We show that market concentration does not facilitate collusion in an oligopoly formed by labor-managed firms.
Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players / Flavio, Delbono; Luca, Lambertini. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 1873-7374. - STAMPA. - 125:(2014), pp. 156-159.
Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
DELBONO, FLAVIO;LAMBERTINI, LUCA
2014
Abstract
We show that market concentration does not facilitate collusion in an oligopoly formed by labor-managed firms.File in questo prodotto:
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