In the early 1990s, major electoral reforms took place in both Italy and Japan: each replaced a kind of proportional representation with a mixed member system. The reform were enacted by political elites in the context of divisions within the dominant party, changing patterns of party support and party splits. The experiences of both countries provide a laboratory in which to investigate the effects and implications of electoral reforms and, more broadly, to analyze voting behavior in the context of institutional change. As the essays in this volume show, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements, and consider the complex interplay of political geography, political history and the rational calculations of political actors.
A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform. Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reforms in Italy and Japan / Giannetti D. ; Grofman B.. - STAMPA. - (2011), pp. 1-167.
A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform. Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reforms in Italy and Japan
GIANNETTI, DANIELA;
2011
Abstract
In the early 1990s, major electoral reforms took place in both Italy and Japan: each replaced a kind of proportional representation with a mixed member system. The reform were enacted by political elites in the context of divisions within the dominant party, changing patterns of party support and party splits. The experiences of both countries provide a laboratory in which to investigate the effects and implications of electoral reforms and, more broadly, to analyze voting behavior in the context of institutional change. As the essays in this volume show, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements, and consider the complex interplay of political geography, political history and the rational calculations of political actors.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.