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This is the final peer-reviewed author's accepted manuscript (postprint) of the following publication:

Published Version:

Raggi, M., Viaggi, D., Bartolini, F., Furlan, A. (2015). The role of policy priorities and targeting in the spatial location of participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes in Emilia-Romagna (Italy). *LAND USE POLICY*, 47, 78-89 [10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.03.005].

Availability:

This version is available at: <https://hdl.handle.net/11585/521863> since: 2022-02-21

Published:

DOI: <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.03.005>

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<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.03.005>

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The role of policy priorities and targeting in the spatial location of participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes in Emilia-Romagna (Italy)

The objective of the paper is to understand the determinants of the spatial location of participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes and, in particular, to understand the interplay between structural determinants, priority criteria and spillover effects in guiding participation. As a first step, the paper seeks to conceptualise the issue based on the existing literature. Thereafter, an econometric model is used to provide an empirical application on data regarding participation in measure 214 of the Rural Development Programme 2007-2013 in an Italian region (Emilia-Romagna). The results show that both priority scores and the spatial dimension are significant in affecting participation.

Keywords: Agri-Environmental Schemes, participation, targeting, priority implementation, spatial lag fractional logit model

JEL: Q18; Q28

1. Background and objectives

Determinants of participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) have been analysed from several angles, mainly by applying econometric models, using cross sectional data or panel data, usually collected at the farm level. The results of early papers on this issue highlight that profitability, risk reductions, and attitudes toward sustainable methods of production, are determinants of adoption. The literature has also pointed out the positive effects of motivations and incentives in promoting AES (Morris and Potter, 1995). Several papers have provided further evidence in recent decades and various papers also provide extensive reviews of the determinants of participation (e.g. Defrancesco et al., 2008; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). The determinants have been organised in different ways depending on the scientific approach of the researchers. It can be recognised, however, that the macro areas of interest can be ascribed to the socio-economic characteristics of the farmer and his/her household (e.g. age, composition, presence or lack of a successor), the attitudes and beliefs of the farmers (e.g. opinions about the environment), farming conditions (e.g. site conditions, yield expectation due to geophysical and climatic settings, designation status), structural characteristics of the farm (e.g. size, specialisation, stocking density, financial constraints) and context variables (e.g. information received, neighbours' participation, market opportunities) (Vanslebrouck et al., 2002; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Jongeneel et al., 2008; Peerlings and Polman, 2009; Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2010; Wauters et al., 2010; Aumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). Studies based on secondary information tend to put less emphasis on individual variables and more on the structural or environmental characteristics of each farm/area, which is largely driven by information availability (Borsotto et al., 2008; Hynes and Garvey, 2009; Capitano et al., 2011; Lapple and Kelley, 2013). For example, the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) information tends to record only if the farm is funded and the relevant Rural Development Program (RDP) axis, without providing specific information about the measure or sub-measure (Pascucci et al., 2013). In addition, FADN offers a meaningful aggregation only at the NUTS 2 level and is biased towards professional farms,

42 available for bookkeeping, at least compared to Integrated Administration and Control System
43 (IACS) data.

44 The literature also highlights the limitations and inconsistencies of the variables used to explain
45 participation, emphasising how different data collection approaches affect the results and, in
46 particular, the inconsistent use of environmental awareness and farmers' attitudes across studies
47 (Aumgart-Getz et al., 2012). Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) even conclude that there are very few,
48 if any, variables that consistently explain adoption of conservation practices.

49 In spite of this, over time, determinants have been increasingly investigated, including by enlarging
50 the scope of attention. The recent literature recognises that participation in AES is affected by
51 agglomeration effects due to the spatial dependence of explanatory variables, as in Schimidtner et
52 al. (2012). The authors pointed out that, for the case of organic farming in Germany, vectors of
53 prices and costs are heterogeneously spatially distributed due to spatial differences in distance to
54 markets or the positive values of transportation costs. Furthermore, the authors argue that
55 production functions and transaction costs required to participate in AES are heterogeneously
56 distributed across the space due to different natural conditions, which implies changes in input-
57 output relations, and heterogeneity in the quality of institutions and social capital elements. In
58 addition, a growing body of literature on spatial phenomena points to the relevance of proper spill
59 over effects due to, for example, imitation or economic signals outside the involved farms (e.g.
60 through effects on prices) (Anselin 2010; Bell and Dalton, 2007; Brady and Irwin, 2011).

61 The above-mentioned literature, largely based on *ex-post* studies on participation, only marginally
62 addresses policy design variables, targeting and participant selection processes. This may be
63 justified by the fact that the case studies from which the participation data were obtained involved
64 little targeting or poor selection priorities. Furthermore, when selection criteria are in place, the
65 existing budget may or not be sufficient to allow for participation from all of the applicants.
66 Regardless, farmers' decisions may be influenced by their expectations of the priority mechanisms.
67 When the analysis is performed with secondary data (e.g. FADN), taking into account the
68 participant selection process may be even more difficult, due to the fact that information about the
69 full process (i.e. if the farmer applied and was not accepted or did not apply) is rarely available for
70 researchers.

71 Policy design is more directly dealt with in the literature addressing farmer preferences for different
72 contract alternatives based on hypothetical questions (e.g. Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Christensen et
73 al., 2011; Broch et al., 2013). However, given the particular focus of this type of study on individual
74 behaviour, the authors deal more with "hard" variables of direct interest to the farmer (such as
75 payment levels, contract length, transaction costs etc.), rather than variables that matter mainly on
76 the aggregate, such as those related to how the policy includes targeting and selection mechanisms
77 for farmers.

78 On the other hand, the literature on AES design points out the relevance of targeting as a key issue
79 (and a major gap) for the improvement of AES effectiveness and efficiency (Coisson et al., 2014).
80 In particular, the literature contrasts spatial targeting, aimed at promoting the concentration of AES
81 in selected areas, and group targeting, more related to other farmer characteristics (Uthes et al.,
82 2010). The former may be based on the combination of different policy components (e.g. zoning,
83 eligibility criteria, scoring systems, differentiated payments) and is a cornerstone of environment-
84 related measures as it allows, in principle, to concentrate measures in areas where the added value

85 of environmental improvement is higher; at the same time, a more focused targeting approach could
86 lead to higher administration/transaction costs and result in the perception of an unequal distribution
87 of funding (Vatn, 2010).

