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# Understanding decentralization: deconcentration and devolution processes in the French and Italian cultural sectors

## Abstract

**Purpose** – Decentralization is a widespread and international phenomenon in public administration. Despite the interest of public management scholars, an in-depth analysis of the interrelationship between two of its forms – deconcentration and devolution – and its impact on policy and management capacities at the local level is seldom investigated.

**Design/methodology/approach** – This article addresses this gap by examining the implementation of deconcentration and devolution processes in France and Italy in the cultural field, combining the analysis of national reform processes with in-depth analyses of two regional cases. The research is the result of document analysis, participatory observation and semi-structured interviews.

**Findings** – The article reconstructs the impacts of devolution and deconcentration processes on the emergence of policy and management capacity in two regions (Rhône-Alpes and Piedmont) in the cultural sector. The article shows that decentralization in the cultural sector in France and Italy is the result of different combinations of devolution and deconcentration processes, that the two processes mutually affect their effectiveness, and that this effectiveness is deeply linked to the previous policy and management capacity of the central state in a specific field/country.

**Originality/value** – The article investigates decentralization as a result of the combination of deconcentration and devolution in comparative terms and in a specific sector of implementation, highlighting the usefulness of this approach also for other sectors/countries

**Keywords** Decentralization, Deconcentration, Devolution, Regions, Cultural sector

**Paper type** Research paper

## 1. Introduction

In the second half of the 20th century, decentralization of power and authority from the central state to lower levels of government was one of the key features of many reforms worldwide ([Rondinelli et al., 1983](#); [Litvack et al., 1998](#); [Litvack and Seddon, 1999](#); [OECD, 1997](#)) and as a general political process (e.g. [Requejo 2011](#); [Măiz and Requejo, 2005](#)). Later on, and focusing more directly on administrative studies, starting from the 1980 to 1990, the diffusion of the New Public Management literature that had the aim of “reinventing government” ([Osborne and Gaebler, 1992](#)) also promoted decentralization as a way to increase the performance of the public sector ([Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011](#)).

This article investigates decentralization processes in the cultural sector in France and Italy, with a focus on the regional level. It draws on a relatively marginal approach that articulates decentralization in terms of deconcentration and devolution and focuses on the interrelation between the two. The underlying research question is how the relationship

between the two distinct processes affects the ability of regions in the two countries to develop policy and management capacities in the cultural field. Indeed, we look at decentralization in terms of the way it affects local administrations' capacity building (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).

We compare the cultural fields of France and Italy because they share an administrative law tradition (Kickert, 2007; Bonini Baraldi, 2014), and the state plays an important role in the cultural policies of both nations (Pongy and Saez, 1994), although there are some important differences in qualitative and quantitative terms (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018). Yet the recent decentralization reforms of the two countries differ considerably, and the intervention of regions in the administrative processes of cultural policy has been rarely investigated (in France: Queyranne, 1982; Doucin, 1987; Pongy and Saez, 1994; Negrier and Teillet, 2011; Association des Régions de France, 2013. In Italy: Bechelloni, 1972; Bodo, 1990; Meneguzzo, 2004; Stratta, 2009). This is an important gap in the literature.

The article is organized as follows. The next section focuses on the literature review. Section three highlights methodological issues. Section four reconstructs deconcentration and devolution reforms in the cultural sector at the national level in the two countries. Section five provides an in-depth analysis of two regional case studies in the actual process of enacting decentralization reforms. Section six compares these practices in the two contexts, investigating the interplay between devolution and deconcentration elements. The concluding section addresses possible implications for the broader debate on decentralization.

## 2. Literature review

Given the focus of the paper, there are three potentially controversial issues that are involved in providing an adequate literature review. First, at a very general level, the traditional public administration literature examines different forms of decentralization in a variety of ways, introducing the distinction between the following: political, administrative and fiscal decentralization (Furniss, 1974; Litvack *et al.*, 1998; Smoke, 2003; Falleti, 2005); devolution, delegation and privatization (Rondinelli *et al.*, 1983; Manor, 1999; Smith, 2001); horizontal and vertical (Dubois and Fattore, 2009), internal and external (Pollitt, 2005) and functional and territorial decentralization (Cohen and Peterson, 1999).

However, despite the interest of public management scholars, an in-depth analysis of the interrelationship between two forms of decentralization — deconcentration and devolution — is seldom investigated, and when it is, it is in relation to developing countries (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Wollmann, 2007; Utomo, 2009; Adamtey, 2012). Deconcentration refers to an intra-organizational transfer of functions from the central government to its peripheral offices (e.g. Hutchcroft, 2001). Litvack and Seddon, 1999, p. 2) defines it as “the redistribution of decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the national government”; and similarly Wollman (2007, p. 3) describes it as “the transfer of administrative tasks from an upper to a lower layer of unit of state administration, typically through the establishment of regional or local field offices”. Devolution is intended as a transfer of authority to legally established lower-level organizations run by elected representatives (e.g. Pollitt *et al.*, 1998) or, as the WB defines it as “the transfer of authority for decision making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status”. With devolution, powers and functions (as well as resources) are assigned to sub-national bodies and actors that possess some political autonomy in their own right (Wollmann, 2007) involving “a much more extensive transfer of decision-making authority and responsibility to local government units” (Hutchcroft, 2001, p. 30).

We adopt the perspective of deconcentration and devolution processes (Maddick, 1963; Lundquist, 1972; Rondinelli *et al.*, 1983; Manor, 1999; UNDP, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2001; Benz, 2002; Schneider, 2003; Pinto, 2004; Wollmann, 2007) for several reasons. First, the

meanings of all these terms shift in different disciplines and languages (Cohen and Peterson, 1997), leaving room for ambiguity and misunderstandings. For instance, the term deconcentration is widely used in the French but not in the English literature, where the transfer of tasks to peripheral branches of the same public body is usually classified as administrative decentralization (Divay, 2012). However, many scholars also consider devolution of functions to local governments to be a form of administrative decentralization (Rondinelli, 1987, 1990; Litvack and Seddon, 1999), which may create confusion for international readers approaching decentralization processes. In addition, while devolution is largely investigated – sometimes acknowledging factors affecting its implementation (Kickert, 2007; Olsen and Peters, 1996; Pollitt *et al.*, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Fedele and Ongaro, 2008) and differences across countries (Fedele and Ongaro, 2008) – an international comparative analysis of its impacts is quite rare (Keating and Mc Ewans, 2006; Fedele and Ongaro, 2008). Also, deconcentration still receives little attention from scholars (Utomo, 2009), and in-depth intercountry investigation is not available. Moreover, as Wollmann (2007) argues, the degree to which devolution is accompanied by deconcentration in some European countries varies significantly, with potentially different effects on the overall pattern of decentralization. Nonetheless, as many authors confirm, these two subtypes of decentralization may be considered complementary and possibly strengthen each other's effectiveness (Diederichs and Luben, 1995; Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Utomo, 2009; Cole, 2012).

