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Title Page

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Title: How different multi-level and multi-actor arrangements impact policy implementation: Evidence from EU regional policy

Running Title: Policy Implementation Through MLG

Abstract. While the implementation through Multi-level Governance (MLG) has often been found to have achieved limited success, the literature agrees that further studies are required to investigate if and how different MLG systems impact policy implementation. By collecting data from the implementation of four EU regional development programs, characterized by distinct organizational and institutional arrangements, this article adopts a performance-oriented approach to EU implementation in order to support or challenge the conventional assumptions about the expected benefits of MLG. Our data suggests that effective MLG needs a central coordinating authority that has the power to: enforce decentralized actors' compliance, mobilize the implementation bodies, and, provide actors with adequate organizational structures and the resources that they lack.

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44 **1. Introduction**

45 Does Multi-level Governance (MLG) improve policy implementation? How do different MLG
46 systems impact on policy implementation? Despite recent developments in the field, the political
47 scientist literature agrees that only partial answers have been given to these interrelated research
48 questions, to which this article intends to respond.

49 Implementation arrangements and structures are of long-standing concern in public policy and
50 public administration research. Since the 1970s, in fact, political scientists have been interested in the
51 impact of multi-level and multi-actor arrangements on policy implementation (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978;
52 Matland, 1995; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; O'Toole 1986, 2000). This debate gained traction in
53 the context of European integration, since the implementation of several European Union (EU)
54 policies required the development of MLG systems (Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Casula 2022) in order
55 to facilitate the fulfilment of EU policy targets and objectives (Committee of the Regions 2009, 2014).
56 In this context, implementation through MLG often had limited success, since sub-national actors
57 struggled to establish functional governance layers (Gollata & Newig, 2017) and became caught in a
58 number of implementation traps (Domorenok, 2017; Milio, 2010).

59 The recent literature has confirmed that further empirical studies are required to learn if and
60 how MLG improves policy implementation (Thomann & Sager, 2017a; Trein et al., 2019), thus
61 advancing our understanding of implementation performance in the EU multi-level system (Thomann
62 & Sager, 2017b). After testing their hypothesis that the interplay between Europeanization and
63 domestication is a central explanatory feature of implementation performance, Thomann and Sager
64 advocated addressing the practical effectiveness of EU policy through the use of a more evaluative
65 perspective, and exploring the relevant properties of policies and institutions that bring about different
66 implementation dynamics (Ibid., 1398). This article contributes to this academic debate on the
67 relevance of MLG policy-settings to policy implementation from both a theoretical and an empirical
68 standpoint. It does so by addressing if and how different MLG systems impact on policy
69 implementation.

70 The theoretical contribution of this article consists in its assessment of the way in which
71 components of MLG are integrated to produce policy. In doing so, the article investigates how four
72 context conditions – namely, i) the level of decentralization in the management of policy, ii) the role
73 of regional political factors, iii) the organizational features of policy performance; and, iv) the degree
74 and type of stakeholder participation – affect the effectiveness of decentralized policy management
75 by producing different implementation dynamics. For this purpose, the article posits a set of
76 theoretical propositions to guide the empirical analysis in order to support or challenge conventional
77 assumptions on the expected benefits of policy implementation through MLG.

78 Against this theoretical background, the article’s empirical contribution is its examination of
79 how different multi-level and multi-actor arrangements operate across different policy stages, and
80 how they affect policy implementation. An evaluation perspective is adopted to analyze the different
81 implementation dynamics related to the management of four Italian and Spanish regional
82 development programs financed by EU regional policy (also known as the Cohesion Policy). The
83 implementation of the Cohesion Policy is a paradigm case of MLG: since the 1990s, EU-funded
84 regional development programs have been managed by means of multi-level and multi-actor
85 governance arrangements (Hooghe, 1996), and implementation of the partnership principle (Bache &
86 Jones, 2000). More specifically, EU regional policy is implemented through Operational Programs
87 (OPs) — detailed plans in which the amount of money to be spent during a programming period is
88 determined. The implementation of an OP, drawn up to achieve a country-wide or regional objective,
89 requires constant interaction among EU, national, regional, local, and civil society representatives
90 during all stages of preparation, financing, management, monitoring, and operations assessment. The
91 way in which policy is designed can vary in each Member State (MS) and its regions, depending on
92 domestic policy choices. Thus created are different implementation dynamics with different multi-
93 level and multi-actor arrangements.

94 The article’s findings suggest that, in order to avoid the implementation gaps that may arise
95 between an intended policy and its results (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984), effective policy

96 implementation through MLG must operate in a context of fully participating technical actors,
97 politicians, and vertical and horizontal partners. But their participation must occur under the
98 supervision of a higher level of government, one able to compensate for the potential shortcomings
99 of MLG.

100 The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background. Section 3
101 illustrates the distinct characteristics of the Italian and Spanish contexts for implementing EU
102 Cohesion Policy. Section 4 details the research design and methodology. Section 5 presents the results
103 of the empirical analysis. Section 6 discusses the findings. Section 7 concludes.

104 105 **2. Theoretical Background: Policy Implementation through MLG**

106 The concept of MLG made its first appearance in European integration studies as an alternative to the
107 state-centered inter-governmental approach and as a result of the new structures put in place by the
108 Treaty of Maastricht (Marks 1993). In this role, MLG reflects the importance of distributing the
109 competences of actors at different levels for designing effective EU policies (Bache, 2008). The
110 dispersion of policy-making tasks was seen as more efficient than central state monopoly and other
111 modes of governance (Piattoni, 2010), given that the simultaneous activation of new center-periphery,
112 domestic-foreign, and state-society dynamics — which is at the core of MLG theorizing — would
113 first ensure wider and fuller participation in decision-making processes (input legitimacy) and then
114 produce better policies (output legitimacy) (Piattoni 2009, 164).

115 The canonical distinction between Type I and Type II MLG provided by Hooghe and Marks
116 (2003) suggested that the participation of lower levels of government in Type I MLG (because of
117 their greater insight into the needs of beneficiary groups), and of private actors in Type II MLG
118 (because of their different viewpoints), guarantees the incorporation of more diverse information in
119 policy-making. Having established that more and more EU policies aim at the inclusion of both
120 private actors and different levels of government, Piattoni defined MLG as «a class of policymaking
121 arrangements characterized by the simultaneous activation of governmental and non-governmental

122 actors at different jurisdictional levels and such that the interrelationships thus created defy existing
123 hierarchies and rather take the form of non-hierarchical networks» (Piattoni 2015, 326). In a seminal
124 article, Piattoni (2009, 176) suggested that the concept of MLG should not be tailored as a mere
125 descriptor of existing governance structures; rather, it should help empirically analyze the
126 implications of these structures in different countries. Given that domestic actors enjoy a great deal
127 of autonomy and discretion in designing their MLG mechanisms (Ongaro, Gong & Jing, 2019), the
128 impact of different multi-level and multi-actor arrangements on policy implementation is an
129 interesting subject for empirical investigation.

130 To investigate the matter, this article adopts a policy implementation perspective rooted in the
131 public governance literature. As said, the study of implementation arrangements and structures has
132 been of long-standing concern in the public policy and administration literature since the 1970s. In
133 identifying the numerous barriers to effective implement policy programs (Linder and Peters 1987),
134 the first studies on implementation research (see, among others: Bardach 1977; Pressman and
135 Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975) had the merit of
136 conceptualizing implementation as a complex and dynamic process in which multiple actors with
137 contrasting interests and different interpretations of authoritative decisions participate. These
138 pioneering implementation studies were criticized for being overly top-down in their approach. Then,
139 an alternative bottom-up approach in program implementation research began to develop in the 1980s
140 (see, among others: Elmore 1980; Hjern 1982; Hjern and Porter 1981). These implementation
141 scholars were interested in analyzing the role of local networks in affecting a given problem during
142 the implementation process. According to Hull and Hjern (1987), for example, implementation
143 structures and arrangements tend to be poorly hierarchical, and their establishment leads towards the
144 creation of collaborative networks at the operational level that transcend standard organizational
145 boundaries. This sterile top-down/bottom-up dispute has subsided since the 2000s because sufficient
146 evidence has been accumulated to argue that «variables located at the top or center can be important,
147 as can contextual or field variables» (O' Toole 2000, p. 268) – and therefore «to validate partially

148 top-down and bottom-up arguments» (Ibid.). Efforts at synthesis have been numerous (see, among
149 others: Elmore 1985; Sabatier 1986; Goggin et al. 1990). They have adopted several theoretical and
150 methodological approaches, often in combination with each other, and they have proved promising
151 for implementation scholarship in the past three decades (see O'Toole 2000, pp. 273-282). Used in
152 particular have been the following: rational-choice institutionalism; the governance approach; the
153 network and network management; formal, rational-choice models; and, the policy design and
154 instrument approach.

155 The study of network and public management is pertinent to the purpose of this article because
156 it “draws from promising theoretical streams with questions of implementation—performance via
157 governance in the delivery of policy results—as significant as ever” (O'Toole 2000, 281). In a
158 pioneering article, O'Toole (1997) argued that «in many cases involving network implementation,
159 empirical scholarship has demonstrated that substantial challenges await those seeking to manage the
160 effort and that significant *implementation performance gaps can often be found*» (p. 116, *emphasis*
161 *added*). This multi-actor implementation perspective (O'Toole 1986) has consolidated in recent
162 decades (O'Toole 2012), and several attempts have been made to link it with the policy design
163 approach (Buseti and Dente 2018; May 2012). Ansell et al. (2017), for example, argued that the
164 implementation of well-crafted policy designs cannot be ensured by traditional top-down
165 implementation based on command and control, but instead by an ongoing collaborative design
166 process able to adapt the initial policy design so that it better reflects emerging problems and
167 challenges. This literature has therefore conceived implementation as a problem of cooperation
168 among multiple actors, with «the degree of coordination required in a given instance [that] is largely
169 determined by the structure of interdependence among those involved» (O'Toole 1997, 120).

