We identify amistake in the specification of the demand systemused in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn, whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987).
On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts / M. Kopel; L. Lambertini. - In: MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0143-6570. - STAMPA. - 34:(2013), pp. 40-43. [10.1002/mde.2572]
On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts
LAMBERTINI, LUCA
2013
Abstract
We identify amistake in the specification of the demand systemused in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn, whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987).File in questo prodotto:
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