88 Targeting, eligibility and selection criteria can interact: Bartolini et al. (2013) found that selection
89 criteria and priority mechanisms increase the spatial targeting of agri-environmental measures.
90 However, the authors found that sub-measures react heterogeneously to economic incentives due to
91 the relevance of motivation and social capital in explaining spatial concentration (e.g. organic
92 farming). Moreover, given their relationship with space, these mechanisms can interact with the
93 occurrence of the spillover effects highlighted above. For example, on the one hand one could
94 expect that targeting may stimulate concentration above that justified by spontaneous decisions. Yet
95 eligibility constraints may hamper spillovers by hindering willingness to participate. However,
96 these issues are not generally addressed in the empirical literature.

97

98 The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the spatial location of participation
99 in AES and, in particular, to understand the interplay between structural determinants, priority
100 criteria and spillover effects in guiding the spatial distribution of participation in AES.

101 The objective is addressed through the application of spatial econometrics on participation in
102 measure 214 (Agri-Environmental measure) in Emilia-Romagna, Northern Italy, including priority
103 variables to reflect the selection process mechanisms. Emilia-Romagna offers a very interesting
104 case with respect to the objectives of the measure. This region is very heterogeneous in terms of
105 territorial and agricultural conditions and the local administration has put in place a complex system
106 of scoring, based on several criteria, which is aimed at guiding the selection of applications in each
107 area, taking into account the specific environmental context.

108 Spatial econometrics is the chosen methodology due to its ability to account specifically for spatial
109 dependency due to spillover effects that can be traced through the spatial association of
110 participation. Spatial econometrics is largely applied in the regional studies literature and has
111 recently been applied to better understand participation in AES (Schmidtner et al 2012, Yang et al
112 2014). The main originality of this paper, compared with the recent literature, is the use of (*ex-post*)
113 priority setting in the context of spatial econometrics models, allowing for discussions of the
114 interplay between spatial effects, priority targeting and other explanatory variables of participation.
115 It also provides insights into how this interplay concerns different sub-measures (interpretable as
116 different types of measures). In addition, in order to fit these purposes, and in particular to account
117 for the share of participating land as the dependent variable, a fractional logit model is used. Due to
118 the novelty of the approach and the data limitations (see discussion), this is to be considered mainly
119 as an explorative exercise.

120 Section 2 provides a formalization of the problem addressed and the description of the
121 methodology. Section 3 describes the case study area. The results are illustrated in Section 4,
122 followed by a discussion and concluding remarks in Section 5.

123

124 **2. Problem setting and methodology**

125 *A framework for analysing funding priority effects*

126 The connection between participant (self-)selection, targeting and policy design is addressed from
127 different perspectives in the literature. Babcock et al. (1997) analyse the problem of targeting
128 conservation payments and the role of different targeting instruments, comparing situations in
129 which targeting is based either on cost or benefits, with a situation in which targeting is based on an
130 ideal cost-benefit ratio. They consider three practical targeting options: acreage maximisation;
131 enrolling land based only on environmental benefits; and maximising the environmental benefits of
132 the programme. They find that the magnitude of losses depends on the joint distribution of costs and
133 benefits.

134 Compared with this basic analysis, the potential economic benefit of targeting is made more
135 complicated when taking into account: a) different rationales for payment settings, and b) different
136 ways of representing the decision making process followed by farmers. With regard to point a),
137 while in an ideal auction system payments may be more directly related to opportunity costs of
138 alternative land uses (Babcock et al., 1997), in most of the EU the rationale is rather a fixed
139 payment based on average costs. As a result, assuming profit maximisation decisions by farmers,
140 farmers tend to self-select (in presenting the application) based on the difference between
141 compliance costs and the payment offered. In addition, environmental benefits at the individual
142 farm level are usually not explicitly taken into account in designing the measures and setting the
143 payment. Rough approximations of these benefits may be used for farm selection, whereby the
144 regulator can set out a selection mechanism to concentrate payments in those areas where expected
145 environmental benefits are high using eligibility rules or scoring systems. An additional issue is that
146 farmer participation may not necessarily follow a purely economic rationale (point b above). Morris
147 and Potter (1995) have identified four behaviour typologies for participation in AES: active
148 adopters, passive adopters, conditional non-adopters and reluctant adopters. While the third and
149 fourth group are driven by economic incentives, farmers in the first and fourth groups follow mainly
150 motivational reasons (e.g. farmers participated because of their belief).

151 The problem of interpreting participation and priority setting in *ex-post* econometric models can
152 then be illustrated as in Figure 1.

153

154 (Figure 1 about here)

155

156 Figure 1 depicts the distribution of a set of farms by compliance costs and decreasing priority
157 scores. The position on the y-axis, represents the decision of the farm to participate or not based on
158 the positioning with respect to the payment level. We assume that the different factors affecting
159 willingness to participate contribute to decisions through (and are well represented by) the
160 Willingness to Accept (WTA) a payment for participation in AES, equal to the perceived
161 compliance cost. Farms with WTA below the payment level are willing to participate, while those
162 above are not.

163 The public regulator selects farms based on a priority score (x-axis), based on farmer or farm
164 characteristics (e.g. age of applicant, location, farm specialisation). This may be related to the
165 presumed higher relevance with respect to a measure's objectives (e.g. higher likely ability to
166 produce environmental externalities). Priority will then be given to the farms with the highest score
167 among those applying for the payment. Assuming that there are budget limitations, the subset of

168 funded farms will be those farms in area A. Area B includes those applying, but not funded because
169 the budget was used up entirely by farms with higher priority. Area D includes those farms that
170 would not apply, but would compete for the budget based on the priority score if they did. Finally,
171 Area E includes all farms that would not apply, and that would not be funded even if they did, due
172 to the priority mechanism.

173 In addition, the regulator, by setting eligibility rules based on location or farm/farmer characteristics
174 (i.e. altitude or specific zoning based on environmental sensitivity; legal status or farm size), can
175 exclude farms (areas C and F). Of the two sets, Area C represents the one that would have
176 incentives to participate, as their costs would be lower than the payment.