170 This article recognizes that these problems of cooperation increase in the context of EU
171 integration, since the implementation of EU programs requires the design and consolidation of
172 implementation structures that involve multiple actors at different levels of government. According
173 to this article, the successful establishment of these multi-level and multi-actor implementation

174 arrangements requires an ongoing collaborative design process in which high degrees of coordination
175 are needed to avoid the various disputes that may occur among politicians, bureaucrats and social and
176 private actors (Ansell et al. 2017) if they see a policy program as directly relevant to their personal
177 interests (Matland, 1995).

178 Due to the “complexity of joint action” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) required by a EU
179 program’s implementation (Bauer 2006), in the view of this article the achievement of these high
180 degrees of coordination for a better policy performance is expected to happen under the supervision
181 of a higher level of government able to guarantee continuous cooperation among the plurality of
182 actors involved. Hence, this article follows the argument put forward by Homsy et al. (2019, 572-
183 573) that to be effective, MLG requires the presence of a central coordinating authority with the
184 power to enforce solutions on decentralized actors and to provide them with adequate organizational
185 structures.

186 To discuss this general hypothesis, the article analyses the role that four different context
187 factors – namely, i) the level of decentralization in the management of policy, ii) the role of regional
188 political factors, iii) the organizational features of policy performance; and, iv) the degree and type
189 of stakeholder participation – have on the effectiveness of decentralized policy management. By
190 doing so, the article follows Winter’s (2012) recommendation that implementation research can
191 continue to improve only by «developing and testing partial theories and hypotheses rather than trying
192 to reach for utopia in constructing a general implementation theory» (p. 265). Hence, the role played
193 by these context factors in different stages of the implementation process is individually analyzed
194 through the use of specific theoretical propositions. Finally, how they are integrated to produce policy
195 in multi-level settings is discussed. Overall, in line with Piattoni’s definition of MLG (2015), the
196 analysis of these four selected dimensions evidences how the main actors within an MLG system
197 (technical actors, politicians, and partners) hierarchically and horizontally interact to produce policy.

198 The analysis of these four specific components of MLG therefore helps to discuss the general
199 hypothesis. It does so by assessing the different multi-level and multi-actor implementation dynamics,

200 and by unpacking those specific elements of the implementation process that are linked to distortions
201 in policy implementation (Lester and Goggin, 1998). In this regard, Pressman and Wildavsky (1984)
202 argued that the “complexity of joint action” can result in an “implementation gap” between intended
203 policy and results. Moreover, in research on Europeanization, the compliance concept has been used
204 to capture the degree of “conformance implementation” (Thomann and Sager 2017a, 1254),
205 understood as the extent to which a policy is implemented from top to bottom (Barrett and Fudge
206 1981).

207 By focusing on policy outputs, this article conceives an implementation gap as (the extent of)
208 non-compliance with intended policy (Thomann 2015, 178) brought about by non-conformance with
209 EU regulations (Thomann and Sager, 2017a). Six theoretical propositions related to the four above-
210 mentioned dimensions are used for the purpose of the article. These propositions interpret the
211 emergence of a possible implementation gap (dependent variable) as a result of a particular context
212 factor (independent variable). Formulated by combining the literature on policy implementation,
213 which discusses the impact of multi-level and multi-actor arrangements on policy delivery, and on
214 MLG in the context of EU studies, these propositions are presented below. In Section 3 they are
215 connected with specific sub-dimensions of the OP implementation process to afford better
216 understanding of how their analysis enables the exploration of the relevant properties of multi-level
217 policies that generate different implementation dynamics (Thomann & Sager 2017b, 1398).

218

219 *Decentralization*

220 The implications of how public goods and services are allocated between the central and the local
221 level have been discussed in depth in the policy implementation literature since the 1970s. In their
222 pioneering study, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, xvi) viewed the multiple levels of government in
223 the U.S. as a cause of implementation delays. They postulated that implementation is more
224 problematic in the presence of many decision-making points. This interpretation of multi-level
225 structures as obstacles to implementation was shared by Bardach (1977), who advocated greater

226 control to remedy unpredictability. This also seemed to hold for EU policy-making, since both
227 regional participation in the EU arena and the devolution of tasks and responsibilities at sub-national
228 levels increased the complexity of policy-making due to high transaction costs required for the
229 coordination of multiple jurisdictions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Scharpf, 1988). According to
230 Maggetti and Trein (2019, 359), the problems may have also been a consequence of opportunist
231 behavior, and the possible conflicts on competences between the regional authorities and the central
232 state.

233 To avoid these coordination costs, some scholars suggested that, in multi-level systems,
234 decentralization should be backed up by central control (e.g., Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Matland, 1995).
235 Hanf and Scharpf (1978), for example, emphasized the necessity «to provide central government with
236 the capacity for formulating and putting into effect comprehension and integrated policies,
237 *implemented through instruments of central control* and designed to ensure that *lower units will be*
238 *more effectively guided by the policy objectives of more inclusive levels of government*» (*emphasis*
239 *added*, 2). Similarly, in the field of EU integration the debate centered on whether sub-national
240 authorities are capable of improving EU policy-making without the supervision of central
241 governments (Piattoni 2010, 18; Pollack 1995).

242 According to this article, those instruments of central control able to resolve possible problems
243 of cooperation during program implementation, and which are therefore likely to be effective within
244 a multi-level setting, refer to specific government measures giving a central authority formal
245 responsibility for coordinating and supervising the overall program implementation, and the relative
246 activities of the decentralized implementation bodies. On the basis of a coordination principle, these
247 central instruments are then expected to help these bodies perform their tasks. The following
248 theoretical proposition is therefore advanced:

249 *Proposition 1. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps*
250 *if there are instruments of central control than if there are none.*

251

Organizational Features

The importance of organizational features in avoiding implementation gaps in program implementation has been frequently discussed in policy implementation studies since the 1970s. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, xv) emphasized the significance of establishing adequate bureaucratic procedures and the presence of both sufficient resources and a clear system of responsibilities for effective policy implementation. The positive effects of these elements were also pointed out in the context of EU integration, with several scholars arguing that to avoid implementation gaps, EU policies must have adequate organizational structures and human resources, and enough available support functions in the right combination (see, among others: Bachtler et al., 2014; Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001; Milio, 2010). Moreover, according to Leonardi (2005), MLG requires all relevant actors to fully participate at different levels, and that effective institutions with adequate organizational features should carry out their due tasks. On this issue, some scholars (see, among others: Bachtler et al. 2014; Bondarouk et al., 2020) have added that the effective implementation of EU policy programs needs stable organizational structures throughout the programming period in order to prevent a reorganization of responsibilities among implementing bodies that may induce a loss of accumulated policy knowledge on EU regulations.

The following theoretical propositions are therefore advanced:

Proposition 2. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is availability of suitably qualified staff than if there is not.

Proposition 3. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is organizational stability than if there is not.

Political Factors

The literature identifies the interest of regional governments in promoting a policy as an influential political factor determining program implementation performance in multi-level systems. Indeed, Piattoni states that «the explanation of the differentiation in policy efficiency [...] lies in the different

278 capacity and willingness of the regional political class to promote adequate requirements for
279 implementing the funds» (1998, 50). Similarly, for several scholars (see, among others: Bache and
280 Jones 2000; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Milio 2010; Pollack 1995; Smyrl 1997), the implementation
281 of EU multi-level programs depends on the institutional capacity of the regional political class to
282 build and sustain policies over the years. Hence, this article argues that leaving the management of a
283 multi-level policy to regional political actors without central control creates implementation gaps
284 related to different contextual political variables. It does so particularly in the presence of a regional
285 government's different interest in promoting and sustaining the policy throughout the implementation
286 period. The following theoretical proposition is therefore advanced:

287 *Proposition 4. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps*
288 *if regional government has a political interest in promoting and sustaining a policy over the years*
289 *than when it does not.*

290

291 *Stakeholder Participation*

292 From a normative standpoint, several different actors contributing information, consultation, and
293 participation are expected to improve the quality of decision-making (Piattoni 2010, 2013, 2015;
294 Trein et al. 2019). However, some empirical studies show that the lack of stakeholder participation is
295 a disruptive factor at the implementation stage (e.g. West, 2005). Consequently, Ongaro et al. (2019)
296 emphasize the necessity to create conditions for the empowerment of stakeholders, in order «to help
297 these actors develop their capabilities and to provide room for their interactive involvement in
298 governance» (p. 109). They agree with Piattoni that «although MLG arrangements challenge the
299 ideal-typical notion of Westphalian state, *their ultimate impact is determined by the mobilization*
300 *capacity of all actors involved*» (Ongaro et al. 2019, 109, *emphasis added*).

301 As a large body of research in network settings/collaborative implementation has shown, in
302 fact, differences in stakeholders' mobilization capacity depend on several factors, including trust and
303 the relative stakeholders' understanding of both the benefits and risks of participating (Ansell & Gash

2008); their interdependence with other stakeholders (Ansell & Gash 2008; Innes & Booher 2018); and, the presence/absence of formal and informal incentives and disincentives (Fisher 2012; Hui and Cain 2018). Hence, it has become increasingly evident that stakeholders' effective participation in program implementation is conditional upon their ability to present their views at the negotiating table, and upon their access to adequate technical resources and expertise (Culpepper, 2002; Maloney et al. 2004). Since these requisite resources and capacities are rarely distributed equally among stakeholders, this article maintains that it is first necessary to create conditions for their empowerment and to increase their mobilization capacity (Ongaro et al. 2019), and then to devise new opportunities structures to involve them more closely in the policy process (Ansell et al. 2020). Accordingly, in line with the general hypothesis advanced above, in multi-level settings these factors causing a possible lack of stakeholders' mobilization can be overcome in the presence of a high level of government able to stimulate a wider stakeholders' participation during the implementation phase by creating new opportunities structures.