A second element of potential controversy in investigating the impact of deconcentration and devolution relates to regions' ability to develop policy and management capacity. Here, vague definitions and a variety of approaches emerge (Peters, 1996; Painter, 2002; Painter and Pierre, 2005; Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010; Addison, 2009; Keating, 1991; Pasquier, 2004; Ongaro and Valotti, 2008). According to Painter and Pierre, (2005), policy capacity is “the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends” (Painter and Pierre, 2005, p. 2; see also Torgerson, 1986; Peters, 1996, pp. 11–12). However, policy capacity is deeply linked not only to policy making but also to policy implementation processes (Zan *et al.*, 2015), thus including a managerial dimension (and related capacities). According to

Ongaro and Valotti, management capacity refers to “public bodies capacity to manage available resources to produce expected outputs and outcomes in an efficient, effective and sustainable way” (2008, p. 14). Both policy and management capacities at the regional level are not only strictly interconnected, but also largely dependent on the related capacities of the state (Painter, 2002; Painter and Pierre, 2005; Ongaro, 2007). Indeed, the role played by ministries (and their peripheral branches) becomes crucial, calling for further investigation.

The third element of potential controversy is about the nature of the cultural sector itself, where different contexts have different dominant (hegemonic) approaches and disciplinary backgrounds. The intentions of various “cultural policies” vary greatly, from mere “administrative policies for culture” (e.g. tax incentives or procedural rules for state subsidies) to the substantive elements of political discourse about culture (e.g. Menger, 2010, 2013). This sometimes have implications in terms of nationalism (Máiz and Requejo, 2005), where policies aim to define what can be told about culture and heritage (e.g. the emphasis on Ottoman heritage in current-day Turkey, or the focus on Chinese-ness in the management of heritage in China (Zan *et al.*, 2015; Zan *et al.*, 2018). In this continuum, France and Italy differ, with a much stronger national discourse characterizing the former, for instance in terms of the defense of national identity and language (Máiz, 2011). However, the focus of this paper is on administrative processes rather than cultural policies seen in their substantive aspects.

In addition, a central discussion in the debate about decentralization in the cultural sector is about how large cultural institutions have been transformed by forms of autonomy and accountability (e.g. the British Museum, the Louvre, the Prado, Pompeii and hundreds of

other possible examples: see for instance [Rius and Rubio Arostegui, 2013](#); [Zan et al., 2015](#)). This debate, while interesting, involves the parallel process of administrative reforms of state and local bureaucracies, and is not the focus of this paper.

Finally, there are different professional jurisdictions involved in different ways in the debate (and the literature) about reforms in the cultural sector in the two countries. In France, political scientists play a leading role, dominating the debate in the cultural sector within a disciplinary discourse that focuses on cultural policies and their evolution over time (for a review, see [Poirrier, 2013](#)). By contrast, in Italy, public intervention in the cultural sector has been mainly investigated from a legislative perspective and less commonly from a public policy ([Emiliani, 1975](#); [Spadolini, 1975](#); [Bobbio, 1992, 1997](#); [Dal Pozzolo, 1999](#); [Giambrone, 2013](#)) or a managerial perspective ([Zan et al., 2007, 2009](#); [Bonini Baraldi, 2007](#)). The supremacy of the legislative discourse in the Italian context ([Panozzo, 2000](#); [Zan, 2006](#); [Bonini Baraldi, 2014](#)) might have played a role in the lack of attention paid to the accompanying process aimed at developing regional capabilities (including the transfer of resources), which have characterized the Italian process of decentralization—which we discuss later.

### 3. Methodology

To conduct the research, we adopted a multi-level approach combining the analysis of national debates about decentralization processes in the cultural sector in the two countries, plus a comparative two-case study at the regional level ([Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007](#); [Ragin, 1987](#)). Both levels involved a complex set of literature reviews, extensive analysis of legislation plus official and internal documents, a series of interviews and an intensive period of participant observation by one of the authors. The empirical realms (France and Italy; Rhone-Alpes and Piedmont regions) were selected on the basis of the *most similar systems design* ([Przeworski and Teune, 1970](#)): at the national level, the two countries share a tradition of public intervention in the cultural field, with decentralization processes to the regional and local levels; at the regional level, although different in size and economic performance, both regions have a reputation for dynamic activity ([Association des R gions de France, 2013](#); [Palumbo, 2015](#)) in the cultural sector.

At the national level, a longitudinal analysis from the 1980s up to recent years allowed us to outline the emergence of the regional intervention in the cultural sector and the role of the cooperation between the regions and the peripheral branches of the Ministry of Culture, deriving from the deconcentration and devolution frameworks. This approach required making sense of an extensive number of sources: we collected existing publications, and we analyzed the national legislation, official documents, agreements and reports related to the devolution of cultural duties toward regions and the deconcentration of powers from the central to the peripheral administration of the Ministry of Culture. We conducted our research in libraries, documentation centers and archives in France and Italy, as well as from the websites of the French and Italian Ministry of Culture, of the Italian State-Regions Conference, and of the French Regions Association. However, the process of enfolding the literature ([Eisenhardt, 1989](#)) was difficult due to the differences in disciplinary approaches in the two countries. At the regional level, the analysis of the implementation of deconcentration and devolution processes in the two cases involved two passages. First, we reconstructed the characteristics of the peripheral branches of the Ministry in the two regions (deconcentration). Second, we analyzed the transfer of duties and powers as implemented by the regions with reference to specific examples, e.g. the cultural heritage inventory in Rhone-Alpes and the instrument for the enhancement of cultural heritage in Piedmont (devolution). Within this framework – and in order to grasp the interplay between deconcentration and devolution – we investigated the instruments and the type of the cooperation between the regional branches of the Ministry of Culture and the Directorate of

Culture of the two regions. Indeed, by analyzing the role of the ministerial branches in supporting the deployment of expertise in the regions, we could outline the impact of the interplay between devolution and deconcentration at the regional level. To conduct this part of the analysis, we consulted official and internal documents that when not publicly available – we requested from the related organizations: regional legislation, agreements, financial statements, meeting notes and evaluations, as well as external reports, publications and press articles. We also consulted ad hoc documentation centers and archives, as well as collecting data and documents from the websites of the peripheral branches of the Ministry of Culture, of Rhone-Alpes and Piedmont regions, of regional agencies and of the Cultural Observatory of Piedmont.

Due to our interest in the actual effects of the policies and practices of devolution and deconcentration, we also undertook extensive field work of two main kinds. First, we conducted 15 semi-structured interviews averaging 90 min each, for a total of approximately 20 h in 2015 with representatives at both the management and operational level in various entities: the Department of Culture of Rhone-Alpes region and of Piedmont region, the regional branches of the French Ministry of Culture, DRAC Rhone-Alpes, and of the Italian Ministry of Culture, MIBAC-Piedmont Regional Secretariat, in regional agencies or institutions involved in the decentralization processes directly (e.g. regional cultural agency NACRe) or as consulting bodies (e.g. the French Observatory for Cultural Policies). Second, one of the authors undertook long-term participant observation at the regional agency of performing arts of Rhone-Alpes, NACRe-Nouvelle Agence Culturelle Régionale (for four months, 35 working hours per week, for a total of approximately 560 h). This experience allowed us to observe an organization that is the result of a decentralization process (NACRe), and that served as an expert and consulting body for the region.