177 The simple framework above involves several considerations.

178 From the point of view of policy design, it is important to understand the interrelationships between
179 the different policy variables in the figure. The payment level clearly affects the individual's
180 interest in participating, whilst the number of selected participants will depend on budget
181 availability. However, the budget constraint will be more or less selective depending on the number
182 of farms willing to participate. Hence, in order to be selective with respect to the priority criterion,
183 and to be effective in selecting farms with high priority, a scheme needs to set the payment high
184 enough to encourage excessive participation. However, in presence of a fixed budget, increasing
185 unit payments also means strengthening the budget constraint (i.e. allowing participation from
186 fewer farms), hence making the selection process more arduous. On the other hand, if the payment
187 is so low that the farms willing to participate are less than that which is allowed by the budget, the
188 priority will not be selective at all. This problem may also be altered by population distribution. For
189 example, for the star type distribution there is no trade off and moving the payment higher or lower
190 will end up selecting the "right" farms. On the contrary, the search for the right combination of
191 payment and priority matters in the case of a "cloud" type distribution.

192 A second group of considerations concerns the connection between the distribution of farms in an
193 area and its connection with potential analytical issues. For example, square dots in Figure 1 are
194 distributed without any particular relationship between WTA and the priority score. On the
195 contrary, stars represent hypothetical farms of a region in which the priority is higher for farms that
196 also have lower WTA. It may be expected that, in this case, priorities will push participation in the
197 same direction as was the case with WTA and that the policy variable "priority" would be highly
198 correlated to other factors affecting participation. The opposite happens if hypothetical farms in a
199 region are represented by circles. In this case it may be expected that the policy variable "priority"
200 acts as a more relevant independent variable in affecting participation.

201 From the point of view of spatial econometrics applications, it is worth noting, first and foremost,
202 that econometric studies may in fact use different samples with respect to this framework. Studies
203 based on WTA usually consider the full set of farmers. Studies using information by applicants, on
204 the other hand, observe only components A+B of the population (except when motivations other
205 than profit affect participation). When only actual participants (approved applications, i.e.
206 beneficiaries) are used, we consider only section A of the quadrant (with the same caveat as above).
207 This means that, in the latter case, investigating the effect of priority setting is impossible, as in
208 order to do so, it would be necessary to have information about the whole population characteristics
209 and the ultimately funded farms.

210

211 *Methodology*

212 In this paper, spatial econometric methods are used to explain participation at the municipality level
213 (1 municipality = 1 observation), which is a way of approximating the full set of potential
214 participants (i.e. all components in Figure 1). By comparing with existing models, the aggregation
215 of data at the municipality level and the spatial econometric methods make it possible to investigate
216 extents and reasons for the agglomeration effects of participation in AEM. As mentioned above,
217 agglomeration effects could be explained by design and implementation of selection mechanisms or
218 spillover effects. Thus, ignoring the prioritisation mechanisms set out by public administrations can
219 result in an overestimation of spatial spillovers caused, for example, by (unobserved) imitation
220 processes, differences in the quality of extension services among observations or economic
221 connections among neighbouring areas.

222 The methodology is composed of two steps. In the first step, the Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis
223 (ESDA) is performed in order to investigate the spatial regime of the distribution of uptake of
224 measure 214. It consists first of mapping the spatial distribution of measures, followed by the
225 compilation of a LISA cluster map, a Moran's scatter plot and the computation of a Moran's I index
226 to identify spatial associations, using GEODA software (Anselin et al., 2006).

227 In the second step, spatial econometric models are applied with the aim of investigating
228 determinants of spatial distribution of uptake, focusing on both individual municipality
229 characteristics and the priority mechanisms implemented.

230 Spatial econometric models can be thought of as an extension of standard linear regression models
231 (Lesage and Page, 2009). In this paper spatial lag models are performed. This is motivated by the
232 fact that a preliminary analysis already showed relevant spatial correlation and because the
233 candidate explanations for spatial correlation (after controlling for other similarities in the
234 municipalities, such as altitude) were likely due to well identified factors, such as communication,
235 imitation and interactions (though we do not have explicit variables accounting for them).
236 Following Anselin (1988) the reduced form of the spatial lag model could be written as :

$$237 \quad y = \rho W y + x \beta + \varepsilon$$

238 where W is the spatial weights matrix that specifies for each municipality the first order of
239 contiguity with neighbours, then $W y$ represents the spatial lag for the dependent variable, i.e. the
240 weighted average of the neighbours (or a spatial smoother). β and ρ are the parameters to be
241 estimated; the first is the vector of coefficients for explanatory variables and the second reflects the
242 spatial dependence in the sample data, measuring the average influence of neighbouring
243 municipalities on observations in vector y .

244 The econometric models have been applied both to the participation in the whole measure 214 and
245 to selected individual sub-measures (organic farming, integrated production and meadows and
246 grazing payments). The dependent variable is the rate of participating areas in each municipality
247 (hectares under the measure divided by the total UAA hectares of each municipality, which is also
248 the eligible area for the measure/sub-measure in question).

249 The choice of the model applied needs to consider the fact that the dependent variable is calculated
250 as a proportion (Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003; Long, 1997; Papke and Wooldridge, 1996;

251 Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004). The use of a linear model and an Ordinary Least Square method
252 (OLS) presents some methodological problems as it violates the assumptions of the regression
253 model (even if in some applications the sample sizes were large enough to invoke asymptotic
254 arguments to reason out less stringent characterisations of the regression models). First, proportions
255 are not normally distributed because they are not defined over the full set of real numbers, since this
256 variable is only observed over a closed interval. This implies that the conditional expectation
257 function must be nonlinear and that the conditional variance is a function of the mean. Moreover,
258 the linear model is not appropriate since it does not guarantee that the predicted values of the
259 dependent variable are restricted to the unit interval. The linear approach could be justified when all
260 of the proportioned data fall in the middle (roughly between 0.2 and 0.8) because the effect of
261 explanatory variables tends to be non-linear, yet the sigmoidal relationship looks like a flattened S,
262 that is “almost” linear in the middle. Our data do not allow for this approach since they do not show
263 any linearity and due to a high concentration of zero values.

264 An alternative to the linear approach, used in the literature, is to first calculate the logit
265 transformation of y and then use the linear regression on the transformed dependent variable.
266 Obviously, this is possible only if the proportions are strictly in the open interval (0,1). On the
267 contrary, our data include several observations for which the participation proportion is equal to 0.

268 A third approach is to treat the proportion as a censored continuous variable in the closed interval
269 [0,1] and use a censored normal regression model (i.e. the Tobit model) (Cook et al., 2008). Some
270 authors (see Maddala, 1991; Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) observe that it is not appropriate to use a
271 censored model since the data are not censored as a natural result of choices, but are rather
272 proportions, which are not possible outside the [0,1] interval.