The following theoretical propositions are therefore advanced:

Proposition 5. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is mobilization capacity among all the actors involved than if there is none.

Proposition 6. In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if a higher level of government creates the conditions for mobilizing all the actors involved than if it does not.

Against this theoretical background, the next section will explain why the study of Cohesion Policy implementation in Italy and Spain is a testing ground for understanding how MLG works.

3. EU Cohesion Policy Implementation in Italy and Spain in Practice

The adoption of Community Regulation No 4253/1988 initiated a new era in EU regional policy because it completely reversed the logic adopted since the Treaty of Rome (Graziano, 2013; Leonardi, 2005). After the 1988 reform, five multiannual programming periods were launched by the EU, covering the following time spans: the first – 1989-1993; the second – 1994-1999; the third – 2000-2006; the fourth – 2007-2013; and the fifth – 2014-2020. During these decades, different structural funds worked together to support regional development in Europe, namely: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund (ESF); the Cohesion Fund (CF); the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).

While the regulatory context (and the role of the European Commission, EC) changed over the course of these five multiannual programming periods (Casula 2021a), the 2000-2006 programming period was characterized by a decentralization of responsibilities in implementation which was further stabilized in the following period (Piattoni and Polverari, 2016). From the 2000s, the responsibility for each OP was formally conferred to a domestic institution — the so-called Management Authority (MA) — that supervises its entire supply chain, i.e. from the definition and approval of the OP to its final evaluation.

Depending on the varying emphases to MLG given by the regulatory context and the EC, the role of partners changed after the 1988 reform. In particular, the “vertical” dimension of the partnership principle — that is, the interaction among European, national and sub-national levels during the formulation, implementation, and monitoring stages of the OPs — was placed side by side with a “horizontal” one through the involvement of private sector and socio-economic actors (Bauer 2002). The horizontal dimension was then expanded during the following two programming periods to include «any other appropriate body representing civil society, environmental partners, [and] non-governmental organizations»,ⁱ in order to strengthen the application of the partnership principle at all

353 OP implementation stages. This led to the establishment of a «cohesion policy system of multi-level
354 governance based on decentralization of responsibilities and a stronger role for actors on the
355 ground».ii

356 Keeping in mind the theoretical background presented in Section 2, even if EU regulations
357 establish the “rules of the game”, domestic actors have some maneuvering space to model their
358 governance arrangements for OP implementation in accordance with their political-administrative
359 structures and traditions (Casula 2021b). In particular, they can choose between more centralized and
360 decentralized systems for policy management. Moreover, in line with Piattoni’s definition of MLG
361 (2015), and the choice to analyze the four dimensions under investigation in this article, OP
362 implementation can be influenced not only by effective administrative structures but also by both
363 regional political dynamics and the effective participation of vertical and horizontal partners.

364 Hence, the governance of Cohesion Policy implementation varied significantly among MSs
365 (and sometimes within them), and in some cases it underwent changes over the course of the
366 programming periods. Italy and Spain, for example, opted for different governance systems for
367 implementing EU Cohesion Policy.

368 The implementation of Italian OPs was completely under the control of sub-national
369 governments, with the MA placed under the supervision of regions. Thus, regional actors decided on
370 development strategies and investment priorities, drew up the programming documents, and
371 negotiated them with the EC; they decided on the content of public calls, as well as the features of
372 regional institutions placed under their management and control; they established direct contacts with
373 the final beneficiaries responsible for managing the projects; they were entrusted with creating a
374 regional monitoring system and directly supporting the beneficiaries as they uploaded their data
375 within an online system; they were made responsible for creating and consolidating evaluation units
376 that were meant not only to produce frequent evaluation reports but also to actively support the overall
377 programming. This system significantly differed from the one in Spain, which was centrally
378 coordinated and where all activities were directly managed by a single MA located in Madrid, rather

379 than multiple MAs for each OP placed under the administrative control of the regions. Through a
380 *documento de attribution de funciones* (function attribution document), some of the MA's function
381 could be delegated to the regions (which thus became Intermediate Bodies), while the MA still
382 remained responsible for overall governance. In particular, regional actors had to manage the stage
383 of project selection/approval on the basis of a common system of national rules, and in accordance
384 with the MA's daily recommendations. Moreover, even if some of the monitoring structures were
385 allocated to the regional level, a single national monitoring system with procedures consistent across
386 regions was present. Only the evaluation was directly managed by regional governments.

387 In light of the foregoing description of the legal context, the next section will explain the
388 empirical and analytical strategies used to assess the implementation performance of the Italian and
389 Spanish OPs, and the factors influencing it.

390

391

392 **4. Research Designs and Methodology**

393

394 Driven by the logic of comparison in qualitative studies (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Casula et al.
395 2021), this article focuses on a small-N, case-oriented comparison. Case studies and small-N
396 comparisons are praised for their detailed analyses of processes (Rueschemeyer, 2003) and can be
397 useful for both theory-building and theory-testing (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). They can be used to
398 explore the impact of a large number of relevant factors and to confront analytical propositions with
399 many data points (Della Porta & Keating 2008, 211).

400 The four regional Italian and Spanish OPs, financed by the ERDF during the 2007-2013
401 programming period, are chosen here as units of analysis, and compared with each another. Against
402 the above theoretical background, analysis of the regional ERDF OPs financed within the fourth
403 programming period is a basis for understanding how different multi-level and multi-actor
404 arrangements affect policy implementation, for three reasons: *i*) a decentralization of responsibilities

405 to sub-national actors; *ii*) the reinforcement of institutional capacities in domestic administrations,
406 considered necessary to achieve greater economic efficiency; *iii*) the partnership principle going from
407 simple consultation to close cooperation, planned to be strictly applied at all stages of OP
408 implementation. Moreover, the decision to examine the implementation of two OPs for each of the
409 MSs considered allows empirical investigation of the following: *i*) if central coordination produces
410 similar effects among the regions; and *ii*) in the absence of central coordination, how regional
411 contextual factors may lead to implementation gaps. As described in-depth in Section 3, in fact, Italy
412 and Spain significantly differ in the extent of their multi-level and multi-actor policy-making. Indeed,
413 «despite the highly decentralized political system in Spain, the central government plays a strong role
414 [...] in programming as well as in the OP implementation phase»,ⁱⁱⁱ because established in this MS is
415 a more general centralized system jointly with the attribution of responsibility to an overall ‘national
416 garrison’ (Casula 2020) which has more instruments of central control with which to supervise the
417 entire OP supply chain. In line with the theoretical background set out in Section 2, those instruments
418 extend beyond an administrative basis. They allow, in fact, the presence in Spain of a central
419 coordination authority able to supervise the program’s implementation, and to support the activities
420 of the decentralized implementation bodies.

421 When a comparison strategy for similar cases (della Porta & Keating 2008, 214) is adopted,
422 the four regionally implemented OPs are similar from an economic standpoint. They were therefore
423 selected against the same backdrop of EU regulations for OP implementation. To clarify, the four
424 regions considered (Campania and Calabria for Italy, and Andalusia and Galicia for Spain) were part
425 of the so-called Convergence Area, which included the most underdeveloped European regions, i.e.
426 those with a GDP per-capita below 75% of the EU average. Given the theoretical propositions
427 advanced, the following sub-sections describe the analytical and empirical strategies used to
428 investigate possible implementation gaps. This methodological section concludes with the
429 presentation of the data analysis procedure used.

430

431 **4.1. Data**

432 From an analytical standpoint, 13 dimensions were selected for each of the five implementation stages
433 of a funded ERDF OP. These dimensions were adopted from previous analyses in the academic and
434 non-academic literatures (see, for example, Bachtler et al. 2014; Leonardi, 2005; Milio, 2010), and
435 modified in view of the policy's technical characteristics during the 2007-2013 programming period.
436 Given the aim of this article, and the propositions advanced in Section 2, the use of these dimensions
437 enabled us to see, very broadly, how organizational structures were modeled in different sub-national
438 contexts, and – through the use of an evaluation perspective – to empirically assess whether
439 implementation gaps were present during any of the OP implementation stages. Then, each dimension
440 was used to measure a specific component of MLG, and its related proposition. Tables 1-2-3-4-5
441 summarize this analytical strategy by connecting each dimension (and the relative acronyms used in
442 the body of the article, as indicated in the first column of the Tables) to a specific theoretical
443 proposition (fourth column), on the basis of the main actors and/or structures involved, as required
444 by EU regulations (third column). The Tables also describe how implementation should have
445 happened ideally, i.e. without any implementation gaps (second column).

446 [Insert Tables 1-2-3-4-5 here]

447

448 **4.2. Methods**

449

450 With regard to the empirical strategy, a preliminary desk analysis was conducted. EC reports, national
451 and regional program documents, and evaluation studies were consulted, as well as data related to
452 commitment, expenditure, decommitment, and system effectiveness. Furthermore, a total of 80 semi-
453 structured interviews were carried out from 2016 to 2020.^{iv}

454 All the primary and secondary data collected were then triangulated to explain how the
455 independent variables listed in the six theoretical propositions advanced in Section 2 affected the

482 criterion to evaluate the degree of presence/absence of each variable, and the triangulation of all the
483 primary and secondary data collected. For this purpose, the terms “consolidated/strong” (A),
484 “significant” (B), “moderate” (C), and “absent/weak” (D) were used to categorize variations in the
485 selected variables.