Regarding the analysis, we first conducted a within-case examination (Eisenhardt, 1989) and then we identified some main elements (e.g. the cooperation between the regions and the peripheral branches of the Ministry of Culture, the building of a policy and management capacity) to be compared between the two cases. Finally, we hold an inductive analysis during which we moved between theory and data to give sense to the phenomenon and contribute to the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989).

#### 4. The national level: deconcentration and devolution in France and Italy

At the national level, major differences emerge in the deconcentration and devolution approach in the cultural sector in France and Italy (See [Tables 1 and 2](#) for a summary, and [Appendix](#) for further details).

##### 4.1 *Deconcentration*

The deconcentration process in France started in the second half of the 19th century and resumed after the 1960s (Marcou, 2002). The Ministry of Culture, founded in 1959, also carried out an important deconcentration reform. This was mainly based on the establishment of regional branches in 1977, named DRACs (Regional Directorate for Cultural Affairs), with the related allocation of regional budgets and human resources (Decree 115/1977).

DRACs are regional branches of the Ministry, playing a fundamental role in the governance of the overall cultural sector (from conservation to coordination, from cultural heritage to theatre). They are responsible for the implementation of national cultural policies at the regional level by ensuring that policy actions are consistent with related public institutions. At the same time, they monitor the application of regulations and execute professional control over regional activities within their fields of responsibility. They also contribute to academic research, as well as to the dissemination of public data related to culture (Decrees 538/1986, 1430/2004, 633/2010).

Table 1.  
Deconcentration of the  
Ministry of Culture in  
France and Italy

	France	Italy
Peripheral entities	DRACs, since 1977	(1) Superintendence, since 1907 (2) Regional secretariat, since 2000
Areas of responsibility	Overall cultural sector (heritage, theater, dance, music etc.)	Only CH, specific sub-sectors (archaeology, architecture, fine arts etc.)
Territorial jurisdiction	Region	(1) Superintendence: aggregations of municipal or provincial territories (2) Regional secretariat: region
Functions	Diversified and comprehensive: implementing national policies at the regional level	Limited: (1) Superintendence: authorizations (2) Regional secretariats: coordination on CH
Relationship with the Ministry	Unitary, autonomous entities	Non-autonomous entities
Relationship with regional authorities	Intense cooperation using contracts, funds and agencies under holistic view	Weak/discontinuous cooperation, with no specific resources and competences on partial intervention

Table 2.  
Devolution in the  
cultural sector in  
France and Italy

	France	Italy
Timing	Started 1982-83, 3 legislative waves	Started 1972, 3 waves Constitutional reform (2001)
<i>Implication in terms of:</i>		
(1) Administrative power	Regions gain responsibility on the CH inventory and the professional artistic education; lose power to voluntary acting in the cultural sector	Regions gain responsibility on libraries, local museums, enhancement of CH (in collaboration with the State), regional cultural development, and management of some local museums.
(2) Legislative power	none	In the enhancement of CH (the State keeps exclusive power only on protection)
Major operating tools	(1) contract-based activity (2) collaboration in managing regional funds and agencies	(1) National Programming Framework (2) Agreements (art. 112 CH Code)

In Italy, heritage has always played a central role within the cultural field. To ensure its protection, the Central offices of the Ministry were integrated with several peripheral branches all over the country: the superintendence [1]. Logic of high specialization was adopted both in terms of disciplinary areas of specialization (archaeology, architecture and fine arts) and territorial jurisdiction (often superintendence only covers one or more provinces). Their role was to guarantee heritage preservation, rather than defining cultural policies, mainly through an authorization power: allowing or not initiatives of private and public bodies in relation to the possible impact on cultural heritage—e.g. infrastructure construction, housing, trade of art works. As local branches, they had (and still have) a very limited autonomy toward the central administration, with both financial and human resources provided, managed and controlled at the ministerial level (Zan and Paciello, 1999; Bonini Baraldi, 2014).

Starting from 1997, a gradual process of deconcentration took place, eventually arriving at the creation of regional branches of the Ministry: the Regional Secretariats. These aim to coordinate different superintendences within the region, while ensuring systematic



cooperation at the regional level with local authorities and other cultural heritage institutions. Yet, serious troubles in operationalizing the reform emerged: while the relationship between the regional secretary and the superintendence is somehow problematic, the regional secretariats were not provided with adequate resources to play their coordination and programming role (Cammelli *et al.*, 2016; OECD, 2016).

#### 4.2 Devolution

French devolution occurred in three waves. The first wave (1982–2002) recognized regional intervention in the cultural sector on a voluntary basis. The second wave (2003–2010) transferred the Cultural Heritage Inventory and professional artistic education to the regions (L 809/2004), while abolishing in 2010 the voluntary basis option (L 1563/2010). The third wave (2012–2015) did not have any further direct effect on the cultural sector. In the end, neither the second nor the third wave recognized with specific legislative measures the regions' role in the cultural sector.

Nonetheless, two main tools ensure that regions are involved in the cultural sector. The first tool is *contract-based activity* in the form of multi-year plans based on the CPER (agreement for state/region projects) State–Region project agreement that defines major programs and financial tools for territorial development in each region, including the cultural sector (decree 21.01.1984). These plans focused mainly on conservation and rehabilitation of cultural heritage, promotion of creativity, democratization of culture and promotion of regional identity (Ernst and Young, 2007). The second tool is *collaboration in managing regional funds and agencies*. Regional funds are financial subsidies managed in cooperation by the region and the DRACs for the development of specific cultural activities. They include FRAC (regional fund for contemporary art), FRAM (regional fund for museum collections enrichment), FRAB (regional fund for library enrichment, established in only nine regions: Toulouse, 1996) and FRAR (regional fund for restoration) [2]. In the 1970s, regional agencies for performing arts were created to develop joint policies in the field (IGAC, 2012) and during the 1980s the Ministry of Culture also created regional agencies for books (Pedot, 2003) [3].

In Italy, too, the devolution process at the regional level took place in three waves, along with a constitutional reform in 2001. The three waves of regionalization relate to administrative functions: transferring to regions the management of libraries and some local museums, the duties in terms of regional cultural development, the enhancement of cultural heritage in collaboration with the state (DPR 3/1972, DPR 616/1977, L 59/1997, L 127/1997). The constitutional reform extended the law-making power of regions, including to *enhance* cultural heritage, while *protection* remains under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state (constitutional law 3/2001) [4].