273 The modelling approach for handling proportion data, in which zeros and ones may appear, was
274 proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), who refer to it as a fractional logit model. It consists of
275 a Generalized Linear Method (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function. They
276 propose the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) which is fully robust, relatively
277 efficient and requires no special data adjustments for the extreme values of zero and one. Formally,
278 to obtain consistent parameter estimates with QMLE, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) assume a
279 logistic distribution:

$$280 \quad E(y_i|x_i) = \frac{\exp(x_i\beta)}{1 + \exp(x_i\beta)}$$

281 and propose the following Bernoulli log-likelihood function:

$$282 \quad l_i(\beta) = y_i \ln(G(x_i\beta)) + (1 - y_i) \ln(1 - G(x_i\beta))$$

283 where G is the logistic cumulative distribution function.

284 In this paper, we use a modified version of this approach that combines the spatial lag model and
285 the fractional logit model. In practice, we include not only the explanatory variables X in the
286 equation of the conditional expected value of y , but also the spatial lag WY . Estimates are obtained
287 using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation criteria in a Generalized Linear Method with a
288 binomial distribution and a logit link function. The procedure was written in STATA software
289 modifying Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to include a spatial lag component.

290
291 The explanatory variables were selected based on a preliminary analysis of expected determinants
292 and spillover mechanisms (see Bartolini et al., 2011), in the previous literature and in local policy
293 design. In particular, based on the discussion above, the determinants are organised into three
294 groups:

- 295 1. the level of priority of the area where the municipality is located;
- 296 2. the characteristics of the area, the farms or farmers in the municipality, affecting WTA;
- 297 3. residual spatial effects, related to the neighbourhood and hence potentially attached to
298 spillover effects.

299 The second category concerns variables related to the location of the municipalities (altitude,
300 density of inhabitants), farm structure (amount of household and external labour used on the farm,
301 farm specialisation income from the farming activity, farm specialisation) and farmer characteristics
302 (age).

303 Municipalities are neighbours (adjacent) if they share a common border and/or vertex (Queen 1
304 contiguity).

305 The details and descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables are available in
306 Appendix A of this paper, while further details regarding participation in the case study area and
307 policy priority design are provided in the following section.

308

309 **3. The case study: regional features, AES implementation and uptake distribution**

310 The Emilia-Romagna region is located in north-eastern Italy, and includes the southern part of the
311 Po plain. The region is environmentally heterogeneous. The southern portion is made up mostly of
312 the hilly and mountainous areas of the Apennines, whilst plains dominate the northern part. The
313 plains are characterised by intensive agriculture and arable crops, the hilly area by specialised
314 vineyards and orchards, and the mountainous area by extensive agriculture (mainly grasslands and
315 arable crops) and woods.

316 The plain area is highly urbanised while, on the contrary, the mountainous area is marginalised and
317 experiencing land abandonment in part due to the lack of services in the immediate area. The plain
318 area has very low biodiversity and faces various risks related to water quality (mainly pollution by
319 nitrates), while the mountainous area experiences problems related to water erosion and landslide
320 risks for cultivated soils.

321 Given the complexity of the regional context, AES were designed to address different agri-
322 environmental issues. Measure 214 (Agri-Environmental payments) is aimed at promoting the
323 sustainable management of the territory, with a specific focus on increasing water and soil quality
324 and biodiversity conservation. The measure is divided into 10 sub-measures, differentiated by
325 environmental objectives, priority mechanisms and target areas.

326 The entire region is eligible for inclusion in measure 214. Within such an area, however, priorities
327 are established that form a score used to rank applicants in decreasing order and then select those to
328 be funded starting with the highest score and moving down until the budget is exhausted.

329 The prioritisation process is based on three groups of criteria in decreasing order of importance: a)
330 territorial, b) sub-measures and c) farm structure characteristics. The territorial criteria (a) present a

331 relatively high level of complexity; the RDP refers to 15 different themes. The themes are grouped
332 into four separate typologies of protection as depicted in Table 1, in which the sub-measures
333 affected by the various preference criteria are also presented.

334

335 (table 1 about here)

336

337 The most important territories in the selection, according to the EU strategic approach, are Natura
338 2000 and Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ), treated together as “absolute” priority. These are
339 followed by lower levels of priority based on regional territorial planning and linked to nature
340 conservation (parks, ecological networks etc.), water protection areas (related to the risk of
341 pollution for water bodies), soil protection areas (related to the risk of erosion) and protected
342 landscape areas. In this design, each level of environmental sensitivity is translated into a different
343 ranking of territorial priority (e.g. Natura 2000 is ranked higher than parks). The scores given for
344 each kind of area are added in case of overlapping, which is common at the local level.

345 The second level of priority, related to the sub-measures (b), enables the regional administration to
346 link the selection to the RDP objectives by following crosscutting priorities designed across the
347 whole programme. For example, a high ranking in this case is provided for organic farming. Other
348 priorities are applied to a selection of measures, based on specific environmental objectives
349 addressed by given sub-measures. In some cases the sub-measure priority is linked to the territorial
350 criteria (the highest rankings for sub-measures related to water quality, i.e. integrated production,
351 are provided when the farm is located in a water protection area).

352 The third level of priority, linked to the structural characteristics of the farm and farmer (c), always
353 has a lower weight than the previous ones, as these characteristics are not directly linked to the
354 environmental objectives of the programme.

355 Scores allocated to each relevant characteristic (territorial, sub-measure and farm characteristics)
356 are widely differentiated across the region, making it impossible to recall them in detail here.
357 However, given that the main rationale of this priority system is to have a concentration of
358 applications in the most sensitive areas, the scores used for the three categories have been strongly
359 differentiated. The territorial category always has much higher scores and the effect of the other two
360 categories are mainly to differentiate farms with similar territorial priority scores. Similarly, the
361 sub-measure is always prevalent on farm characteristics, in order to select farms involving higher
362 environmental effort (e.g. organic farms).

