southern border, Ankara carried out military operations on both Syrian and Iraqi territory. Tehran's and Ankara's reactions to the expansion of ISIL diverged sharply from the policies adopted by Baghdad and 'Amman. The governments of Iraq and Jordan concentrated on maintaining stability inside their own domains, and took steps to impose stricter control over districts that lay along their respective borders with Syria. Such measures aggravated long-standing tensions between the central administration and the inhabitants of frontier zones in these two countries, thereby heightening conflict between their respective political leaderships and Islamist radicals at home. Yet a third posture is evident in Qatar's and Saudi Arabia's responses to the rapid ascendance of ISIL. Doha and Riyad found by mid-2014 that the armed formations they had previously sponsored inside Syria had been effectively eclipsed. The Qatari and Saudi governments consequently scaled back material and moral support for their respective clients on the ground. These varying reactions had an impact on the patterns of inter-state alignment and rivalry that structured the international relations of the Middle East in the aftermath of the popular uprisings that erupted across the region during the winter of 2010-11. As a result, ISIL's June 2014 offensive marked the opening of a new phase in regional politics, whose dynamics remain in flux.

Mentre l’Organizzazione dello stato islamico in Iraq e nel Levante (ISIL) prendeva il controllo di aree molto estese in Iraq e Siria durante la primavera e l’estate del 2014, i governi dei Paesi confinanti hanno reagito in modo significativamente diverso. La Repubblica islamica dell’Iran risponde all’espansione di ISIL aumentando il proprio intervento diretto sia nella guerra civile siriana sia negli affari interni dell’Iraq. La Turchia, al contrario, all’inizio esita ad impegnarsi frontalmente contro ISIL, ma in seguito a scontri tra quest’ultima e i combattenti curdi, cristiani e turcomanni a ridosso del confine meridionale turco, Ankara conduce operazioni militari sia in Siria sia in Iraq. Le reazioni di Teheran e di Ankara sono molto diverse da quelle di Baghdad e di Amman: i governi di questi due Paesi si concentrano sul mantenimento della stabilità all’interno dei propri territori e intraprendono delle misure per imporre un maggior controllo sulle provincie ai confini con la Siria. Queste operazioni aggravano le tensioni già esistenti tra le autorità centrali e gli abitanti locali, aumentando il conflitto tra i dirigenti politici e le forze islamiste radicali interne. Infine, un altro tipo di posizione è riscontrabile nelle politiche del Qatar e dell’Arabia Saudita. Dalla metà del 2014, Doha e Riyad si rendono conto della sconfitta delle formazioni armate che avevano sostenuto fino a quel momento in Siria. Di conseguenza, i due Paesi diminuiscono il proprio sostegno materiale e morale ai propri partner sul campo. Queste reazioni alquanto diverse hanno un impatto sul sistema di alleanze e rivalità inter-statali che costituisce la struttura delle relazioni internazionali del Medio Oriente dopo le rivolte popolari dell’inverno 2010-2011. Il risultato più rilevante dell’offensiva di ISIL del Giugno 2014 è dunque l’apertura di una nuova fase della politica regionale le cui dinamiche restano estremamente fluide.

Le risposte regionali all’ascesa di IS: la trasformazione delle alleanze e le rivalità di lunga durata, di Fred H. Lawson

TRENTIN, MASSIMILIANO
2017

Abstract

As the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized control of extensive areas of Syria and Iraq during the spring and summer of 2014, surrounding governments reacted in markedly different ways. The Islamic Republic of Iran responded to the expansion of ISIL by stepping up its direct intervention in both the Syrian civil war and the internal affairs of Iraq. Turkey, by contrast, at first hesitated to engage ISIL directly, but after clashes between ISIL cadres and Kurdish, Christian and Turkmen (or in Iraq, Turkoman) fighters spread into districts adjacent to the country's southern border, Ankara carried out military operations on both Syrian and Iraqi territory. Tehran's and Ankara's reactions to the expansion of ISIL diverged sharply from the policies adopted by Baghdad and 'Amman. The governments of Iraq and Jordan concentrated on maintaining stability inside their own domains, and took steps to impose stricter control over districts that lay along their respective borders with Syria. Such measures aggravated long-standing tensions between the central administration and the inhabitants of frontier zones in these two countries, thereby heightening conflict between their respective political leaderships and Islamist radicals at home. Yet a third posture is evident in Qatar's and Saudi Arabia's responses to the rapid ascendance of ISIL. Doha and Riyad found by mid-2014 that the armed formations they had previously sponsored inside Syria had been effectively eclipsed. The Qatari and Saudi governments consequently scaled back material and moral support for their respective clients on the ground. These varying reactions had an impact on the patterns of inter-state alignment and rivalry that structured the international relations of the Middle East in the aftermath of the popular uprisings that erupted across the region during the winter of 2010-11. As a result, ISIL's June 2014 offensive marked the opening of a new phase in regional politics, whose dynamics remain in flux.
2017
Fred H. Lawson
Regional Responses to the Rise of the Islamic State: Shifting Alignments and Enduring Rivalries
Trentin, M.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/578343
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