Within this context, regions and the state have developed specific tools to cooperate, mostly in the form of framework planning agreements (FPA: *Accordi di programma quadro*) within the national bargaining programming (*Programmazione Negoziata*). These are forms of joint programming by the state and the regions, defining ad hoc projects, with financial resources and responsibilities for each participant [5]. The actual operationalization of these tools is discretionary: in the cultural field between 1999 and 2011, 35 agreements were signed: 17 cultural heritage projects, 13 contemporary art projects, three heritage and tourism projects and two specific projects (ACT, 2019). On the whole, this is not a great number of projects, and they were spread unevenly across regions (e.g. for the cultural sector, Piedmont signed one FPA and two amendments, Abruzzo three and four, Valle d'Aosta none).

Other cooperation tools include the so-called *enhancement agreements*, envisioned by art 112 of Decree 42/2004. These aim to elaborate strategic plans for cultural development, identifying common strategies and goals for cultural heritage enhancement between the

ministry and the region. This option has not been widely used either: 44 agreements in 2005–2011, mostly with regard to single sites and not specific areas as originally intended (Guarini, 2012).

## 5. Analyzing practices of deconcentration and devolution at the regional level

In this section, we analyze how processes of decentralization are enacted in the regions of Rhone-Alpes (France) and Piedmont (Italy) [6]. The aim is to investigate how the interplay between deconcentration and devolution – investigated through the relations activated between the regional branches of the state and the regions – affected the development of a policy and management capacity in the cultural field at the regional level.

### 5.1 The French case: Rhone-Alpes region

Deconcentration in Rhone-Alpes started few years before other French regions. Indeed, DRAC Rhone-Alpes – the regional branch of the French Ministry of culture – was created in 1969 as one of the first experimental regional directorates before the 1977 founding decree (Ministry of Culture 23.05.1969). Its aim is to provide a variety of services to local authorities and professionals, from funding opportunities to technical support in the whole cultural sector. Throughout the years, it developed a wide range of funding instruments for artists, professionals, companies, facilities and single projects for different purposes, such as training, purchase, restoration, distribution and production (see for instance DRAC Rhone-Alpes Annual Report 2012). From 2004 to 2012 (with funds stable between €73.3 and €75.5 million), DRAC mainly funded cultural heritage (21% in 2004, 23.5% in 2012) and creativity projects (54.6 % in 2004, 57.6% in 2012), while cross-cutting activities such knowledge transmission and democratization of culture decreased in the period (27% in 2004, 19% in 2012: DRAC Rhone-Alpes budgets 2004–2012) [7]. As such, DRAC Rhone-Alpes was regarded as an effective and reliable actor in the cultural field, having developed important skills and achieved significant results.

Until the end of the 90s and mid-2000s, the State was the guarantor of cultural policies. The State knew what to do and had the means to implement it. Local administrations just provided for part of the funds to realize those policies, which were established and ensured by the State and its regional branches (interview, Chardonnier, 2015).

As regards devolution, in 2004 Rhone-Alpes region took responsibility for the Cultural Heritage Inventory, which previously belonged to the DRAC. As a result, the quality of the service increased, the technological level was improved (Bengio, 2015), while the inventory activity was extended to new areas, e.g. industrial heritage (Interview, Chardonnier, 2015).

The inventory was welcomed by the region. They wanted to show that the region is good in managing the cultural field (interview, Guillemont, 2015).

The staff are quite satisfied, because they got resources, and nobody questions the specific professional approach to problems. We [the region] are satisfied because we have now an excellent tool for professional research, that we can use in our intervention in cultural heritage, and in territorial development (interview, Bengio, 2015).

This success was not by chance but is the result of the clear role of DRAC Rhone-Alpes in the accompanying activity and intense cooperation between the two bodies. On the one hand, as in other regions, Rhone-Alpes region was given precise indications of specific implementation issues by the state, including the “number of agents” to be transferred from DRAC to the regions and the “operating costs, in addition to the staff ones” (Decree, 2007). The transfer included human resources (16 staff) and financial resources related to the inventory that were

added to the regional budget (interview, Chardonnier, 2015). The inventory budget increased from **€130,000** in 2006 to **€300,000** in 2010 (internal data provided by the region).

On the other hand, cooperation between DRAC and the region is seen as positive and effective in Rhone-Alpes, as also emerges from our interviews:

At Rhone-Alpes there is good cooperation...our staff are daily in contact with their peers from the state. Positive and constructive relations with DRAC, discussing respective positions on individual dossiers, sharing our expertise (interview, Chardonnier, 2015).

The basic idea is partnership. Today there is a strong link between DRAC and Rhône-Alpes region ... in general State/Region relations are rather good and productive ... we get easily and often to converging views about cultural policies (interview, Guillemont, 2015).

This positive cooperation has been built thanks to the many collaborative tools and projects developed between the two bodies throughout the years. Rhone-Alpes region started in fact developing its cultural policy in the 1980s, just when it got involved in an intense cooperation with DRAC Rhone-Alpes. Already in 1982, a cultural development convention was established, wherein the state-region *contract-based activity* started to identify shared cultural policy goals (Pongy and Saez, 1994). Thanks to the following state/region agreements (CPERs of 1984–88, 1989–93, 1994–98, 2000–2006, and 2007–2013), the two actors established cooperation for the governance and financing of major projects and structures (e.g. network between some *Ecoles d'Art* and *Ecoles d'Architecture* in 2000–2006; enhancement of the *Grotte de Chauvet* in 2007–2013). Another interesting case of cooperation is that of NACRe, the regional agency for performing arts created in 2007 [8]: in some of the projects carried out by NACRe, Rhone-Alpes region is partner or initiator, while DRAC relies on NACRe's knowledge in some technical commissions, allowing the sharing of skills and knowledge. Throughout the years, this intense cooperation allowed the region to benefit and learn from the skills DRAC already had in the governance of the overall cultural sector.

In addition to the intense cooperation with DRAC Rhone-Alpes, the region also engaged external cultural professionals, further developing internal expertise in policy making. This is clear, for instance, in the process of formulation of the new performing arts policy (2005), which was based on a consultation and a collaborative activity with performing arts professionals (named *Rencontres du spectacle vivant*), in partnership with the OPC–National Observatory of Cultural Policies [9]. In operationalizing the policy, the region decided to rely not only on the dedicated regional agency NACRe but also to strengthen its internal administration (*Direction de la Culture*): from 2004 to 2010 the region's staff rose by 12 units, while its budget increased by 28.8% (internal data provided by the region).

In short, as a result of this multi-faceted process of collaboration (both with DRAC Rhone-Alpes and with cultural professionals), the region's internal staff increased in expertise and it developed its own policy and management capacity, becoming an effective cultural policy maker. This is clearly reflected in our interviews:

Until recently we did not have any skilled staff; now we got an internal expertise (interview, Bengio, 2015).

What characterizes Rhone-Alpes region is the systematic construction of its cultural policy. For sure, it is not the region that spent most. But it organized its policy, made it accessible, involving actors and institutions in a shared discussion for the development of cultural policy (interview, Saez, 2015).