363 In this paper we focus on territorial priorities. In order to feed priorities into the econometric model,
364 specific variables have been created to account for each of the preferential dimensions illustrated in
365 Table 1. The municipal level data were processed by calculating the overall preferential area (plots
366 included in at least one of the areas) for each group of protection type. The resulting preferential
367 area of the plots included in the RDP applications was compared to their total surface area. The
368 municipality is thereby classified as “preferential” (value 1 of the related binary variable) or “not
369 preferential” (value 0) for a certain group of protection type (water protection, nature protection
370 etc.), if the preferential area of the participating plots is above 50% of the total participating surface
371 for each group of priorities.

372

373 In this paper we use data from areas enrolled in the first call for measure 214 applications (RDP
374 2007-2013). This call, related only to year 2008, resulted in a total of 81,600 hectares being enrolled
375 across the entire region, mostly with 5-year contracts. The most important sub-measures were: 2-
376 organic farming (51% for over 42,000 ha), 1 - integrated farming (26% for 21,000) and 8-meadows
377 and grazing payments (17% for 13,800 ha). In this paper we focus on the aggregate of measure 214
378 and on these three most important individual sub-measures.

379 As mentioned, in this study the dependent variable for all models and measures is the participation
380 expressed as the ratio between the participating area for each sub-measure and the utilised
381 agricultural area of the municipality. The number of observations is hence equal to the number of
382 municipalities in Emilia-Romagna (341) at the time of the first call (2008).

383 The distribution in the region , in terms of the percentage of participating area per municipality, is
384 rather differentiated and is different between the aggregate and specific sub-measures (Figure 2).

385 Moreover, the concentration of participation is very different across municipalities and hints at the
386 fact that participation follows the zoning rules applied.

387

388 (Figure 2 about here)

389

390 In particular, sub-measure 1 (integrated production) is mainly located in the plain and is particularly
391 focused on areas characterised by a concentration of fruit production (eastern part of the region).
392 This is largely connected to a deliberate strategy of valorisation and targeting of the fruit sector. On
393 the contrary, organic production (sub-measure 2) is much more widespread in hill and mountain
394 areas, characterised by more extensive systems and requiring fewer chemicals for plant protection.
395 This is true with the exception of Ferrara Province, which is a completely flat area, and where the
396 main farming systems are cereal and alfalfa crops located in the municipalities with the highest
397 participation rate. Measure 8, which is related to meadow and grazing conservation, is mainly
398 distributed in the hill and mountain area, and in the Parma and Reggio Emilia Provinces, which are
399 characterised by a high concentration of dairy farming.

400

401 **4. Results**

402 *4.1 LISA cluster map and Moran scatter plots*

403 The LISA cluster map and Moran scatter plots, depicting the spatial associations of participation in
404 measure 214 and in the three selected individual sub-measures, are presented in Figures 3 to 6,
405 respectively. In all of the figures the participation is measured as the ratio between uptake and the
406 total utilised agricultural area in each municipality.

407 The figures show a different level of spatial agglomeration and occurrence of hotspots, which in
408 fact largely reflects the concentration already noted in the participation maps. The Moran Index
409 (Moran's I) is positive and varies slightly between sub measures, with values changing from 0.403
410 to 0.455, hence representing rather strong evidence of spatial correlation.

411 Measure 214, as a whole, indicates a large hot spot (i.e. high participation municipalities close to
412 high participation municipalities), represented by red cells in the centre-west mountain area of the
413 region, in contrast with a large cold spot (i.e. low participation municipalities close to low
414 participation municipalities) in the lowland area. The Moran's I is 0.447.

415

416 (Figure 3 about here)

417

418 Two sub-measures (1-integrated production and 2-organic farming) have a higher Moran's I index
419 compared to the measure 214 as a whole i.e. higher spatial correlation. In the LISA maps, sub-
420 measure 1 shows a major hot spot in the eastern part of the region (orchard and vineyard
421 specialisation), while cold spots are small (basically each derived from the combination of a couple
422 of municipalities) and located in the Apennine area.

423

424 (Figure 4 about here)

425

426 Sub-measure 2 - Organic farming (Figure 5) has one major hot spot and one major cold spot. In
427 particular, the main hotspot area is located in the western Apennines, while the main cold spot is
428 found in the centre-east part of the low plain area, though agglomeration also occurs in most of the
429 lowest part of the entire plain area.

430

431 (Figure 5 about here)

432

433 Sub-measure 8 – Meadows and grazing payments (Figure 6) is the least spatially correlated sub-
434 measure according to the Moran's I (0.449). In this case, a large cold spot covers the plain area
435 where the participation is very low or null (particularly in the east side), while small hot spot areas
436 can be identified in the Apennines and in the plain area close to Reggio Emilia (the main dairy
437 cattle area in the region).

438

439 (Figure 6 about here)

440

441 *4.2 Spatial econometric models*

442 Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the a-spatial fractional logit model and the spatial lag fractional
443 logit model, respectively. Estimates are obtained using the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation
444 criteria explained in the methodology section. The a-spatial fractional logit model allows for the
445 identification of benchmark results, ignoring the spatial dependency component and identifying the
446 determinants. In comparison, the spatial lag fractional logit model is capable of identifying changes
447 in the overall performance of the model and in the role of different explanatory variables due to the
448 introduction of a spatial lag component, which takes into account spatial spillovers.

449 For each table, the model is applied to data regarding participation in measure 214 as an
450 aggregation of all sub-measures and to the data involving individual sub-measures 1, 2 and 8. The
451 presentation of the data in this way allows for a smooth comparison of the results of the same set of
452 explanatory variables across the different sub-measures, hence highlighting the (different) role of
453 priority mechanisms in affecting different measures. The results are presented as marginal effects.

454 The a-spatial fractional logit model (Table 2) AICs show that each sub-measure model is better than
455 the ones that consider the aggregate of measure 214. No variable is significant for all sub-measures
456 and the aggregate. Only the percentage of farms with livestock (LIVESTOCK) and priority related
457 to nature conservation areas (PREFNAT) are significant for all measures individually, without
458 being significant for the aggregate. While several variables are significant for more than one
459 measure, they often change their sign, i.e. the direction of the marginal effect.