486 [Insert Table 7 here]

487

488 The sources used to empirically assess the variables listed in the six propositions, and to
489 categorize each dimension for the four regional OPs analyzed, are presented in the Appendix.

490

491

492 **4.3. Data Analysis Procedure**

493 A four-step data analysis was conducted, with the procedure for each step based on a triangulation of
494 different primary and secondary data.

495 The aim of the first step was to identify the main characteristics of the multi-level and multi-
496 actor governance systems for the management of the four ERDF OPs in the Italian and Spanish
497 contexts, and possible differences between the respective regions selected with regard to each
498 dimension analyzed (see the fifth column of Tables 1-2-3-4-5).

499 The second step allowed reconstruction of the results of the implementation process, and in
500 particular the presence of possible implementation gaps for each selected dimension. The
501 implementation performance of the 13 dimensions selected was then categorized as
502 “consolidated/strong” (A), “significant” (B), “moderate” (C), or “absent/weak” (D) for each of the
503 four regions, and reported in the last columns of Tables 1-2-3-4-5.

504 The third step provided an extension of information concerning the factors influencing
505 implementation for each dimension. It did so through a categorization of the degree of
506 presence/absence of the related variable(s) listed in the propositions that the single dimension was
507 intended to measure. The results of this third step of data analysis enabled the integration of the

508 information related to the main characteristics of the four sub-national contexts analyzed through the
509 use of the development continuum criteria previously described. This information is reported in the
510 fifth column of Tables 1-2-3-4-5.

511 Finally, the aim of the fourth step was to construct – for each of the five stages of
512 implementation – a history of implementation performance for the four regional ERDF OPs based on
513 the six theoretical expectations formulated. EU representatives, external evaluators, and observers
514 specialized in this research field were consulted to validate the results once they had been completed.
515 These policy narratives are presented in the following section, while Section 6 discusses how the four
516 context conditions analyzed integrate with each other to produce policy in multi-level settings.

517

518

519 **5. Findings**

520 The manner in which different multi-level and multi-actor arrangements operated in the four regions,
521 along with their implementation performances, is presented in what follows. By elaborating the five
522 stages of OP implementation, differences between the Italian and Spanish OPs, and between the
523 regions of the same countries, will be described, bearing in mind the theoretical propositions
524 previously presented.

525 The presentation of the findings follows the structure of Tables 1-2-3-4-5, which steer the
526 progress of this article. As described in the methodological section, these tables set out the results of
527 the implementation process as regards the presence/absence of implementation gaps for each stage of
528 an OP. These results of the implementation process are explained in terms of, first, the characteristics
529 of the institutional context of the four regions analysed, and then of the specific component of MLG
530 and the relative theoretical proposition that each of the 13 dimensions was intended to measure. These
531 tables categorize variations in both the implementation performance of the 13 dimensions (dependent
532 variables) and the implementation-influencing factors listed in the theoretical propositions

533 (independent variables), based on the assessment proposed in Table 6 and Table 7, which summarize
534 how the IDF Method was used for the purposes of this article.

535

536 *Programming*

537 Implementation gaps were not found in the programming stage of the two Spanish ERDF OPs. The
538 implementation process (Prog1) and the program documents (Prog2) – both dimensions classified as
539 “consolidated/strong (A)” – were in fact clearly defined, and responsibility was attributed to a central
540 coordinating authority (“Proposition 1”), which in Spain was identified with the MA.^{vi} As reported
541 in Table 1, the variable “instruments of central control” was then classified as “consolidated/strong
542 (A)” in the two Spanish ERDF OPs, since “instruments of central control [were] present, well-defined
543 and well-implemented”. Moreover, by displaying a great capacity for mobilization (“Proposition 5”),
544 stakeholders were able to contribute information that improved the general quality of programming.
545 Due to the presence of stable organizational structures (“Proposition 3”), the negotiation of the OP
546 (Prog3) was speedy and without technical problems.^{vii}

547 Conversely, in both Italian regions, many implementation gaps were found for each of the
548 three dimensions under scrutiny: Prog 1 was classified as “moderate (C)” in Calabria and
549 “absent/weak (D)” in Campania, while Prog2 and Prog3 were respectively classified in both regions
550 as “absent/weak (D)” and as “moderate (C)”. To start with, partners were unable to present a coherent
551 position at the negotiating table (“Proposition 5”). The “absence of stakeholders mobilization capacity
552 (D)” was then classified and reported in Table 1. Moreover, in conditions of decentralization,^{viii} the
553 different political interests of regional governments in sustaining the policy over the years negatively
554 affected this stage (“Proposition 4”), particularly with regard to programming organization (Prog1).
555 For example, in Campania, implementation was re-programmed three different times from 2007, each
556 time with a different programmatic line, and utilizing different implementation arrangements and
557 tools.^{ix} The absence of a coordinating authority also negatively influenced organizational features:
558 their instability (“Proposition 3”) caused implementation gaps during negotiation (Prog3).

559

560 *Project Selection/Approval*

561 In the Spanish regions, implementation gaps in the project generation stage (PSA1) concerned only
562 the competitive projects that were mainly financed through grants for Small and Medium-sized
563 Enterprises (SMEs). Given the insufficient presence of suitably qualified staff (“Proposition 2”), these
564 project applications were of low quality, as «half of them were not completely satisfactory in terms
565 of innovation».^x In line with the theoretical and analytical background previously described,
566 instruments of central control (“Proposition 1”) were used to improve the programming capacity of
567 the SMEs,^{xi} particularly by organizing workshops, and providing enterprises with a permanent
568 technical consultant from the Regional Development Agencies.^{xii} No implementation gaps were
569 found in the project selection/approval stage (PSA2) due to the stability of organizational structures
570 (“Proposition 3”). These procedures never exceeded 4-5 months.

571 In the Italian regions, on the other hand, several implementation gaps were found in most of
572 the “competitive” and “non-competitive” projects, the projects presented being of poor quality, and
573 not integrated into a single idea of development (D). The reason was the absence of qualified staff
574 able to generate high quality projects coherent with the overall programming (“Proposition 2”),
575 among both respective regional directors and the final beneficiaries involved – mainly the local
576 authorities in Campania and SMEs in Calabria. For example, in Campania, the main problem with
577 the local authorities concerned «their lack of knowledge regarding European rules, which often led
578 them to make mistakes when they decided to take part in a public call».^{xiii} Calabria SMEs, on the
579 other hand, demonstrated a severe lack of planning capacity.^{xiv}

580

581 *Project Management*

582 The strong coordinating center also had a positive impact during the management stage of the OPs in
583 both Galicia and Andalusia; neither region displayed implementation gaps, with ProjectMan1,
584 ProjectMan2, and ProjectMan3 classified as “consolidated/strong (A)”. MLG was in fact effective at

585 this stage in Spain due to the presence of a central coordinating authority, with a constant supportive
586 role (“Proposition 1”). This authority was able to promptly separate control and management powers
587 (ProjectMan1). Moreover, it opted for a system in which responsibilities for annual control were
588 assigned to the CA and the MA (both located in Madrid). These bodies were allowed to temporarily
589 suspend payments in the case of irregularities. Organizational features, pertaining both to the
590 availability of suitably qualified staff (“Proposition 2”) and the stability of organizational structures
591 (“Proposition 3”), positively affected the other two dimensions considered.^{xv} Unique problems during
592 the management of these EU projects pertained to the SMEs, since their capacities to finance the
593 projects significantly declined due to the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, under strong
594 solicitation by the MA, the regional governments decided to improve the use of financial aids, and to
595 involve the banks in the certification of expenditure. Because of these corrective actions, there was
596 no decommitment (ProjectMan3). In Andalusia, moreover, the MA assigned direct responsibility for
597 supporting local beneficiaries to the Regional Development Authority.^{xvi}

598 Conversely, implementation gaps were found throughout the entire management stage in
599 Campania and Calabria, with ProjectMan1, ProjectMan2, and ProjectMan3 classified as
600 “absent/weak (D)”. Because this stage was completely decentralized in Italy at the sub-national level,
601 the regional administrations were reluctant to introduce the novelties required by EU regulations that
602 concerned the separation between management and control functions (ProjectMan1).^{xvii} This resulted
603 in direct intervention by the EC, which suspended payment for around a year and a half. In fact,
604 systems were not clearly defined, with major processing problems and frequent delays (D). This
605 inevitably affected the stages of project payment (ProjectMan2) and project management
606 (ProjectMan3) due to the participation of both the regional offices and the final beneficiaries at this
607 stage. In the case of ProjectMan2, for example, while the PA offices were poorly organized, with
608 unstable structures and frequent internal reorganizations (“Proposition 3”), the staff of the final
609 beneficiaries showed a lack of European culture in managing the project dossiers and the relevant

610 expense documentation, with «nearly all of them lacking highly qualified staff to interact with a
611 regional monitoring system that is often very confusing»^{xviii} (“Proposition 2”).

612

613 *Monitoring*

614 Implementation gaps were absent in both the Spanish regions during the monitoring stage for each of
615 the three dimensions considered. As regards Monit1, the use of a monitoring system was perfectly in
616 accordance with European standards and classifiable as one of the most effective and well-structured
617 monitoring systems in Europe.^{xix} In line with “Proposition 1”, this was due to the presence of a single
618 monitoring system applied across the whole of Spain and developed by the MA in Madrid.
619 Monitoring data were available throughout the programming cycle (Monit2), due to the presence,
620 among the final beneficiaries, of qualified staff with a consolidated monitoring culture to ensure that
621 monitoring data were promptly and correctly uploaded to the online system (“Proposition 2”).
622 However, monitoring for management purposes (Monit3) was increased within the Spanish regions
623 during the last years of implementation of the 2007-2013 ERDF OPs, due to increased political
624 support from the regional governments (“Proposition 4”). In 2015, for example, the Galician regional
625 government assembled a regional task force «to guarantee as much effect as possible of the
626 monitoring data on decision-making».^{xx} This decision was accepted within the MC,^{xxi} where
627 stakeholders were strongly encouraged to actively participate in these strategic choices (“Proposition
628 6”).

