We investigate the conditions for the desirability of exclusive intellectual property rights for innovators as opposed to weak rights, allowing for some degree of imitation and ex post competition. The comparison between the two alternatives reduces to a specific “ratio test,” which suggests that strong, exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spillovers are small.
Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research Spillovers, and the Incentive to Innovate / L. franzoni; V. denicolò. - In: AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW. - ISSN 1465-7260. - STAMPA. - 14/1:(2012), pp. 111-140. [10.1093/aler/ahr017]
Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research Spillovers, and the Incentive to Innovate
FRANZONI, LUIGI ALBERTO;DENICOLO', VINCENZO
2012
Abstract
We investigate the conditions for the desirability of exclusive intellectual property rights for innovators as opposed to weak rights, allowing for some degree of imitation and ex post competition. The comparison between the two alternatives reduces to a specific “ratio test,” which suggests that strong, exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spillovers are small.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