460

461 (Table 2 about here)

462

463

464 As for variables related to location in preferential areas, the absolute preference variable
465 (PREFASS) is positively and highly significantly related to the participation in the aggregate
466 measure for integrated production and grazing, but not for organic production. Being located in a
467 preferential area for water protection (PREFIDRO), landscape protection (PREFPAE) and soil
468 protection (PRESUOLO) is never significant on the aggregate or for the single sub-measures
469 considered. Being in a preferential area for nature conservation (PREFNAT) has a negative
470 marginal effect on sub-measure 1 (integrated production) and on sub-measure 2 (organic farming),
471 while it has a positive marginal effect on sub-measure 8 (grazing). Altogether the results
472 demonstrate the relevance of the priority mechanism implemented by the regional administration.
473 The weak effects of the priority mechanism for organic farming might be due to the higher
474 relevance of motivation and attitude variables in explaining participation compared with other
475 measures.

476 With regard to altitude, only location in hills and mountains (codes HILL and MOUNTAIN
477 respectively) has been retained, while location in plains (PLAIN) has been omitted due to
478 collinearity with HILL and MOUNTAIN. With respect to PLAIN, municipalities located in HILL
479 and MOUNTAIN have a positive and significant effect on participation in organic farming (sub-
480 measure 2), while MOUNTAIN has a negative effect on sub-measure 1 (integrated production).
481 This is generally consistent with integrated production being applied more often on relatively
482 intensive arable and perennial crops in the plain area.

483 Density of inhabitants (DENS_AB) is negative for measure 214 as a whole and for sub-measures 1
484 and 2, hence showing that participation tends to be higher in the more remote/rural areas. Most
485 likely, the effect on overall participation is largely due to the combined effect of sub-measures 1
486 and 2. The share of different crops has markedly different behaviour across sub-measures. In
487 particular, the share of arable farming (ARABLE) in the municipality negatively affects the
488 aggregate measure 214 as well as sub-measures 1 and 8, while fruit (FRUIT) positively affects sub-
489 measure 2, which is also negatively affected by grazing land (GRAZING). GRAZING, as expected,
490 has a positive marginal effect on measure 8. The share of forest (FOREST) is also positively

491 associated with the aggregate measure 214 and sub-measure 2. The livestock variable
492 (LIVESTOCK) also has complex behaviour, as it is positively associated with participation in sub-
493 measure 8 (grazing) and 2 (organic farming), while being negatively related to integrated
494 production (sub-measure 1). A large share of older farmers (AGE_MORE65) is positively related to
495 sub-measure 8. Part time farming (PARTIME) is negatively related to integrated production (sub-
496 measure 1), hinting at the fact that this measure best suits professional productive farms.

497 Table 3 illustrates the results of the spatial lag models. The ρ parameter (coefficient of spatial
498 dependence) has a positive value and is highly significant in all models, hence corroborating the
499 notion that relevant spatial concentration phenomena can indeed occur. However, its value is rather
500 low, as it is higher for the aggregate 214 and lower for sub-measure 1. Spatial dependency
501 coefficients show *inter alia* high spillover effects for the organic measure. AIC increases in all cases
502 (indicating worse fitness of the models), but the size of change is negligible. The same is the case
503 for BIC: a slight increase, yet almost negligible.

504

505 (Table 3 about here)

506

507 The results in terms of significant variables are largely consistent with an a-spatial fractional logit
508 model, but with several noteworthy differences. Notably, absolute preferences (PREFASS) keep the
509 same sign but take a lower value for measure 214 as a whole and for sub-measure 8, and become
510 non-significant for sub-measure 1 (integrated production). PRFENAT roughly maintains the sign
511 and size of the marginal effect for measures 1, 2 and 8. The results of the spatial model makes it
512 possible to present a more accurate estimation of the priority mechanism effects, disentangled from
513 other agglomeration effects that are derived from imitation among farmers, other processes or
514 differences in the quality of extension services. The outcome confirms that even when the model
515 removes those spatial components, the priorities mechanism remains as a significant variables to
516 explain participation and hence as a tool to target AEM.

517 Of the altitude variables, the main change occurs for MOUNTAIN, which becomes non-significant
518 for sub-measure 1. This could be expected as mountain areas are mostly contiguous and the effect
519 of this feature may hence be absorbed by the spatial component. The inhabitant density
520 (DENS_AB) does not show relevant changes. The fact of having only household labour
521 (ONLY_HHLAB) becomes significant with a positive sign for measure 214 as a whole only.

522 Arable crops (ARABLE) remain stable (with an increase in absolute values for sub-measure 8),
523 while FRUIT and GRAZING lose significance. FOREST remains significant for 214-All and sub-
524 measure 2, but also becomes significant with negative signs for sub-measure 1. LIVESTOCK
525 maintains its role for sub-measures 1 and 8, but loses significance for measure 2.

526 AGE_MORE65 becomes non-significant, while part-time maintains its role in sub-measure 1
527 (integrated production).

528 The effect of the shift to the spatial model in terms of reduction of significance of MOUNTAIN,
529 FRUIT and GRAZING variables may be attributed to the fact that these explanatory variables are
530 very prominent in groups of geographically contiguous municipalities. This concentration effect is
531 absorbed by the spatial variable when it is introduced.

532 Table 4 shows the change in marginal effects of preference variables between the values of 0 and 1
533 of the preference variables, assuming an average value for all other explanatory variables, computed
534 based on the spatial lag fractional logit model.

535

536 (Table 4 about here)

537

538 Moving from 0 to 1 causes a decrease in the marginal value of the effect of PREFASS on the
539 aggregate of measure 214, and of PREFNAT on sub-measures 1 and 2; on the contrary, both
540 PREFASS and PREFNAT show an increase in the marginal effect on sub-measure 8.

541

542 **6. Discussion and conclusions**

543 The main objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the spatial location of
544 participation in AES and, in particular, to understand the interplay between structural determinants,
545 priority criteria and spillover effects in guiding participation.

546 This work is affected by several weaknesses, the main one of which results from limitations in the
547 scale of analysis, the only feasible scale being the municipality level. This has implications for
548 consistency with potential spillover effects and also with respect to the priority criteria used by the
549 regional administration, which are mainly related to the farm level. This also affects the availability
550 of explanatory variables, which in most cases are limited to a small amount of information related
551 to secondary data about crops, age and population in a given municipality. As is the case with other
552 studies using aggregated data, this study was not able to take into account personal and attitudinal
553 variables that are considered important in explaining participation in AES. This, on the one hand,
554 leaves open the possibility that relevant spillover is not taken into account by the model, while, on
555 the other hand, the spatial variable could also incorporate spatial differentiation that is explained by
556 variables not accounted for in the model due to a lack of data.