629 Once again, implementation gaps were found in both Calabria and Campania. In accordance
630 with the analytical section, and in the absence of central coordination, implementation gaps at this
631 stage can emerge due to a lack of interest by the regional governments (“Proposition 4”), which
632 impeded the development of an adequate monitoring system in line with EU standards — Monit1
633 was classified as “absent/weak (D)” in both regions. For example, doubts were expressed by the EC
634 on several occasions about the Calabrian monitoring system, described at times as rudimentary.^{xxii}
635 This had knock-on effects on the other two dimensions analyzed in Calabria and Campania. With

636 regard to Monit2 – classified as “moderate (C)” in both regions – widespread training activities were
637 not carried out by the managers of the operational objectives, and their high turn-over rate did not
638 allow for the consolidation of a coherent training system for the final beneficiaries (“Proposition 2”).
639 Moreover, with regard to Monit3 – classified as “absent/weak (D)” in both Campania and Calabria
640 since a lack of use of monitoring for program management had been found – the MC was «a place
641 for decisions that were already made, without concrete strategic actions being proposed, and with
642 poor involvement from partners» (“Proposition 6”).^{xxiii} Such was the case of Campania, where the
643 regional government was «interested only in obtaining the financial data when necessary for external
644 publicizing»^{xxiv}, and not to improve the general programming (“Proposition 4”).

645

646 *Evaluation*

647 With regard to the evaluation stage, fewer implementation gaps were found in Galicia and Campania.
648 On the other hand, evaluation was still far from completion in Andalusia and Calabria: a “low quality
649 of evaluation activities (C)”, and a “lack of use of evaluation for program management (D)” was
650 found in both regions.

651 The absence of implementation gaps in both Galicia and Campania – where evaluation
652 activities (Eval1) were “established and well implemented (A)” and an “institutionalized use of
653 evaluation for program management (A)” (Eval2) was present – must be attributed to the close
654 attention paid by the regional government to the evaluation stage during those years (“Proposition
655 4”). In Campania, for example, although the regional government underwent some change, evaluation
656 was always acknowledged as «a practice of decision-making support» (Eval2).^{xxv} This also ensured
657 a strong involvement of partners (“Proposition 6”), who found themselves able to use evaluation as
658 support for general programming.^{xxvi} In both regions, the findings showed a “strong interest to
659 increase stakeholders’ mobilization capacity [,with] actions clearly defined and implemented (A)”.
660 In particular, while training courses in Campania were organized to create the conditions for

661 stakeholder mobilization, partners in Galicia were involved in the design of a regional evaluation
662 plan.

663 Regional governments were not similarly invested in either Calabria or Andalusia, where the
664 widespread of an evaluation culture was delayed. In Calabria, for example, the Evaluation Unit was
665 not able to start a process of institutionalization (Eval1),^{xxvii} and a real will to consolidate an
666 evaluation culture and improve the performance of the OP was lacking (Eval2).^{xxviii}

667
668

669 **6. Discussion**

670

671 The last column of Table 7 summarizes the main empirical points supporting each of the six
672 theoretical propositions formulated from the analysis of implementation performance for the four
673 OPs. The analysis and its findings contribute to knowledge about the dynamics of implementation
674 performance in EU multi-level systems, and they afford better understanding of how different
675 components of MLG integrate with each other to produce policy. They thus further clarify how these
676 data can contribute to supporting or challenging the conventional assumptions about the expected
677 benefits of MLG.

678 The presence of various types of instruments of central control – particularly coordination –
679 can help prevent implementation gaps in multi-level and multi-actor policies (“Proposition 1”). The
680 presence of control instruments, in fact, also directly and indirectly impacts on the other three factors
681 considered. Even if the presence of suitable qualified staff (“Proposition 2”) and stable organizational
682 structures (“Proposition 3”) positively correlates with better implementation performance, it is not
683 true that this is always achieved in the absence of central coordination. This issue is connected with
684 the role played by the third component of MLG considered in this article and related to regional
685 political factors. The presence of a central coordination authority is also able to overcome a lack of
686 interest by the regional governments in sustaining the policy (“Proposition 4”). Similarly, although

687 increased participation in decision-making of all vertical and horizontal partners is expected to
688 produce better policies (output legitimacy), partners do not necessarily possess the knowledge and
689 expertise to take part in EU policy implementation (“Proposition 5”), and their mobilization may
690 depend on whether it is stimulated by higher levels of government (“Proposition 6”).

691 These findings contribute to the long-running debate among political scientists on policy
692 implementation in different multi-level settings. In particular, they shed light on those aspects of
693 implementation performance related to the crucial policy design/implementation dynamic (see also,
694 Winter 2012; Kaufmann et al. 2020). Whilst the fact that the design of public policies can play a
695 crucial role in program implementation was recognized by pioneering implementation scholars,
696 academic interest in this link has waned in recent decades. Nevertheless, according to Sætren and
697 Hupe (2018, pp. 571-572), its study can continue to represent an advancement towards a more general
698 theory in this field of research. This is particularly the case in the context of EU integration, where
699 different MLG policy-settings for policy implementation are needed, and different regional actors
700 and stakeholders are involved. As regards the aforementioned link, the findings presented allow us to
701 advance observable implications on the way in which the presence of a central coordination authority
702 can compensate for the potential pitfalls of MLG settings. More in detail, these findings substantiate
703 the thesis that multi-level and multi-actor structures obstruct implementation in the presence of
704 multiple decision-making points, and in the absence of central control to remedy unpredictability. In
705 other words, while generalization of results beyond these cases requires caution, MLG seems to
706 improve policy implementation in the presence of a coordination authority that, besides possessing
707 traditional command and control instruments, is able to ensure the real involvement of all the actors
708 during the implementation process, doing so in particular through the creation of new opportunities
709 structures that guarantee an equal distribution of those actors’ involvement. As the findings suggested,
710 in fact, effective MLG can benefit an authority that mobilizes implementation bodies, not only by
711 providing actors with adequate organizational structures and the technical and professional resources
712 that they lack, but also by creating conditions for consolidating the participation of stakeholders when

713 they lack a similar mobilization capacity. The same central authority can guide an ongoing
714 collaboration design/redesign process which may be needed over the years to reflect emerging
715 management challenges better, and to ensure a high degree of cooperation when multi-actor and
716 multi-level arrangements are established.

717

718

719 **7. Conclusion**

720 In recent decades, MLG has been increasingly used as an instrument of effective policy
721 implementation. While the greater involvement of various actors at different levels of government is
722 expected to produce better policies, the literature is in agreement that more empirical studies are
723 needed to analyze if and how different MLG systems impact on policy implementation. Adopting a
724 performance-oriented approach to EU implementation, this article has contributed to this academic
725 debate by investigating how different context conditions affect the effectiveness of decentralized
726 policy management. By combining traditional literature on policy implementation with the literature
727 on EU studies, this article has developed a set of interrelated theoretical propositions to guide
728 empirical research on the various stages of implementation of an EU development program in four
729 different regions belonging to two MSs characterized by different organizational and institutional
730 arrangements.

731 The findings support the hypothesis that the presence of a central coordination authority can
732 compensate for the potential pitfalls of MLG settings, and that it is therefore helpful to guarantee a
733 better implementation performance in the EU multi-level system. However, it should be borne in
734 mind that the empirical research reported in this article adopted a logic of qualitative comparison
735 focused on a small-N comparison. Hence, caution is necessary when proposing possible
736 generalizations of these results not only to other EU policy sectors where MLG systems are used for
737 policy implementation but also to other MSs where Cohesion Policy is implemented. As explained,
738 policy implementation can be affected by different policy traditions, institutional architectures, and

739 other factors related to policy specificity. The decision to decentralize to sub-national governments
740 in Italy, for example, led to the consolidation of very different regional governance systems for the
741 management of EU structural funds. Those in Spain proved to be more homogeneous (apart from the
742 institutionalization of the Evaluation Units). The analysis of how these different multi-level and
743 multi-actor systems concretely operate and their effect on EU policy implementation has been the
744 empirical added value of this article for public administration scholars interested in Cohesion Policy.
745 It also assists theoretical reflection on the application of the “partnership” principle itself. If
746 comparative studies on how this principle operates across the different policy stages that compose an
747 OP and how it affects its policy performance continue to be limited because of the large amount of
748 field research work required, this article – which has likewise required a large amount of research
749 over the years – confirms the political (and not only technical) conception of the partnership principle.
750 It therefore substantiates the argument that the principle’s correct application cannot ignore the
751 institutional and legal framework of each MS within which it is implemented.

752 To conclude, considering that the perspective adopted in this article seems to be a productive
753 way to provide a comprehensive outlook on research in the field of policy implementation and MLG,
754 the future challenge will likely be the conversion of the theoretical propositions presented into testable
755 hypotheses. This will make it possible to assess the level of intensity with which different factors
756 related to organizational features, sub-national political dynamics, and stakeholder participation are
757 able to influence policy performance, when such a central coordinating authority is present. The aim
758 could also be to perform comparative studies in different European policy sectors and countries, and
759 to investigate the effect of different contextual factors and governance models in order to evaluate
760 the usefulness of implementing through MLG. This means, as Piattoni puts it, that not only input
761 legitimacy, but also output legitimacy would be ensured.