## 5.2 The Italian case: the Piedmont region

The intervention of the Piedmont region in the cultural sector dates back to the 1970s, right after the creation of the regions (Dal Pozzolo and Benente, 2006). At that time, the regional branch of the Ministry was not established, and the Piedmont region cooperated with

individual superintendences. The relationship was bi-directional but limited: the region provided financial support to major projects of heritage rehabilitation (e.g. the restoration of the Venaria Royal Palace), while various superintendences performed control-authorization responsibilities for each intervention related to cultural heritage within the region.

The late 1990s was a turning point, and decentralization processes were enacted at various levels. As regards deconcentration, the regional branch of the Ministry of Culture was established (DPR 441/2000) – later named the Piedmont Regional Secretariat (DPCM 171/2014). It was in charge of coordinating all peripheral institutions of the Ministry in the region (eight state Archives, one national library, four superintendences, two museum hubs and many heritage sites), and the interaction with regional and local bodies. From then on, the region began to collaborate with the Regional Secretariat on some major projects: the cataloguing of regional cultural heritage (Agreement 31.12.2005); the Savoy Royal Family Museum project, developed between 2005 and 2014 (Turetta, 2014).

As regards devolution, despite the devolving of legislative power, a situation of ambiguity emerged after the 2001 constitutional reform, with lack of precise guidelines from the state. In this context the Piedmont region decided not to implement its “concurrent power” and did not promulgate a law on the enhancement of cultural heritage. Rather it focused on supporting the development of cultural enhancement projects through the so called integrated enhancement plans (*Piani di valorizzazione integrata*). These plans aimed to “improve cultural heritage in holistic perspective with other territorial resources ... adopting participatory processes ... based on synergies among local authorities, associations and communities” (DGR 19–1328/2010). The region supported these initiatives through the following activities: accompanying actions to strengthen the plans; promotion and communication actions related to the plan; training activities for volunteers and in relation to the opening of heritage sites; and knowledge dissemination [10]. During 2009–2011, the Piedmont region implemented 32 plans by allocating €525,000 in 2010 and €586,500 in 2011, in co-funding with other actors, banking foundations, private enterprises and local authorities for a total amount of €750,000 in 2010 and €1,026,570 in 2011 (internal data provided by the region).

Through such plans, the region mostly provided professional skills and financial resources in addition to training and awareness-raising activities for public and private actors already cooperating in the field. In doing so, it relied mostly upon external expertise (a private foundation and the Piedmont Cultural Observatory) [11] and not on Ministerial bodies. The same aspect can be found in the process of defining the regional museum’s quality standards (DM 10.05.2001), wherein the Piedmont region relied on a collaboration with external partners such as the polytechnic school, a private foundation and museum professionals (DGR 24–3,914/2012). In the overall process, the role of the Ministry was quite weak, not bringing in any specific capacity, nor playing a leading role in the whole discussion on museum standards (interview, Carli, 2015); interestingly enough, only three members out of 52 belonging to five working commissions for the elaboration of the standards were officers of the superintendences.

Starting from the early 2000s, the Piedmont region and the state also began to collaborate broadly on culture issues within the national bargaining programming by signing an Institutional Agreement in 2000, and a Comprehensive Planning Agreement in 2001 [12]. The former was addressed to improve the cultural supply for tourism and was articulated in four main objectives concerning cultural and museum systems, libraries and archives, national school of cinema and religious heritage. Fifty-two detailed actions were identified, for a total of 605.5 billion lire (€312.7 million), provided by the state (226), the region (205) and private actors, mainly banking foundations (130).

As regards the agreements for Cultural Heritage Enhancement as defined by art. 112, a few projects have been signed by the Piedmont region and the Ministry since 2004 (e.g. the

preparation of the management plan for the Royal Residences, just listed as a UNESCO site; the promotion of the consortium “La Venaria Reale”). Yet, in Piedmont too, the cooperation regarded mostly one individual site, rather than the overall regional cultural development. The exception was a project regarding the enhancement of the network of the Royal House of Savoy, involving many sites, with the aim of regulating the management and coordination of the network with a joint management and financial plan. More generally, as our interviewees underscore, the role of the Regional Secretariat has been limited to coordination:

It is a good cooperation, though we [the region] perceive the Regional Secretariat as somehow redundant; we have direct relationships with the individual superintendence (interview, Carli, 2015).

[In Piedmont] the regional branch of the Ministry acted mainly in connecting and sharing projects (interview, Papa, 2015).

In short, in Piedmont we observe a positive development of policy and management capacities, emerging as one of the best-performing actors in the national context:

There was an effort to review cultural policies, more than in other Italian regions ... exploiting an important capital of ideas, projects (interview, Papa, 2015).

Yet, in the words of some of the actors, only a partial exploitation of the potential of the process actually took place:

It seems that over years as [Regional] Cultural Directorate, we forgot our programming role in favor of a grant-making one ... As tool for action, we intervened on individual funding, on specific projects, on specific needs of museums, but never in terms of general programming (interview, Carli, 2015).

The region has not been able to invent a new role ... was unable to provide goals and strategies (interview, Formento, 2015).

This is due to the narrow approach developed through the cooperation tools, mainly used in reference to individual sites; the discretion of the process, based on the regional initiative; and above all, the weak role of the Ministerial regional branch, which did not have previous role and policy capacity in many aspects of the cultural field.

## 6. Discussion

Although dealing with a similar phenomenon (and we will come back on this aspect), decentralization processes in the two countries vary considerably at both the national and the (regional) case study level (see [Tables 3 and 4](#) respectively).

At the country level, in France, decentralization in the cultural sector is the result of an important deconcentration process toward the regional level, with the key role of DRACs, and a limited devolution of powers to regions (not including legislative power). Devolution in this field rests on an accompanying process undertaken by the regional branches of the Ministry with the aim of developing regional capabilities in the overall cultural sector, also thanks to the transfer of knowledge and resources (people and money). Such elements are consistent

Devolution	Strong Weak	Deconcentration		Table 3. Deconcentration and devolution in France and Italy: the country level
		Strong France	Weak Italy	

Table 4.  
Deconcentration and  
devolution: the case  
study regional level

Deconcentration	Policy capacity and autonomy of the peripheral branches of the Ministry	Authorization capacity and fragmentation and of the peripheral branches of the Ministry
Devolution	(1) Transfer of responsibility, of knowledge, and financial and human resources (2) Cooperation for the overall regional cultural development	(1) Transfer of responsibility but not of the related knowledge and resources (2) Cooperation limited to individual projects, mainly for authorization or funding
Effects on capacity building	Capacity-building of the region is ensured by a structured accompanying process of the Ministry mostly through the DRAC	Capacities of the region in the cultural sector are mostly built through a discretionary self-made approach of the region relying on external actors (universities, foundations, professionals). No role of the Regional Direction in capacity building

with a high administrative capacity of *grands corps* at a general level, and a stronger tradition of policy and management capacity of the State in the cultural field.