557 Another relevant limitation concerns the time frame covered by the data on participation, as data
558 were available only for the initial part of the programme. As a result, participation is largely focused
559 on "first comers" and this may yield a somewhat biased picture of participation, particularly in light
560 of the fact that different calls may change the weighting of the priorities and have irregular budget
561 endowments. In addition, due to the limitation of the time frame considered, participation could not
562 be treated in the form of a time series, but was rather presented as a "one-off" participation.

563 In spite of the limitations, the spatial econometric exercise showed altogether a satisfactory ability
564 to explain participation in measure 214. In the estimated models, the regional priorities are
565 significant in affecting the results. This occurs in a differentiated way across sub-measures and the
566 effects are more evident for individual sub-measures than on the aggregate.

567 It is relevant to note that the priorities affected the participation level and localisation, even though
568 in the 2008 call, and in the subsequent calls (2011 and 2012, not studied in this paper), the resources
569 allocated were sufficient to fund all of the admissible applications. This contradicts the expectation
570 that an excessive budget would nullify the use of articulated priorities to select farms and may point
571 to the importance of expectations about the selection process with regard to farmers' decisions

572 whether or not to apply. However, this also means that the role of priority variables in the model is
573 likely lower than what it could have been in case for a higher number of applications compared to
574 the available budget.

575 The concentration of the commitments followed the territorial priorities, especially for the absolute
576 preference which is consistently relevant in most of the models. This is not the case for the other
577 preference variables (cfr. Table 1), with extreme cases for hydrological, landscape and soil
578 preferences, which are never significant, even though they should be relevant for all of the measures
579 considered, according to the intended design of such preferences. Moreover, the nature protection
580 variable is not always significant and, when it is, it has contradictory results (signs).

581 Hence, altogether, the weight of the priority variables for participation seems to be low compared to
582 the sophisticated zoning system underlying such priorities. In fact, only absolute priority and
583 priority related to natural areas seem to work. One likely explanation is that some elements of the
584 other priority variables are actually incorporated into these two priority indicators. Another
585 explanation is that the measures considered (in particular integrated production) are rather a-specific
586 and target several priorities at the same time. Accordingly, they end up being rather uniformly
587 distributed.

588 The other explanatory variables were sharply differentiated by sub-measures. Most of them are
589 consistent and confirm previous results. For example, higher participation in most remote areas
590 confirms previous literature findings on the positive effect of increasing distances from urban areas
591 on participation in AEM (Coisnon et al., 2014). Altogether, socio-economic variables appear to be
592 less often significant and less stable across models, compared to “harder” structural, location and
593 specialisation-related variables. This may suggest that the participation decision process is more
594 affected by such structural variables (or related profitability considerations) than by socio-economic
595 factors or softer preferences and attitudinal factors, though this judgement may be biased by data
596 limitations related to personal and attitudinal information, due to the scale of analysis and the
597 sources of information.

598 The additional spatial component was highly significant demonstrating the relevance of spatial
599 effects beyond the characteristics discussed above; this confirms previous findings, highlighting in
600 particular that this effect is stronger for organic farming (Schmidtner, 2012). However, the spatial
601 variant adds little to the overall explanatory ability of the model.

602 In spite of these qualifications, this exploratory paper demonstrates the potential relevance of
603 accounting for policy design variables and, in particular, for policy priorities, in the analysis of
604 participation in AES, and hints at several directions for further research in this field. The most
605 relevant ones include the extension of the range of policy variables in the model (including, for
606 example, payment levels) and the investigation of the connection between econometric models and
607 normative policy design models able to exploit information about policy design in *ex-ante* policy
608 evaluation exercises. In order to be effective, however, this needs to be backed by appropriate data
609 collection systems, in particular those designed to be usable at the farm level, making it possible to
610 cover both participants and non-participants and to connect information about participation in AES
611 and other structural farm and household information.

612

613 **Acknowledgments**

614 This research was carried out as part of a project entitled “SPARD; Spatial Analysis of Rural
615 Development Measures”, funded by the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme
616 (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no.244944. This work does not necessarily reflect the view
617 of the European Union and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area. The
618 authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimers apply.

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715 **Appendix A - Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables**

716 Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of independent variables (n=341)

Code	Description	Mean	Sd	min	max
PREFASS	1 for location in area with absolute preference 0 else	0.31	0.46	0	1
PREFIDRO	1 for location in preferred area for water protection 0 else	0.31	0.46	0	1
PREFNAT	1 for location in preferred area for nature protection 0 else	0.25	0.43	0	1
PREFPAE	1 for location in preferred area for landscape protection 0 else	0.18	0.38	0	1
PREFSUOLO	1 for location in preferred area for soil protection 0 else	0.36	0.48	0	1
PLAIN	1 for location in plain 0 else	0.50	0.50	0	1
HILL	1 for location in hill 0 else	0.22	0.41	0	1
MOUNTAINT	1 for location in mountain 0 else	0.28	0.45	0	1
DENS_AB	Density of in-habitants (n. per square Km)	219.3	318.2	3.9	2793.8
COND_DIR	Percentage of farms directly conducted by farmers	91.0	8.5	8.8	100
ONLY_HHLAB	Percentage of farms that used only household labour on-farm	82.0	12.1	47.7	100
ARABLE	Percentage of farms with arable crops	73.6	20.6	0	100
FRUIT	Percentage of farms with fruit crops	22.5	22.3	0	94.1
GRAZING	Percentage of farms with grazing	26.5	30.1	0	100
FOREST	Percentage of farm with forest	38.9	39.2	0	100
LIVESTOCK	Percentage of farm with livestock	14.5	11.7	0	67.1
YOUNG	Percentage of farms younger than 40 years old	8.8	3.4	0.8	21.2
AGE_MORE65	Percentage of farms older than 65 years old	38.2	8.0	18.0	63.4
PARTIME	Percentage of part-time farming	58.6	13.9	24.6	95.1

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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (percent of funded farms over the total number of farms in each municipality) (n=341)

	Mean	sd	min	max
All 214	8.4675	10.2610	0	100
Sub-measure 1 (integrated production)	1.0234	2.5388	0	23.2560
Sub-measure 2 (organic farming)	4.8410	7.0432	0	46.6256
Sub-measure 8 (Meadows and grazing payments)	2.3380	6.4744	0	100