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Table 1. Explaining the results of the implementation process: the programming stage

| Dimension (and relative acronymous) | Dimension Description | Main Actor(s) Involved | Specific Component(s) of MLG & Proposition(s) Measured | Main characteristics of this stage | | Results of the implementation process | | | |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|---|---|---------|
| | | | | | | Campania | Calabria | Andalusia | Galicia |
| | | | | Italian Context | Spanish Context | | | | |
| Programmin g Organization (Prog1) | Clear definition of the OP implementatio n process | MA, following consultation with regional political actors - request of stakeholders , involvement | Decentralization: ○ Proposition 1 Political Factors: ○ Proposition 4 Stakeholder Participation: ○ Proposition 5 | ○ “Absence of instruments of central controls (D)”: stage decentralized at the level of an MA placed under regional administrative control ▪ In Campania & Calabria: - “Unstable structures with frequent internal reorganization (D)” - “Moderate political interest. Sporadic actions (C)” - “Absence of stakeholder mobilization capacity (D)” | ▪ “Instruments of central controls present, well- defined and well- implemented (A)”: stage centralized at the level of an MA in Madrid - “Stable structures and responsibilities throughout the entire programming period (A)” - “Strong stakeholder mobilization capacity (A)” | “Processes not clearly defined, and implemented inadequately (D)” | “Processes defined, but implemented inadequately (C)” | “Processes clearly defined, and implemented well (A)” | |
| Program Documents (Prog2) | Identification of a clear strategic development focus, with targets to be reached | | Decentralization: ○ Proposition 1 Stakeholder Participation: ○ Proposition 5 | | | “Documents of poor quality, without a clear strategic focus (D)” | | “Well-structured documents, with a clear development strategy (A)” | |
| Negotiation & Approval (Prog3) | Efficient and fast negotiation process concerning the OP | EC and MA | Organizational Features: ○ Proposition 3 | | | “Major problems with negotiations, but minor delays in approval (C)” | | “Efficient and speedy negotiation and timely approval (A)” | |

Table 2. Explaining the results of the implementation process: the project selection/approval stage

| Dimens ion | Dimensio n Descripti on | Main Actor(s) Involved | Specific Component(s) of MLG & Proposition(s) Measured | Main characteristics of this stage | | Results of the implementation process | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|----------|--|---------|
| | | | | | | Campania | Calabria | Andalusia | Galicia |
| | | | | Italian Context | Spanish Context | | | | |
| Project Generat ion (PSA1) | High quality projects, and integrate d within a single concept of developm ent | <ul style="list-style-type: none">MA, for non- competi tive projectsFinal benefici aries, for competi tive projects | Decentralization: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 1 Organizational Features: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">“Absence of instruments of central controls (D)”: stage decentralized at the level of an MA placed under regional administrative controlIn Campania & Calabria:<ul style="list-style-type: none">As concern the non- competitive projects → “Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover (D)”: Lack of programming capacity of the MAAs concern the competitive projects → “Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover (D)”: Final beneficiaries unable to present high quality and coherent projects“Unstable structures with frequent internal reorganization (D)” | <ul style="list-style-type: none">“Instruments of central controls present, well- defined and well- implemented (A)”: stage centralized at the level of an MA in Madrid- As concerns the non- competitive projects → “Staff available with sufficient experience and qualifications. Low turnover (A)”: strong technical expertise and qualification of the MA staff- As concerns the competitive projects → “Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover (D)”: in particular, lack of programming capacity of the socio-economic beneficiaries- “Stable structures and responsibilities throughout the entire programming period (A)” | As concerns both the non- competitive and the competitive projects → “Poor quality projects, and not integrated into a single idea of development (D)” | | As concerns the non- competitive projects → “High-quality projects, and integrated within a single idea of development (A)” As concerns the competitive projects → “Poor quality projects, and less integrated within a single idea of development (C)” | |
| Project Apprais al & Selectio n (PSA2) | Definition of clear criteria, with short decision times | MA | Organizational Features: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 3 | | | “Criteria not completely defined, lengthy procedures with a focus on formal criteria (C)” | | “Well-defined criteria (including well- developed and applied criteria), with short decision times (A)” | |

Table 3. Explaining the results of the implementation process: the project management stage

| Dimension | Dimension Description | Main Actor(s) Involved | Specific Component(s) of MLG and relative Proposition(s) Measured | Main characteristics of this stage | | Results of the implementation process | | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|---|---|----------|--|---------|
| | | | | Italian Context | Spanish Context | Campania | Calabria | Andalusia | Galicia |
| Project Management/Financial Control (ProjectMan 1) | Creation of efficient financial control and management systems | MA, and CA - Formal separation of powers between management and control | Decentralization: ○ Proposition 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “Absence of instruments of central controls (D)”: stage decentralized at the regional level - In Campania & Calabria: - “Unstable structures with frequent internal reorganization (D)”: poor organizational features of the PA - “Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover (D)”: Poor management capacity of beneficiaries to achieve the task | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Instruments of central controls present, well-defined and well-implemented (A)”: process supervised by the MA in Madrid, with its constant supportive role - “Stable structures and responsibilities throughout the entire programming period (A)”: Adequate organizational features of the PA - “Staff available with some constraints in experience, qualifications or turnover (B)”: significant management capacity of beneficiaries to achieve the task | “Systems not clearly defined, with major processing problems and frequent delays (D)” | | “Systems clearly defined, with quick processing of payment claims, and efficient checks (A)” | |
| Project Payment (ProjectMan 2) | Establishment of a system of commitments and payments | PA | Organizational Features: ○ Proposition 3 | | | “Ineffective systems (D)” | | “Systems of commitments and payments highly efficient, within time constraints (A)” | |
| | | Final beneficiaries, for the elaboration of a project dossier and relative expense documentation | Organizational Features: ○ Proposition 2 | | | | | | |
| Decommitment (ProjectMan 3) | Decommitment rule (n+2) | Final beneficiaries, with adequate management capacity | Organizational Features: ○ Proposition 2 | | | “Significantly above-average decommitments (D)” | | “No decommitments (A)” | |

Table 4. Explaining the results of the implementation process: the monitoring stage

| Dimension | Dimension Description | Main Actor(s) Involved | Specific Component(s) of MLG and relative Proposition(s) Measured | Main characteristics of this stage | | Results of the implementation process | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|---|---|----------|---|---------|
| | | | | | | Campania | Calabria | Andalusia | Galicia |
| | | | | Italian Context | Spanish Context | | | | |
| Presence of an adequate system of indicators and monitoring procedures (Monit1) | Creation of a monitoring system in line with European standards | Monitoring structures | Decentralization: ○ Proposition 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Absence of instruments of central controls (D)”: stage decentralized at the regional level ○ In Campania & Calabria: - “Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover (D)”: lack of the final beneficiaries’ staff of a monitoring culture to ensure that monitoring data is promptly and correctly inserted within the online system - “Moderate political interest. Sporadic actions (C)”: except for obtaining monitoring data for upcoming elections - “Absence of interest to increase stakeholders mobilization capacity (D)”: within the MCs, low stakeholder involvement and decision-making role | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Instruments of central controls present, well-defined and well-implemented (A)”: presence of a single national monitoring system established by the MA in Madrid, with procedures consistent across regions - “Staff available with sufficient experience and qualifications. Low turnover (A)”: final beneficiaries’ staff with a consolidated monitoring culture to ensure that monitoring data is promptly and correctly inserted within the online system - “Strong interest to increase stakeholders’ mobilization capacity. Actions clearly defined and implemented (A)”: Strong involvement of the stakeholders within the MCs’ activities - “Significant political interest. Actions partially defined and implemented (B)”: in the last years of programming, strong investment of regional political class within the MCs to use monitoring for management purposes | “Incomplete monitoring system, with operational malfunctions (D)” | | “Consistent monitoring system, with procedures perfectly operational. System perfectly in line with European standards (A)” | |
| | | Regional political support | Political Factors: ○ Proposition 4 | | | | | | |
| Availability of physical, procedural, and financial data (Monit2) | Availability of monitoring data throughout the entire programming cycle | Final beneficiaries, able to correctly enter data into information systems | Organizational Features: ○ Proposition 2 | | | “Only financial data available at all times (C)” | | “All physical, procedural, and financial data available at all times (A)” | |
| Use of monitoring for management purposes (Monit3) | Monitoring as supportive of general programming | MC, with a decision-making role and plural composition (e.g. representatives from EU, MA, national and sub-national governments, stakeholders, etc.) | Political Factors: ○ Proposition 4 Stakeholder Participation: ○ Proposition 6 | | | “Lack of use of monitoring for program management (D)” | | “Frequent use of monitoring for program management (B)” | |

Table 5. Explaining the results of the implementation process: the evaluation stage

| Dimension | Dimension Description | Main Actor(s) Involved | Specific Component(s) of MLG and relative Proposition(s) Measured | Main characteristics of this stage | | Results of the implementation process | | | |
|--|---|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | Italian Context | Spanish Context | Campania | Calabria | Andalusia | Galicia |
| | | | | Stage entirely delegated to regional actors | | | | | |
| Evaluation Activities (Eval1) | Institutionalization of an evaluation system | Evaluation Units | Political Factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">In Campania:<ul style="list-style-type: none">“Strong political interest. Actions clearly defined and implemented (A)” | <ul style="list-style-type: none">In Andalusia:<ul style="list-style-type: none">“Absence of political interest (D)” | “Established and well implemented (A)” | “Low quality of evaluation activities (C)” | “Low quality of evaluation activities (C)” | “Established and adequately implemented (B)” |
| Use of evaluation for management purpose (Eval2) | Evaluation as support for general programming | Regional political support | Political Factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 4 Stakeholder Participation: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Proposition 6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">In Calabria:<ul style="list-style-type: none">“Absence of political interest (D)” | <ul style="list-style-type: none">In Galicia:<ul style="list-style-type: none">“Strong political interest. Actions clearly defined and implemented (A)”“Strong interest to increase stakeholders’ mobilization capacity. Actions clearly defined and implemented (A)” | “Institutionalized use of evaluation for program management (A)” | “Lack of use of evaluation for program management (D)” | “Lack of use of evaluation for program management (D)” | “Institutionalized use of evaluation for program management (A)” |