In Italy, decentralization in the cultural sector was based on weak deconcentration – they were unable to solve the institutional fragmentation of peripheral branches of the Ministry, they had authorization responsibilities, and their scope in the cultural field was limited to cultural heritage – and on a strong devolution process, including the transfer of legislative powers to regions. In this case, the state did not provide adequate conditions for the development of policy capabilities at the regional level. Supporting activities led by the peripheral branches of the Ministry were missing, and regions were left to work on their own initiatives. In this case, too, administrative traditions matter: for example, in Italy, a juridical approach is one of the crucial factors affecting devolution processes (Cassese, 1999; Capano, 2003; Ongaro, 2006), and there is a lack of an administrative elite (Cassese, 1999; Bonini Baraldi, 2014) in general. This is coupled with the specific tradition of protection in the cultural sector (Settis, 2002; Zan *et al.*, 2007) and a weak policy capacity of the State in the governance of culture. In this sense, a higher devolution and a relatively lower deconcentration compared with France respond to the need to develop institutional capacities that were not previously performed by the state itself.

This view is corroborated by the analysis at the case study (regional) level. Both Rhone-Alpes and Piedmont experienced important achievements in policy making and managerial capacities. However, the development of these institutional capabilities relied on different processes.

In Rhone-Alpes, the deconcentration process has influenced the degree of support and learning provided by the state to the region in the devolution process, positively affecting the development of policy and management capacities in the field. Starting from the 1980s, the Rhone-Alpes region relied on cooperation practices with the DRAC at different levels, such as policies, projects, funds and structures, and knowledge transfer. Interestingly enough in comparative terms, this also took place in the heritage field. The devolution process relating to the inventory of cultural heritage, for instance, relied on a planned, deliberate and effective implementation strategy that included the definition of a national methodology, the transfer of the function from the DRAC to the region, together with the transfer of funds, human resources and knowledge. It allowed the decentralization of an administrative function while maintaining centralized control [13]. Thanks to shared responsibility, the interdependence

between the two actors, knowledge acquired during the cooperation phase, and the transfer of resources, the region could build its capabilities to intervene in the cultural sector.

As regards Piedmont, in parallel with a deconcentration process creating the regional branch of the Ministry of Culture, a devolution process transferred law-making responsibilities to the region. However, Piedmont needed to develop policy and management capacity on its own: there were not specific capacities to transfer beyond protection, and even in the management of national museums, managerial practices were largely outdated (Zan, 2006; Ferri and Zan, 2014; Bracchitta and Monti, 2019). Until the 2000s, in fact, the region could only interact with individual superintendences, and only in 1997 was a (weak) deconcentration put into place, with the creation of a Regional Secretariat. The cooperation with the newly established regional branch of the Ministry after 2000 was positive, although discretionary and not systematic. It was mainly focused on individual projects that had quite distinct roles: the state had authorization functions, and the region provided funding. Conditions for building (or transferring) knowledge were not present.

## 7. Concluding remarks

Our analysis corroborates the relevance of deconcentration and devolution as particular forms under which the more general phenomenon of decentralization could take place (in line with Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Wollmann, 2007; Utomo, 2009; Cole, 2012). Without the two notions, it would be hard to unravel the changes that have happened in the last decades in the cultural sector in France and Italy: two countries historically characterized by strong centralization, and where decentralization processes have been at the core of recent public management reforms (Kickert, 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). While deconcentration remains an under-investigated topic, this article contributes to its analysis by examining how it interrelates with devolution in two apparently similar contexts, characterized by a central state directly intervening in the cultural sector.

In our research, the analysis of decentralization as the interrelation between deconcentration and devolution turns out to be relevant for at least four reasons. First, it allows us to take into account issues involving both the central state (deconcentration) and the regional administration (devolution). Specifically, we showed how under the same “umbrella” of decentralization very different phenomena may actually take place, including a transfer of responsibility among different levels of the national government (with more or less autonomy), and the transfer of authority to sub-national bodies run by elected representatives.

Second, decentralization relies on a different combination of these processes in different systems, for instance strong devolution and weak deconcentration or vice versa (i.e. strong deconcentration and weak devolution in France, as opposed to a low deconcentration and a strong devolution in Italy). Addressing the specific combination of the two allows us to better understand individual patterns in the overall decentralization process and possible underlying contextual explanations (for example, a narrower focus on heritage in Italy versus a broader focus on cultural fields in many sectors in France, with a predominant preservation/stewardship role in Italy versus a tradition of cultural policy making in France).

Third, the two processes mutually affect their effectiveness: deconcentration and devolution, although different, are strictly interrelated and the effectiveness of the former depends on the effectiveness of the latter and vice versa. In France, an effective deconcentration – resulting in the creation of strong and skilled ministerial branches – has also supported the building of policy and management capacity within the region, developed through intense cooperation with the DRACs. In the Italian case, devolution was seriously affected by the weak role of the Ministry at the regional level (both with the superintendence and the Regional Secretariats). As such, the region could not rely on



cooperation with the regional branches of the ministry to develop its policy and management capacity, which possibly affected the effectiveness of the devolution process.

Fourth, the analysis of deconcentration and devolution highlights that their effectiveness is deeply linked to the previous policy and management capacity of the central state in a specific field/country. In France, the accompanying activity of the DRACs to the regions in the development of their own capacities is made possible by a strong tradition of State policy-making in the cultural field. Indeed, DRACs were already detaining important skills and abilities to be transferred to regions. In Italy, the overall policy making capacity of the state in the cultural field was mostly limited to an authoritative function and aimed at ensuring heritage preservation, thus lacking an overall competence to be (eventually) transferred.

At the national level, there is a limitation in our research that needs to be underlined: the necessarily limited selection of our regional case studies does not allow us to grasp regional variances that might emerge. Our hypothesis is that in France, the decentralization process served as a progressive institutional learning for regions (Pinson and Le Galès, 2005; Cole, 2006) in the cultural field, ensuring a general homogeneity in the policy and management capacity of regions (Negrier and Teillet, 2011). In Italy, on the contrary, decentralization led to a variety of solutions at the regional level (relying mainly on individual agreements between the Ministry of Culture and the interested actors (Cammelli, 2004), which might result in an inconsistent process at the national level as a whole, widening the “cultural gap” between regional territories (Putnam, 1993). From this point of view, the analysis would probably question to some extent the very idea of dealing with a similar phenomenon, despite the initial option adopted in terms of “most similar systems design” (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Indeed, our analysis of decentralization in terms of deconcentration and devolution processes reveals another important difference between France and Italy: there is a homogenous process for all regions in France, involving the cultural sector as a whole, driven by a dominating view of social and political disciplines; and in Italy there is an uneven set of individual regional experiences, mainly with regard to the cultural heritage field, driven by the hegemonic view of the legal perspective [14].

As a more general consideration, we could speculate on how the approach underlying this article could be extended elsewhere, at least in terms of a research agenda. In our research – following the literature in the two countries – we examine the cultural sector as a whole; however, breaking down different components of the sector could highlight different situations, patterns and results (for instance, performing arts vs cultural heritage, or opera houses: Zan *et al.*, 2009). Another line of research could involve applying this approach to other sectors, comparing within a single country or between two countries: e.g. healthcare and education (for instance, healthcare could provide an example for Italy in which devolution has been more radical than in the cultural sector). A further extension could consist in applying this framework to countries other than France and Italy, maybe also taking into account opposite processes of recentralization that have been addressed in recent literature on NPM (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Kuhlmann, 2010).