722

723

724 *Table 1 – Regional Cartography used for the management of axis 2 in RDP 2007-2013*

Type of protection	Sub-measures involved	Description	Variable in the model
Absolute	All	Natura 2000 network Area vulnerable to nitrates	PREFASS
Water protection	1 – 2 – 3 – 8 – 9 – 10	Protected area for environmental characteristics of lakes, basins and streams.	PREFIDRO
		Protected area for superficial and subterranean water bodies. Area of protected water for human consumption. Protected area for subterranean water in foothills and plains. Protected area for subterranean water in hills and mountains. Hydrologic pertinence of drainage canals.	
Nature protection	1 – 2 – 8 – 9 – 10	Parks and reserves	PREFNAT
		Nature protection area Faunal areas (Fauna hunting farms – Faunal Protection Oasis– Faunal production centres) Ecological network.	
Landscape protection	8 – 9 – 10	Area of particular landscape-environmental interest	PREFPAE
Soil protection	3 - 8	Risk of erosion	PREFSUOLO

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Table 2: Marginal effects (dy/dx) on the participation rates considering a fractional logit at 0 for all priority (PREF) variables

Variable	All 214	214-sub-measure 1	214-sub-measure 2	214-sub-measure 8
PREFASS ¹	0.050499***	0.005319**	0.008572	0.008212***
PREFIDRO ¹	-0.007162	0.000657	-0.00578	0.000943
PREFNAT ¹	-0.007211	-0.001149*	-0.013222***	0.006435***
PREFPAE ¹	0.008466	-0.000215	0.008930	-0.000035
PREFSUOLO ¹	0.000799	0.000792	-0.004939	0.001883
PLAIN ²	-	-	-	-
HILL ¹	0.018806	0.000863	0.045055***	-0.001324
MOUNTAIN ¹	0.026961	-0.003223*	0.040369**	-0.000382
DENS_AB	-0.000038**	-7.53e-06**	-0.000019*	1.45e-06
COND_DIR	-0.000311	-0.000033	-0.000422	-0.000022
ONLY_HHLAB	0.000769	0.000073*	0.000327	0.000056
ARABLE	-0.000432**	-0.000068**	-0.000043	-0.000079***
FRUIT	0.000179	-0.000024	0.000207**	5.88e-06
GRAZING	-0.00009	0.000021	-0.000181*	0.000035*
FOREST	0.000509***	-0.000045*	0.000520***	0.000048
LIVESTOCK	0.000427	-0.000205***	0.000495**	0.000189***
YOUNG	0.001292	0.000073	-0.000212	0.000076
AGE_MORE65	0.000441	0.000016	-0.000024	0.000114*
PARTIME	-0.000325	-0.000109***	0.000062	0.000065
AIC	0.499864	0.1909676	0.367849	0.250077
BIC	-1860.505	-1871.98	-1865.047	-1871.18
Log pseudolikelihood	-66.226837	-13.559979	-43.718228	-23.638161

729 Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance.

730 ¹ dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

731 ² Omitted because of collinearity

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733

734 Table 3: Marginal effects (dy/dx) on the participation rates considering spatial lag fractional logit model at
 735 0 for all priority (PREF) variables

Variable	All 214	214-sub-measure 1	214-sub-measure 2	214-sub-measure 8
PREFASS ¹	0.041543***	0.003342	0.007154	0.006159**
PREFIDRO ¹	-0.005907	0.001345	-0.004603	0.001409
PREFNAT ¹	-0.003598	-0.001517**	-0.010758**	0.005426***
PREFPAE ¹	0.008704	-0.000514	0.008873	0.000125
PREFSUOLO ¹	0.000781	0.000265	-0.00470	0.001658
PLAIN ²	-	-	-	-
HILL ¹	0.013202	0.002079	0.035639**	-0.001151
MOUNTAIN ¹	0.015301	-0.003113	0.027314*	-0.000449
DENS_AB	-0.000035**	-7.23e-06***	-0.000021*	1.68e-06
COND_DIR	-0.000169	-0.000033	-0.000426	0.000050
ONLY_HHLAB	0.000669**	0.000040	0.000313	0.000041
ARABLE	-0.000489***	-0.000068***	-0.000083	-0.000101***
FRUIT	0.000141	-0.000034	0.000157	0.000011
GRAZING	-0.000085	0.000023	-0.000154	0.000019
FOREST	0.000413**	-0.000048*	0.000449***	0.000042
LIVESTOCK	0.000346	-0.000209***	0.000348	0.000193***
YOUNG	0.001488	0.000088	0.000124	0.000017
AGE_MORE65	0.000189	0.000038	-0.000096	0.000018
PARTIME	-0.000217	-0.000088*	0.000098	0.000069
SPATIAL LAG (rho)	0.030635***	0.009629**	0.022605**	0.011308***
AIC	0.503499	0.201893	0.372468	0.254488
BIC	-1855.434	-1860.591	-1859.64	-1865.844
Log pseudolikelihood	-65.846529	-13.422793	-43.505862	-23.390219

736 Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance.

737 ¹ dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

738 ² Omitted because of collinearity

739

740 *Table 4: Variation of marginal effects of priority variables on the participation rates in the spatial lag*
741 *fractional logit model (marginal value for values=0 minus marginal value for values=1; all other*
742 *explanatory variables have value equal to the average)*


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Priority variable	All 214	214-sub-measure 1	214-sub-measure 2	214-sub-measure 8
PREFASS	0.000777***	0.001076	0.002856	-0.013919**
PREFIDRO	0.005145	0.000032	-0.000583	-0.006277
PREFNAT	0.002849	0.002487**	0.001564**	-0.013434***
PREFPAE	-0.004027	0.000336	0.003774	-0.000707
PREFSUOLO	-0.000515	-0.000075	-0.000579	-0.007078

744


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746 Figure 1: Exemplary illustration of selection process (stars, square dots and circles refer to different
747 hypothetical populations with different distributions)



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

751 Figure 2: Spatial distribution for measure 214 and sub-measures



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754 Figure 3: LISA Cluster Map and Moran's I for measure 214 (all sub-measures)




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758 Figure 4: LISA Cluster Map and Moran's I for measure 214 (sub-measure 1)




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762 Figure 5: LISA Cluster Map and Moran's I for measure 214 (sub-measure 2)


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766 Figure 6: LISA Cluster Map and Moran's I for measure 214 (sub-measure 8)



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