Table 6. Assessment of the implementation process

| Phase | Dimension | Assessment of the OP implementation performance | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total absence of implementation gap(s) | | Total presence of implementation gap(s) | |
| | | Consolidated/Strong (A) | Significant (B) | Moderate (C) | Absent/Weak (D) |
| (1) Programming | Prog1 | Processes clearly defined, and implemented well | Processes clearly defined, and implemented adequately | Processes defined, but implemented inadequately | Processes not clearly defined, and implemented inadequately |
| | Prog2 | Well-structured documents, with a clear development strategy | Some deficiencies in program document structure and strategy | Several deficiencies in program document structure and strategy | Documents of poor quality, without a clear strategic focus |
| | Prog3 | Efficient and speedy negotiation and timely approval | Efficient negotiation process, but with minor delays in negotiation/approval | Major problems with negotiations, but minor delays in approval | Major problems with the negotiation process, and major delays in approval |
| (2) Project selection/approval | PSA1 | High-quality projects, and integrated within a single idea of development | Medium quality projects, and partially integrated within a single idea of development | Poor quality projects, and less integrated within a single idea of development | Poor quality projects, and not integrated into a single idea of development |
| | PSA2 | Well-defined criteria (including well-developed and applied criteria), with short decision times | Well defined criteria, with partly long decision times | Criteria not completely defined, lengthy procedures with a focus on formal criteria | Lack of defined criteria, with long decision times |
| (3) Project management | ProjectMan 1 | Systems clearly defined, with quick processing of payment claims, and efficient checks | Systems partially defined, with quick processing of payment claims and some checks | Systems partially defined, with major processing problems | Systems not clearly defined, with major processing problems and frequent delays |
| | ProjectMan 2 | Systems of commitments and payments highly efficient, within time constraints | Systems of commitments and payments partially efficient, within time constraints | Systems of commitments and payments partially functioning, with some delays | Ineffective systems |
| | ProjectMan 3 | No decommitments | Above-average commitment of funds, below-average decommitments | Above-average decommitments, below-average commitment of funds | Significantly above-average decommitments |
| (4) Monitoring | Monit1 | Consistent monitoring system, with procedures perfectly operational. System perfectly in line with European standards | Consistent monitoring system, with procedures partially operational. System partially in line with European standards | Not totally complete monitoring system, with some operational malfunctions | Incomplete monitoring system, with operational malfunctions |
| | Monit2 | All physical, procedural, and financial data available at all times | Physical, procedural, and financial data partially available at all times | Only financial data available at all times | No data available |
| | Monit3 | Institutionalized use of monitoring for program management | Frequent use of monitoring for program management | Partial use of monitoring for program management | Lack of use of monitoring for program management |
| (5) Evaluation | Eval1 | Established and well implemented | Established and adequately implemented | Low quality of evaluation activities | Absence of evaluation activities |
| | Eval2 | Institutionalized use of evaluation for program management | Frequent use of evaluation for program management | Partial use of evaluation for program management | Lack of use of evaluation for program management |

Table 7 Components of MLG, theoretical arguments, dimensions of analysis and main empirical evidence

| Factor(s) | Theoretical Proposition(s) | Dimensions of analysis | Definition to the purpose of the research | Empirical Application | | Assessment of the variables listed in the propositions | | | | Main Empirical Evidence |
|-----------------------------------|---|------------------------|--|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | Consolidated/strong (A) | Significant (B) | Moderate (C) | Absent/weak (D) | |
| (I) Decentralization | P1: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there are instruments of central control than if there are none. | Prog1 | Formal attribution of responsibility to a central authority to coordinate, and supervise the activities of the decentralized implementation bodies, and to help them to achieve their task | Presence of a central authority that: | Coordinates all the activities related to the programming organization | Instruments of central controls present, well-defined and well-implemented | Instruments of central control present, but partially defined and partially implemented | Instrument of central controls partially present and defined. Poorly used | Absence of instruments of central controls | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Programming Organization" in Andalusia and Galicia - Dimension "Project Management/Financial Control" in Andalusia and Galicia - Dimension "Presence of an adequate system of indicators and monitoring procedures" in Andalusia and Galicia |
| | | Prog2 | | | Coordinates all the activities related to the elaboration of the program documents | | | | | |
| | | PSA1 | | | Has the power and the willingness to improve programming capacity of the implementation bodies through the elaboration of ad-hoc instruments to help them to develop their capabilities to generate high-quality projects coherent with the overall programming | | | | | |
| | | ProjectMan1 | | | Uses instruments to promptly separate management and control functions, and to assign clear responsibilities of annual controls between all the implementation bodies involved | | | | | |
| | | Monit1 | | | Coordinates the establishment and the development of the monitoring structures and systems | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| (II) Organizational Features | P2: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is availability of suitably qualified staff than if there is not. | PSA1 | Availability of staff within the organization(s) with sufficient experience and qualifications to achieve the task due. Low turnover | No turnover, and presence of staff with adequate technical expertise and knowledge regarding European rules within the structure(s) related to: | The MA and the final beneficiaries, in order to generate high-quality projects coherent with the overall programming | Staff available with sufficient experience and qualifications. Low turnover | Staff available with some constraints in experience, qualifications or turnover | Staff available with major constraints in experience, qualifications or turnover | Staff available with serious lack of experience and qualifications. High turnover | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Project Payment" in Campania - Dimension "Availability of physical, procedural, and financial data" in Andalusia and Galicia |
| | | ProjectMan2 | | | The final beneficiaries, in order to manage the project dossier and the relevant expense documentation | | | | | |
| | | ProjectMan3 | | | The final beneficiaries, in order to manage the single projects within time constraints | | | | | |
| | | Monit2 | | | The final beneficiaries, in order to ensure that monitoring data is promptly and correctly inserted in the online monitoring system | | | | | |
| | P3: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is organizational stability than if there is not. | Prog3 | Stability of the organizational structures of the implementing bodies throughout the entire implementation period. No internal reorganization of responsibilities. | No internal reorganization of responsibilities, and stability of the organizational structures related to: | The MA, to follow the activities related to the negotiation and the approval of the OP | Stable structures and responsibilities throughout the entire programming period | Largely stable structures, with minor internal reorganization | Some instability, with episodic internal reorganization | Unstable structures with frequent internal reorganization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Project Payment" in Andalusia and Galicia - Dimension "Negotiation & Approval" in Andalusia and Galicia |
| | | PSA2 | | | The MA, to follow the activities related to the definition of clear criteria for project selection/approval, and their related approval procedures | | | | | |
| (III) Political Factors | P4: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if regional government has a political interest in promoting and sustaining a policy over the years than when it does not. | Prog1 | Willingness and capacity of the regional government to promote adequate requirements for policy implementation | Willingness and capacity of the regional government: | To build and sustain the programming organization throughout the entire implementation period | Strong political interest. Actions clearly defined and implemented | Significant political interest. Actions partially defined and implemented | Moderate political interest. Sporadic actions | Absence of political interest | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Programming Organization" in Campania - Dimension "Evaluation Activities" in Galicia - Dimension "Use of evaluation for management purpose" in Campania |
| | | Monit1 | | | To establish and consolidate a monitoring system in line with the EU standards | | | | | |
| | | Monit3 | | | To use monitoring as supportive of the general programming throughout the entire implementation period | | | | | |
| | | Eval1 | | | To establish an Evaluation Unit, and to consolidate its evaluation activities | | | | | |
| | | Eval2 | | | To institutionalize the use of evaluation for management purposes throughout the entire implementation period | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| (IV) Stakeholder Participation | P5: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if there is mobilization capacity among all the actors involved than if there is none. | Prog1 | Stakeholders with adequate technical resources and expertise to present their view at the negotiation table | Stakeholders' capacity to actively contribute to the discussion about: | The programming phase, by presenting ideas and concrete proposals to improve the general quality of programming organization | Strong stakeholder mobilization capacity | Significant stakeholder mobilization capacity | Moderate stakeholder mobilization capacity | Absence of stakeholder mobilization capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Programming Organization" in Andalusia and Galicia - Dimension "Program Documents" in Andalusia and Galicia |
| | | Prog2 | | | The programming phase, by presenting ideas and concrete proposals to improve the general quality of program documents | | | | | |
| | P6: In the case of multi-level and multi-actor policies, we find fewer implementation gaps if a higher level of government creates the conditions for mobilizing all the actors involved than if it does not. | Monit3 | Willingness and capacity of a higher level of government to provide room for stakeholders' interactive involvement in governance and to help them to develop their capabilities | Elaboration of specific conditions for stakeholders' involvement: | Within the MCS' activities to guarantee its proper functioning (including the use of ad-hoc instruments to help them to develop their capabilities) | Strong interest to increase stakeholders' mobilization capacity. Actions clearly defined and implemented | Significant interest to increase stakeholders' mobilization capacity. Actions partially defined and implemented | Moderate interest to increase stakeholders' mobilization capacity. Sporadic actions | Absence of interest to increase stakeholders' mobilization capacity. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dimension "Use of monitoring for management purpose" in Galicia - Dimension "Use of evaluation for management purpose" in Campania and Galicia |
| | | Eval2 | | | In the evaluation activities and in discussing the evaluation results (including the organization of training courses to develop their capabilities on evaluation issues) | | | | | |

Appendix

Table 1.A. and Table 2.A. respectively summarizes the sources used to empirically assess the variables listed in the six theoretical propositions and to categorize each dimension for the four regional OPs analyzed. These sources include the target interviewees and the questions posed.