While similar applications are likely to call for a change from a two-by-two matrix to a bi-dimensional graphic of continuum variables, there is a more intriguing issue involved in such an extension of the comparative approach: the question of time and path dependency. The difficulty in comparing decentralization processes and their forms – possibly including deconcentration and devolution options – largely depends on the specific timing of underlying processes in different contexts. For instance, in China, unlike France and Italy, devolution is not an issue in the cultural sector, and one is unlikely to find any reference to it in current debates: this is exactly because heritage entities have been devolved during the process of fiscal and administrative transformation since 1978 (World Bank, 2005; Zan *et al.*, 2018) [15]. Perhaps, because we are dealing with processes, we should use verbs rather than



nouns (deconcentration and devolution): in their in-progress, present continuous form (deconcentrating and devolving), or in their historical simple past form (deconcentrated and devolved).

## Notes

- 1 The superintendence system is an old institution: it was already established in 1907 under the Ministry of Education, and this network was then transferred to the newly established Ministry of Culture in 1975.
- 2 FRAC and FRAM were founded in 1982, FRAR in 2000, FRAB in the 1990s. In 2010 FRACs funded in total 488 exhibitions and the purchasing of 758 artworks for a total of €24 million of which €22.2 million was public finding (37% by the Ministry and 53% by regions) ([Ministry of Culture, 2013](#)).
- 3 Regional funding for the agencies increased, while state funding decreased over time, as an evolution of the decentralization process. In 2010, the 20 regional agencies for performing arts received €24.2 million from the regions and €6.1 million from the state (IGAC, 2012).
- 4 A further issue of local meanings emerges here, where the term “valorizzazione” is central to the Italian reform, and is often used in many Latin countries (“mise en valeur” in French, “puesta en valor” in Spanish) and in the UNESCO language, while the English translation “valorization” is totally meaningless.
- 5 Just to give an idea, one of the pioneering FPA in the cultural sector was that of Lombardy, signed in 1999 to implement 16 detailed actions in the field of cultural heritage restoration and enhancement, libraries and performing arts infrastructure and a State–Region integrated information system. It involved a variety of actors like universities, banking foundations and enterprises, for a total investment of 170 billion lire until 2002.
- 6 In this article, we consider Rhone-Alpes region before its merger with Auvergne Region in 2015.
- 7 This could be related to the emerging role of regions in the governance of culture, DRAC thus refocusing more specifically on artistic and cultural domains.
- 8 The agency was founded in 2007 in Lyon from the merger of two regional cultural agencies to support the definition and implementation of regional cultural policy for performing arts, providing advising, monitoring, training and networking for performing arts professionals and local bodies. It is regulated by a three-year agreement between the region and the state, which are its main funders.
- 9 The consultation process has been repeated in the following years for other sectors: in 2006 for contemporary art, in 2007 for publishing, in 2008 for cultural heritage and starting from 2009 to 2010, with an integrated approach concerning digital culture, culture and university and popular education (interview, Chardonnier, 2015).
- 10 For instance, an Integrated Enhancement Plan was launched in 2002 in Val di Susa by local cultural associations, aiming at improving access to cultural heritage. Several partners were involved in the end: 36 municipalities, two natural parks, 19 cultural associations and 34 entities in tourism and eno-gastronomy. Major outcomes include the networking of 39 sites (three parks, 23 architectural sites and 13 museums), the realization of six touristic routes and the introduction of a Val di Susa Card (Bovone and Mela, 2011).
- 11 The Piedmont Cultural Observatory was created at the end of the 1990s (DGR 38–23404/1997) through a memorandum of understanding with a variety of public and private bodies; interestingly enough, it does not include the peripheral branches of the Ministry.
- 12 See: Intesa Istituzionale di Programma 23.02.2000; APQ 18.05.2001.
- 13 The balance between professional control and the centralization/decentralization of administrative responsibility is in fact a crucial trade-off in devolution reforms in the cultural heritage sector ([Zan et al., 2007](#)).
- 14 Indeed, we were forced to quote an endless series of laws, decrees, regulations, which is probably unusual for this journal.

- 15 Curiously, the meaning of “national museum” can differ radically in different countries and over time: it is a museum of national importance, which can be run in a variety of forms, including not profit or NGO forms in the UK; it is a museum that because of its national relevance is run by the Ministry in Italy; it is a museum of national importance which is run by the local administration defined by its location in China (the town, the municipality).

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Table A1.  
Deconcentration and  
devolution in France  
and Italy, cultural  
sector: reconstruction  
of the national context

France			Italy		
	Phenomenon	Source	Phenomenon		Source
Deconcentration	Establishment of DRACs They represent the Ministry of Culture at the regional level DRAC reforms enumerating its numerous functions in the entire cultural sector In 2010 DRAC absorbed the SDAP - the departmental services for CH and architecture	Decree 115/1977			
		Decree 538/1986, Decree 1430/2004 and Decree 633/2010	(1) Establishment of Regional Superintendent, to coordinate existing superintendences (1998) (2) Establishment of Regional Superintendence (2000) (3) Regional Superintendence replaced by Regional directions for CH (2004) (4) 2007 and 2009: Specific reforms enlarged the Regional Directions functions (greater role in the relationship with regional/local authorities) However, the cooperation forms still remain an open issue (5) Reorganization of superintendences (geographical or area jurisdiction) (6) The reform of the Ministry of Culture transformed the Regional Directions into Regional Secretariats; their coordination task is improved Reorganisation of the superintendences (2014)	Decree 368/1998 DPR 441/2000 DM 24.09.2004 DPR 233/2007 and DPR 91/2009 DPCM 171/2014	
(continued)					



	France		Italy	
Devolution	<i>1st wave (1982-2002)</i>		<i>1st regionalisation (1972-1975)</i>	
	Defining local government's responsibilities and functions. Regions had a general competence clause and their intervention in the cultural sector was based on a voluntary basis or by articulating it with their specific competences (economic development, education and transport)	L 213/1982 and L 8/1983 L 125/1992, L 115/1995, L 533/1999, L 276/2002	Administrative functions transferred to regions for libraries, local museums and the function of <i>Soprintendenza beni librari</i> (the Superintendence for book heritage previously belonging to the Ministry). Regions cooperate with the Ministry in the enhancement of CH	DPR 3/1972, L 382/1975
	<i>2nd wave (2003-2010)</i>		<i>2nd regionalisation (1977-1992)</i>	
	France as a "decentralised republic". The constitutional law recognised to regions the competence as regards the organisation and financing of regional museums, the protection and enhancement of regional archives. A law referring to local responsibilities transferred the competence for the CH Inventory to the regions. Reform of the territorial organisation, regions lost their general competence clause	Constitutional reform L 276/2003  L 809/2004 L 1563/2010	Empowering the 1st regionalisation, while transferring regional cultural development. Meanwhile, regions took advantage of the absence of any legislative disposal as regards the enhancement of CH and promulgated laws	DPR 616/1977
	<i>3rd wave (2012-2015)</i>		<i>3rd regionalisation (1997-1998)</i>	
	Laws on the modernisation of public action, the promotion of metropolis, the new territorial organisation of the country: the loss of the general competence clause for the regions is confirmed. Reduction of regions, passing from 22 to 13	L 58/2014, L 991/2015  L 29/2015	Regions are in charge of those activities related to community development. Among the excluded functions, there is the conservation of CH, which still remains at the central level. The management of museums is transferred to regions, provinces and municipalities.	L 59/1997  Decree 112/1998
			<i>Reform of the Italian Constitution (2001)</i> CH protection as an exclusive competence of the State. Regions acquire legislative concurrent competence for the enhancement of cultural heritage. Art 118 affirmed the possibility of forms of coordination between the state and regions in the field of protection	Constitutional reform L 3/2001

#### Deconcentration

- (1) Decree 115/1977: *Décret n°77-115 du 3.02.1977 portant création des DRAC Directions Régionales des Affaires Culturelles*
- (2) Decree 538/1986: *Décret 86-538 du 14.03.1986 relatif aux attributions et à l'organisation des DRAC*
- (3) Decree 1430/2004: *Décret n°2004-1430 du 23.12.2004 relatif aux DRAC et modifiant les attributions des Directions Régionales de l'Environnement*
- (4) Decree 633/2010: *Décret n° 2010-633 du 8.06.2010 relatif à l'organisation et aux missions des DRAC*

#### Devolution

- (1) L 213/1982: *Loi n°82-213 du 2.03.1982 relative aux droits et libertés des communes, des départements et des régions*
- (2) L 8/1983: *Loi n° 83-8 du 7.01.1983 relative à la répartition de compétences entre les communes, les départements, les régions et l'État*
- (3) Decree 21 01 1983: *Décret n°83-32 du 21.01.1983 relatif aux contrats de plan entre l'Etat et les collectivités territoriales ou des personnes morales autres que les entreprises publiques et privées*
- (4) L 125/1992, *Loi n° 92-125 du 6.02.1992 relative à l'administration territoriale de la République, renforçant la décentralisation, la déconcentration et la coopération locale.*
- (5) L 115/1995: *Loi n° 95-115 du 4.02.1995 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire*
- (6) L 533/1999: *Loi n°99-533 du 25.06.1999 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement durable du territoire*
- (7) L 276/2002: *Loi n° 2002-276 du 27.02.2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité*
- (8) Constitutional law 276/2003: *Loi constitutionnelle n°2003-276 du 28.03.2003 relative à l'organisation décentralisée de la République*
- (9) L 809/2004: *Loi n° 2004-809 du 13.08.2004 relative aux libertés et responsabilités locales*
- (10) Decree 20/2007: *Décret n° 2007-20 du 4.01.2007 fixant les modalités du transfert définitif aux régions des services régionaux de l'inventaire général du patrimoine culturel*
- (11) L 1563/2010: *Loi n°2010-1563 du 16.12.2010 de réforme des collectivités territoriales*
- (12) L 58/2014: *Loi n°2014-58 du 27.01.2014 sur la modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles*
- (13) L 29/2015: *Loi n° 2015-29 du 16.01.2015 relative à la délimitation des régions, aux élections régionales et départementales et modifiant le calendrier électoral*
- (14) L 991/2015: *Loi n°2015-99 du 7.08.2015 portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République*

#### Italy

##### Deconcentration

- (1) Decree 368/1998: *Decreto Legislativo 20.10.1998 n. 368 "Istituzione del Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali, a norma dell'articolo 11 della legge 15.03.1997, n. 59"*
- (2) DPR Decree 441/2000: *Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 29.12.2000 n. 441 "Regolamento recante norme di organizzazione del Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali"*
- (3) DM 24 09 2004: *Decreto 24.09.2004 Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali "Articolazione della struttura centrale e periferica dei dipartimenti e delle direzioni generali del Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali"*
- (4) DPR 233/2007: *Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 26.11.2007 n. 233 "Regolamento di riorganizzazione del Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali"*
- (5) DPR 91/2009: *Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 2.07.2009 n. 91 "Regolamento recante modifiche ai decreti presidenziali di riorganizzazione del Ministero e di organizzazione degli Uffici di diretta collaborazione del Ministro per i beni e le attività culturali"*
- (6) DPCM Decree 171/2014: *Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 29.08.2014 n. 171 "Regolamento di organizzazione del Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo, degli uffici della diretta collaborazione del Ministro e dell'Organismo indipendente di valutazione della performance, a norma dell'articolo 16, comma 4, del decreto-legge 24.04.2014, n. 66, convertito, con modificazioni, dalla legge 23.06.2014, n. 89"*

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Table A2.  
List of cited laws,  
decrees, decisions,  
documents and  
interviews

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#### Devolution

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- (2) L 382/1975: *Legge* 22.07.1975 n. 382 "Norme sull'ordinamento regionale e sulla organizzazione della pubblica amministrazione"
- (3) DPR Decree 616/1977: *Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica* 24.07.1977 n. 616 "Attuazione della delega di cui all'art. 1 della legge 22.07.1975, n. 382"
- (4) Law 59/1997: *Legge* 15.03.1997 n. 59 "Delega al Governo per il conferimento di funzioni e compiti alle regioni ed enti locali, per la riforma della Pubblica Amministrazione e per la semplificazione amministrativa"
- (5) Decree 112/1998: *Decreto Legislativo* 31.03.1998 n. 112 "Conferimento di funzioni e compiti amministrativi dello Stato alle regioni ed agli enti locali, in attuazione del capo I della legge 15.03.1997, n. 59"
- (6) Constitutional law 3/2001: *Legge Costituzionale* 18.10.2001 n. 3 "Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione"

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- (4) Ernst and Young (2007), *Étude portant sur l'évaluation des CPER 2000-2006, fiche thématique Culture*, Ernst and Young pour DIACT

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- (1) DGR 38-23404/1997: *Delibera Giunta Regionale* 38-23404 del 9.12.1997 "Protocollo d'Intesa per l'Osservatorio culturale del Piemonte (...)"
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Table A2.

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- (3) *Abraham Bengio*, Deputy Director of Rhone-Alpes region and former director of DRAC Rhone-Alpes (Telephone interview, 23.02.2015)
- (4) *Jean-Pierre Saez*, Director of OPC-National Observatory of Cultural Policies (Grenoble, 19.02.2015)

*Piedmont*

- (1) *Laura Caru*, Officer, Museums and cultural heritage Service, Piedmont region (Turin, 09.02.2015)
  - (2) *Domenico Papa*, Coordinator, Enhancement and communication Service, Regional Secretary of Piedmont, Ministry of cultural heritage and activities and tourism (Turin, 10.02.2015)
  - (3) *Daniela Formento*, former Director of Culture, Piedmont region (Turin, 09.02.2015)
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Table A2.