For methodological correctness, it should be noted that all the in-depth interviews were conducted by the same researcher/evaluator, and that during the field analysis the same dimension had been investigated with at least three of the different public and private actors previously indicated (in accordance with their expert knowledge about the different stages of the OP implementation). In line with Natow (2020), in this way it was possible to obtain a fuller picture of the situation being investigated, and to make the triangulation as accurate as possible. To select interviewees, an “expert interview” methodology (Littig, 2011) was used. For the purposes of this research, “experts” were considered individuals with thorough knowledge of how the four ERDF OPs were implemented in their different stages, and in accordance with the selected dimensions. Different types of public and private actors were included. Namely, interviewees were selected as follows for each OP analyzed: two Commission officials in DG Regio; three national officials; five representatives in total from the MA, Certifying Authority (CA), and PA; four officials working on regional structure; two external evaluators; six representatives of the main stakeholders involved in the OP (two institutional, two socio-economic, two from the tertiary sector). Interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes each. Following the recommendations of della Porta and Keating (2008), a low profile was kept, anonymity was guaranteed, and within 24 hours, interviews were manually transcribed and analyzed. Overall impressions regarding the interview and the interviewee were also noted.

Table 1.A: Source(s) used to assess the variables listed in the theoretical propositions

| Factor (s) | Proposition(s) | Dimensions | Sources used to assess the variables listed in the theoretical propositions | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|--------------|---|---|--------------------|----------------------------------|--|-----------------------|---|---|--|---------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| | | | EC reports | National and regional program documents | Evaluation studies | Interviews with: | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Commission officials in DG Regio | Officials working on national structures | Representatives from: | | | Officials working on regional structures | External evaluators | Representatives of key stakeholders | Exemplary Question(s) Posed during the Interviews |
| MA | CA | PA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (I) Decentralization | Proposition 1 | Prog1 | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | | | Which structures/actors participate in the activities related to the programming organization? Were these activities coordinate by a single authority? If so, by whom and how were the activities related to the programming organization arranged among the structures/actors involved? |
| | | Prog2 | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | | | Which structures/actors participate in the activities related to the elaboration of the program documents? Were these activities coordinate by a single authority? If so, by whom and how were the activities related to the elaboration of the program documents organized among the structures/actors involved? |
| | | PSA1 | | X | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | [Related to the most representative axis of each ERDF OP] Has anything been done to help the final beneficiaries of the projects to improve their programming capacity for project generation? If yes, by whom and which specific actions had been elaborated? Were these actions promptly implemented? |
| | | Project Man1 | X | X | | X | X | X | X | | | | | How was the process related to the separation of management and control functions? Which structures/actors participate in this process? Were these activities coordinated by a single authority? If so, by whom and how were the responsibilities of annual controls assigned among the implementation bodies? |
| | | Monit 1 | | X | X | X | X | | | | X | X | | How was the process related to the establishment and the development of the monitoring structures and systems managed? Which structures/actors participate in this process? Were these activities coordinated by a single authority? If so, by whom? Were common procedures across all the implementation bodies developed? |
| (II) Organizational Features | Proposition 2 | PSA1 | | | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X | [Related to the most representative axis of each ERDF OP] Did the final beneficiaries/the MA have staff with adequate technical expertise to generate high-quality projects coherent with the overall programming? Was there a staff turnover during this phase? |
| | | Project Man2 | | X | X | | | X | | X | | | X | Did the final beneficiaries have staff with adequate technical expertise, and monitoring culture, to manage the project dossier and the relevant expense documentation? Was there staff turnover during this phase? |
| | | Project Man3 | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | Did the final beneficiaries/the MA have staff with adequate technical expertise, and management capacity, to manage the projects financed within the OP within time constraints? Was there staff turnover during this phase? |
| | | Monit 2 | | | X | | | | | X | X | | X | Did the final beneficiaries/the MA have staff with adequate technical expertise, and monitoring culture, to promptly and correctly insert the monitoring data within the online monitoring system? Was there a staff turnover during this phase? |
| | Proposition 3 | Prog3 | | X | | X | X | X | | | X | | | During the stage of negotiation and the approval of the OP, was there any change in the organizational structures related to the MA? And in the internal reorganization of responsibilities? |
| | | PSA2 | | X | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | [Related to the most representative axis of each ERDF OP] During the stage of project selection/approval, was there any change in the organizational structures related to the MA? And in the internal reorganization of responsibilities? |
| | | Project Man2 | | X | | | X | | | X | | | X | During the stage of project payment, was there any change in the organizational structures related to the PA? And in the internal reorganization of responsibilities? |
| (III) Political Factors | Proposition 4 | Prog1 | | X | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | Which actions had the regional government taken to establish the processes related to the programming organization? Was there a political interest in programming issue throughout the entire programming period? |
| | | Monit 1 | | X | | X | X | X | | | | | | Which actions had the regional government taken to establish and consolidate the monitoring system? Was there a political interest in the monitoring issue throughout the entire programming period? |
| | | Monit 3 | | X | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | Which actions had the regional government taken to use monitoring as supportive of the general programming? Was there a political interest in this issue throughout the entire programming period? |
| | | Eval1 | | X | X | | X | | | | X | X | | Which actions had the regional government taken to establish the Evaluation Unit and to consolidate its evaluation activities? Was there a political interest in the evaluation issue throughout the entire programming period? |
| | | Eval2 | | X | X | | X | | | | X | X | X | Which actions had the regional government taken to use evaluation for management purposes? Was there a political interest in this issue throughout the entire programming period? |
| (IV) Stakeholder Participation | Proposition 5 | Prog1 | | X | | | | X | | | X | | X | Were the stakeholders able to actively contribute to the discussion about the programming organization? Did they come up with any concrete proposals? |
| | | Prog2 | | X | | | | X | | | X | | X | Were the stakeholders able to actively contribute to the discussion about the elaboration of the program documents? Did they come up with any concrete proposals? |
| | Proposition 6 | Monit 3 | | X | | X | | X | | | X | | X | Were the stakeholders actively involved within the MC's activities? Has anything been done to help them actively participate in MC's activities and decisions? |
| | | Eval2 | | X | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X | Were the stakeholders actively involved in the evaluation activities? And in the discussion of the evaluation results? Has anything been done to help them to increase their evaluation skills? |

Table 2.A: Source(s) used to assess the implementation process

| Phase | Dimension | Sources used to evaluate the OP implementation performance | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--|---|-------------------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------|---|---|---|----------------------------|--|--|
| | | EC report s | National and regional program documents | Evalu ation stud ies | Data related to (de)commitment , expenditure, and system effectiveness | Interviews with: | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Commis sion officials in DG Regio | Officials working on national structures | Representatives from: | | | Officials working on regional structures | External evaluato rs | Representa tives of key stakeholde rs | Exemplary questions posed during the interviews: |
| MA | CA | PA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Programmi ng | Prog1 | | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | X | | Were the processes related to the programming organization clearly defined? Was there any re-programming? If yes, how is the original programming organization changed? |
| | Prog2 | | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | X | | Did the program documents clearly identify the targets to be reached? Were they integrated within a clear strategic development strategy? |
| | Prog3 | X | X | | | X | X | X | | | | | | Were there any problems encountered during the negotiation and approval phase of the OP? If yes, what kind of problems? Was the process completed on schedule? |
| Project selection/a pproval | PSA1 | | X | X | | X | | X | | | | X | X | [Related to the most representative axis of each ERDF OP] How was the quality of the competitive/non-competitive projects presented? Were they integrated within a single idea of development? |
| | PSA2 | | X | | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | [Related to the most representative axis of each ERDF OP] Which were the criteria used for project appraisal and selection? Please, explain their main technical characteristics. Were these criteria clearly defined? How long did these procedures last? |
| Project managem ent | ProjectMa n1 | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | | Please, reconstruct the events relating to the formal separation of power between management and control, as required by the EU regulations. After this formal separation of power occurred, were the processes related to the financial control and management systems clearly defined and operational? Were there any processing problems? |
| | ProjectMa n2 | | X | | X | X | X | | | X | X | | X | Were the systems of commitments and payments operational, and within time constraints? Was there any problem at this stage? |
| | ProjectMa n3 | X | X | | X | X | | X | | X | X | | X | Was there any commitment of funds? If yes, please quantify it. |
| Monitoring | Monit1 | X | X | | | X | X | | | | X | X | | Was the system of indicators of monitoring procedures complete and adequate? Was this monitoring system in line with the European standards? Were its procedures operational throughout the entire programming period? |
| | Monit2 | | | X | X | | | X | | | X | | X | Were all physical, procedural, and financial monitoring data available at all times? If no, please specify which monitoring data were always available and which were not. |
| | Monit3 | | X | X | | X | | X | | | | X | X | Were the monitoring activities used as supportive of the general programming during the OP implementation process? If yes, when and how monitoring was used for management purposes? |
| Evaluation | Eval1 | X | X | X | | X | X | | | | X | X | | Please, indicate all the evaluation activities carried out in relation to the ERDF OP 2007-2013. By whom were these assessments made? How was the quality of the evaluation produced? |
| | Eval2 | | X | X | | X | | X | | | X | X | X | Were the evaluation activities used as supportive of general programming during the OP implementation process? If yes, when and how were evaluation results used for management purposes? |